310.2/8–150
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State
secret
[Washington,] August 1, 1950.
The attached copy of a message (Tab A) from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver
Franks of July 29 on the subject of Chinese representation in the UN was handed to me by Counselor Graves at
noon yesterday. It proposes a discussion between Sir Oliver and
yourself, having particular reference to Mr. Bevin’s message of July 14
(Tab B).1
Mr. Bevin noted that the USSR in returning to the UNSC might put forward
the question of Chinese representation for consideration on its merits.
He considered that it would be “a very serious development” if the
question were considered in the UNSC and resulted in the exclusion of
the Central People’s (Communist) Government’s representative, and said
that he would find great difficulty, if the question of Chinese
representation were considered by the UNSC on its merits, in going back
on what he declared publicly in the House of Commons on May 24 last.
I made a preliminary reply to Mr. Graves along the general lines of the
conclusion previously reached in discussion with you, supplied him with
a copy of the pertinent memorandum of that discussion (Tab C) and
informed Mr. Graves that the matter would promptly be brought to your
attention.
Recommendation:
It is recommended you read Mr. Bevin’s message to Sir Oliver in its
entirety, and the Department’s telegram of July 31 (Tab D).2 It is also recommended
that you telephone Sir Oliver to confirm that the Department’s position
is as already stated by me to Mr. Graves but that you would be glad to
undertake with him any additional discussion of the subject that he
might desire.
Tab A
Chinese Representation
The general question of Russia’s probable attitude when Mr. Malik
assumes the Presidency on 1st August has been dealt with in
telegrams addressed to United Kingdom Delegation. But there is one
aspect of 1
[Page 255]
this problem
which is so important that you may think it desirable to discuss it
with Mr. Acheson himself, the more so as it is intimately connected
with the interchanges ending with my message of July 14th (copy
handed to Mr. