Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

320/8–950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret

Washington, August 9, 1950—8 p. m.

732. Deptel 666, Aug 5.² In planning its program of action for forthcoming GA session, Dept is proceeding on assumption that aggression in Korea will be dominating political fact before GA and that subject of UN action against aggression will be uppermost in minds of delegates. Dept believes 5th GA will afford UN clear opportunity for gen assessment of position of Org in face of threat of Sov aggression at various points throughout world and is of opinion that 5th GA may offer unique opportunity, utilizing lessons and psychological impact of Korean crisis, to strengthen UN system in order to meet possible future cases of aggression. In Dept’s view, future development and perhaps even existence of UN may depend on outcome its action in Korean crisis and on progressive evolution its machinery for preservation peace and security.

Bearing in mind Sov ability to obstruct operations of SC in cases of aggression, Dept is considering introduction in 5th GA of draft res along fol lines as a major element in adapting UN machinery to new circumstances:

“The GA

Recognizing the obligations of Members of the UN with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, as set forth in the Charter;

“Conscious of the fact that failure of the SC to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of all the Member States does not relieve them of their obligations under the Charter;

““Resolves

1. That if the SC, because of the veto, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in case of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the GA shall consider the question immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Members for collective action, including the use of armed force, to restore international peace and security.

2. That for this purpose the GA shall, if not in session at the time, meet in special emergency session which shall be called by the SYG and convened within 24 hours of the receipt of a request from:

a. Any 7 Members of the SC;

b. Any Member of the UN, concurred in by a majority of the Members; or

c. The IC.

3. That notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in its rules of procedure, the GA when meeting in special emergency session shall proceed to consideration of the subject for which the session has been convened immediately upon election of the President;

And, further, invites each Member to survey its resources with a view to determining the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in accordance with any GA recommendation for the restoration of international peace and security.”

We are also considering possibility include additional para appointing ad hoc comite of limited membership to study and report as a matter of urgency to IC on measures and methods of collective action consistent with Charter (including use armed forces) which GA might recommend to members in a given situation. However, our thinking on this aspect is still tentative and has not yet crystallized, either re UN machinery for study or possible lines along which study might proceed.

Pls explore foregoing with FonOff, indicating US approaching only UK and Fr at this time, and report reactions soonest.³

Acheson

1. Repeated for action to Paris as 725 and for information to USUN as 126.
2. See footnote 1 on p. 551.
3. On August 10 a draft of this proposal was handed to Mr. Gerald Meade, a Counsellor of the British Embassy, by G. Hayden Raynor, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, who then “went over” the draft with Meade (memorandum of conversation by Raynor, August 10, 330/8–1050). On August 11, at New York, John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, handed drafts separately to Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Ambassador Jean Chauvel, indicating “that this draft should be considered largely in the nature of a working paper and as an effort to get down in tangible form some of our thinking on the question of strengthening the organization and procedures of the United Nations for dealing with aggression. … we … would appreciate any views they might care to communicate.” (memorandum of conversation by Ross, August 11, Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (hereafter cited as IO Files), Doc. US/A/2370)