IO Flies: US/A/M (Chr)/136
Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, September 18, 1950, 11:00 a. m.
[Here follows list of persons present (39).]
1. Chinese Representation (SD/A/225/Rev. 1 and SD/A/234)
Mr. Bancroft explained that this subject had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers who had reached agreement on procedures to be followed, but not on substance. Our position was summarized in the papers before the Delegation. It was expected that the issue would be raised either by a Soviet or Indian motion. Our position was to vote for the continued seating of the Nationalists; we believed this issue should be discussed with a minimum of debate and quickly voted upon. We would indicate our belief that the matter should be decided only after deepest thought and consideration which was not possible at the outset of the session in view of the urgent business before the Assembly. We would, however, agree to further study in connection with the Cuban proposal on representation which would presumably provide a basis for deciding between rival claimants for United Nations representation. In the meantime, we could observe the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United Nations. Obviously, as the Secretary had observed during the Foreign Ministers meetings, we did not, desire to slam the door forever on the possibility that the Chinese Communists might be admitted to the United Nations, but at the same time we wished to make clear to them that their conduct was under close scrutiny.
Mr. Bancroft stated that Bevin had indicated the position of his Government would continue to favor seating the Communists both before and after the Cuban study, and the Secretary, on the other hand, had made it clear that no commitment was intended as to the way in which the United States would vote after the study was concluded.
[Page 292]Mr. Bevin had argued that our position was isolating China from the Western World, forcing it into the arms of the Soviet Union and driving a wedge between India and China. Mr. Schuman had taken the position that recognition and representation in the United Nations were two different problems, and while his Government had no thought of recognizing the Chinese Communists so long as they maintained their present position toward Indo-China, it would wish to face the fact that the Chinese Communists controlled all of China and the Nationalist representatives represented nobody. Nevertheless, France would vote against ousting the Nationalists and against seating the Communists.
Mr. Bancroft called attention to another aspect of our position namely, that we were prepared to accept Chinese Communist participation if requested in the Committee 1 debate on Korea and Formosa, and perhaps in the Committee considering the Cuban item. In no way would we suggest that this was a first step toward admission of the Communists, but there were sound political advantages in giving this group a chance to expound its position. Such a device would, among other things, forestall any attempt by India to become the advocate for Red China. However, Mr. Bancroft emphasized that this aspect of the problem would not come up in the immediate future and was not for discussion.
Mr. Hickerson explained that Sir B. N. Rau had visited the Secretary yesterday and talked to him at considerable length on Chinese representation. Rau had said that he saw a great deal of merit in having a commission set up to look into this question and make specific recommendations to the Assembly on the Chinese situation. Possibly the Cuban proposal could be pin-pointed to this particular problem by looking at such matters as actual control of the territory, opposition to the Government, foreign policy of the Government etc. Mr. Hickerson went on to say that fifteen minutes after he had left the Secretary, Rau was telephoning for another appointment since he had received new instructions. This time he had talked to Messrs. Ross and Hickerson and had explained that he was now instructed to give immediate notice of the introduction of a resolution at the beginning of the session which would provide for seating the Chinese Communists, and would attempt to be recognized for this purpose at the very start of the session. Mr. Hickerson read the text of the Rau proposal to the Delegation. Noting that this draft would involve consideration of the question on its merits, Mr. Hickerson reported that he had informed Rau that the United States preferred his previous idea of a Commission, and that we felt quite strongly that it was impossible to get impartial, objective consideration of the question on its merits at the [Page 293] present time because of Korea. Moreover, it was important to get on with the Assembly’s business,
Mr. Rau had inquired what position the United States would take on the Indian resolution, and Mr. Hickerson had replied that we would oppose it. Then Rau had asked whether we would use our influence against the resolution, and the answer had been that we would use all our influence to get the proposal voted down because we thought the procedure which we had in mind was a better way of dealing with the problem.
Mr. Ross observed that Rau did not wish it known that he was in any way the author of the commission idea or that there was any difference between himself and his government.
