Editorial Note

Following upon the meetings of August 21 and August 28, Assistant Secretary Hickerson met with Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Ambassador Chauvel and advisers in New York for a third time on September 6. At this meeting Jebb reported inter alia that the British Cabinet had considered the U.S. program for stopping aggression in its three component parts and had reached certain decisions given to him by phone that day:

  • “(A) UK cannot support proposal for convocation special emergency session GA on 24-hours notice and urges US not put forward. Believes that if necessary same result could be reached by simple amendment rules of procedure. Although UKDel has not yet been given reasoning behind decision, Jebb believes UK fearful that proposal would in practice result in enlarging GA powers by inviting and encouraging it to take action it might not otherwise take in situations where it might not be in interest western powers. …
  • “(B) UK agrees second part US proposal for establishment peace reconnaissance commission, although does not see any great benefits to be derived from it. …
  • “(C) UK hopes to be able support US proposal that members survey resources and designate UN units in armed forces for UN service. This will be considered again by UK cabinet September 11.”

Chauvel indicated that he had no instructions from Paris on the French position, but believed it more or less similar to that of the United Kingdom. Hickerson expressed regret at the British position and referred to a great interest in the United States Congress for some action to strengthen the United Nations. The Assistant Secretary reserved the right of the United States to proceed with its proposals without British or French support. (New York telegram 467, September 6, 9:51 p. m., 396.1—NE/9–650; text is scheduled for publication in volume III.)

The United States program was on the agenda for the tripartite ministers’ meetings on September 12–14 and September 18–19 as Item I–A, “The strengthening of United Nations procedures for dealing [Page 331] with aggression.” The only discussion that occurred, however, was at the official level on September 16, when the British and French indicated they would prefer the question not to go to the Ministers since discussions were continuing on the matter at the United Nations-delegate level and the problems were extremely technical. Apparently this view prevailed, although the United States official, Ambassador Jessup, pressed for consideration “at least briefly” because the proposals were “the central point” in the whole General Assembly program of the United States. Presumably the draft of the United States proposals that was under reference in this discussion was the revised draft resolution which appears in USUN telegram 507, September 12, infra.