IO Files: US/A/2448
United States Delegation Working Paper1
The Problem of Chinese Representation in the General Assembly
For the first time in its history the United Nations is confronted with the necessity of making a decision on the claims of two contenders for the seat of a single Member in United Nations organs. The [Page 297] situation in the General Assembly is therefore without precedent, and the possibilities for action are therefore not clearly defined. The position of the United States is based on the desirability of reaching a quick decision on the seating problem in order that the General Assembly may get on with its work; at the same time we will support a thorough study of the criteria for representation, which may be made under the agenda item submitted by Cuba, “Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State” and a later decision by the Assembly on the basis of a report resulting from that study.
The general line to be followed by the United States Delegation in its statement in the plenary is attached. (Annex A)
1. how the matter may arise
The issue will probably arise in one of the following ways:
(a) In accordance with its practice in other United Nations bodies, the USSR may propose, on a point of order at the very outset of the meeting, the exclusion of the representatives of the Chinese National Delegation and the seating of representatives of the Chinese Communist Regime;
(b) Before the Soviet point of order can be made, India or some other state which recognizes the Communist regime may propose that the Chinese Communists be seated. It is understood that Sir Benegal Rau, under instructions from his government, intends to submit the attached resolution (Annex B) which would provide for the seating of the Communists.
Comment:
Both the Rau resolution and the anticipated Vishinsky resolution are directed toward the same end—namely, a change in Chinese representation. From our point of view it would be advantageous to have a vote on the Vishinsky proposal since it would presumably receive less support than the Rau resolution.
2. how the question might be handled
The following methods for dealing with proposals on Chinese representation have been mentioned:
- (a)
- Immediate debate and action in the plenary session;
- (b)
- Referral to the General Committee for a recommendation as to whether the matter should be included in the agenda and whether it should be handled in the plenary session or referred to a Committee;
- (c)
- Referral to the Credentials Committee; and
- (d)
- Referral to a Main Assembly Committee (Political Committee or Legal Committee).
United States Position on These Methods
(a) The United States should support and, if necessary, initiate a motion to the effect that the Chinese issue should he defeated and acted upon immediately in the plenary session. The United States believes that in this way the Assembly will be able to proceed expeditiously to the election of its officers, its general debate, and its committee discussions. This is particularly important this year because of the urgency and critical nature of a number of items on the Assembly’s agenda and the unusually heavy volume of work with which the Assembly is confronted. At the same time, we are quite aware of the fact that the representation issue is a new problem in the United Nations to which thorough study and consideration should be given. We will therefore support not only an immediate initial decision but also a thorough study of the general problem of representation, and the development of criteria which can be used in such cases. These might be applied by the Members of the United Nations to the Chinese problem.
(b) Referral to the General Committee
The General Committee is the steering committee of the General Assembly and has the function of making recommendations with regard to the method of disposing of agenda items in order to guide and expedite the work of the General Assembly. Under rule 41 of the Assembly’s rules of procedure, however, the General Committee is enjoined from deciding any political questions. Thus this Committee is limited to the making of recommendations with regard to the conduct of Assembly business.
The United States should oppose a referral of the Chinese representation problem to the General Committee. The question here is not whether this subject should be included in the agenda, since a challenge of the right of any Delegation to sit in the Assembly is automatically Assembly business. Nor should there be any particular need for General Committee advice on the way in which this question should be handled. If it is referred to a Committee—any Committee—the ultimate decision must nevertheless be made by the Assembly itself. Since this is so, and since the issue is clear-cut, we would much prefer to avoid repetitious debate and delay in organizing the Assembly by settling the problem directly in the plenary without going through the stage of General Committee consideration, which might be followed by referral to still another Committee before we reached the end-point of Assembly discussion and decision.
(c) Referral to the Credentials Committee
The Credentials Committee, consisting of nine Members appointed by the General Assembly on nomination by the President, examines the credentials of representatives and reports to the Assembly. [Page 299] Hitherto the work of the Credentials Committee has always been purely formal. Acting under the guidance of the Secretariat, it has always reported to the General Assembly that the credentials of the Delegations were in order.
In our view no useful purpose would be served by referring the item to the Credentials Committee. There is nothing it could usefully contribute, and it might indeed report only that it is unable to act on a question of this character. In order to avoid prolongation of debate, we would therefore oppose reference of the matter to the Credentials Committee.
(d) Referral to a Main Assembly Committee
For the same general reasons—namely, a desire for a quick decision and the avoidance of duplication of debate—we would oppose an isolated reference of the Chinese representation problem to a Main Assembly Committee. We would not, however, object to an arrangement under which the resolution proposed by Sir Benegal Rau would be considered in a Main Committee in conjunction with the Cuban item.
3. other procedural questions
It is not possible to determine in advance all the procedural problems which may arise in connection with the representation issue. However, our position on those most likely to arise is as follows:
a. Majority Requirement
The United States believes that a question of representation is a matter relating to the organization of the Assembly and that a simple majority suffices for decisions on such issues. The Delegation should therefore oppose any proposal to the effect that decisions on the Chinese representation question should require a two-thirds majority.
Comment:
Normally, there would be no doubt that a question relating to credentials requires only a simple majority for settlement. However, it may be contended that the decision as to which government represents China is not a simple question of credentials, and that although not specifically listed in Article 18 of the Charter and rule 84 of the rules of procedure it is in fact an “important” question which should require a two-thirds majority for solution. (A decision on the size of the majority required would be taken by a simple majority vote.) The reason for the United States position is not that the matter is inconsequential, but that it is essentially organizational in nature and it would be undesirable to permit a minority group which might consist of one-third of the members of the Assembly plus one to obstruct the proper functioning of the Assembly. It would be unfortunate if, because of a failure to receive a two-thirds majority, neither claimant could be seated. In addition, the United States has always attempted to hold to a minimum the categories of questions which require a two-thirds [Page 300] majority for decision in the General Assembly. The maintenance of this policy is in the best interests of the United Nations and the development of the General Assembly as an effective instrument to carry out the purposes of the Charter.
b. Secret Ballot
The United States should oppose any proposal to the effect that motions relating to the Chinese representation issue should be voted upon by secret ballot. In taking this position the Delegation should point out that it is the clear intent of the rules that the secret ballot should be used only in election questions, that organizationally it would be undesirable to expand the use of the secret ballot, and that there is no reason why any state should not stand up and be counted on this matter.
c. Hearing of Chinese Communists
The Soviets may introduce a motion to give the Chinese Communists an opportunity to be heard on the question of which delegation should represent China. The United States should oppose hearing the Chinese Communists on the ground that the facts of the problem are already clear to all Members of the Assembly and that the issue presently before it requires no further factual evidence. To hear the Chinese Communists at this time would seriously delay the work of the Assembly and prevent it from getting on to its important business.