Senator Lodge inquired as to the significance of the phrase on Page 3 of the position paper, “the attitude the Chinese Communists would adopt in the Assembly.”1 It was explained that it meant if they were members; in any case here the assumption was simply that the Chinese Communists would be heard as witnesses, and would be permitted to take a limited part in the debate by making statements and answering questions. Senator Lodge asked whether this had been done previously; hearings for Albania and Bulgaria in connection with the Greek case and for Italy in the disposition of the former Italian colonies were mentioned as previous illustrations of this practice, and it was noted that in each case the Committee had set the terms for participation of such witnesses.
Senator Lodge asked whether such action would look as if the Chinese Communists were being accorded some kind of recognition. The reply was in the negative. Mr. Hickerson referred to the fact that a number of friendly delegations, such as the Canadians, felt it would be a great mistake not to hear the Communists. Moreover, if no hearing was granted, the Indian Delegation would feel called upon to be their spokesman, an obviously undesirable development. If the Communists did appear, there was a chance that they might make fools of themselves.
Mr. Cohen still believed, in view of our general objectives, that it would be more effective to hold the present Chinese seat vacant, rather than keep the Nationalists in the seat. That position would facilitate the watching of developments and would not give the impression that we were maintaining the Nationalists in the United Nations without due cause. Mrs. Roosevelt asked whether our real objective was not to keep the Nationalists in because of their representation on the Security Council.
[Page 294]Ambassador Austin referred to the language of the position paper in this regard, which indicated the importance of the Chinese Nationalist vote in the Council. He observed that we were operating on a thin margin in the Council, and that actually we could not have maintained our position without the Chinese vote. Mr. Dulles referred to the requirement of Article 28 which indicated that China must be represented on the Council, and thought, that if the seat were left vacant, it would throw a cloud over the legality of Security Council action.
Referring to possible Chinese Communist participation in Committee 1, Ambassador Gross wondered whether we might not also say we favored inviting other interested parties to be heard, as for instance the Japanese. Possibly the paper was incomplete on this point. Mr. Bancroft explained that while the position paper singled out the Chinese Communists, it was not meant to exclude the participation of others.
Mr. Tate asked what the word “perhaps” meant in connection with the possibility of hearing the Chinese Communists on the Cuban item. He saw no reason for their participation on this item. Mr. Bancroft indicated that was the basis for the use of the word “perhaps”.
Senator Lodge asked whether it would be inconsistent with the international status of the Japanese for them to be heard. Mr. Dulles agreed it might constitute a problem, since SCAP was the representative of the Japanese in matters of this sort; he also wondered whether representatives of Formosa might not be heard, although Senator Lodge doubted there were any which would not be under the control of Chiang Kai-Shek.
Speaking to the recommendation that the Assembly should act on the matter of Chinese representation by a simple majority vote, Mr. Cohen thought we should be a little careful of what the Secretary’s statement said, particularly since the paper referred to this subject as a serious and important question. He believed we might be subject to possible embarrassment on this point. He did not recall that our interpretation of Article 18 excluded its application to other questions.
Senator Sparkman asked what the basis for difference in position in the Assembly was, as contrasted with our position taken in the Security Council last week. Ambassador Austin explained that in the Council the real issue was whether the Chinese Communists should be allowed to represent China. The only formal request from the Peiping regime before the Council expressly asked that its representatives be seated in the Council. This intention of the Chinese Communists had been exposed in the Council, and they had failed to get in. Unfortunately, the public had not understood clearly the basis of the position taken by the United States. In addition, Ambassador Austin [Page 295] pointed out that the United States had been prepared to support a Commission on the alleged Manchurian bombings,2 which would have conducted actual hearings on the spot, and after it reported back, we had indicated we would be willing to reconsider the question whether the Chinese Communists should be heard in the Council. Senator Sparkman observed that the press had not made this situation very clear. Mr. Popper pointed out that the hearings recommended in the position paper did not relate to the representation question.
Mr. Bancroft turned to the question whether either regime should be seated. He believed that, as a matter of policy, it would be unwise at this stage to give the Communists any prize. Obviously a second prize would be to exclude representatives of both governments. He suggested also we should see whether any other delegations raise this possibility.
Ambassador Austin stated that the position paper was unanimously adopted as the policy of the Delegation.3
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]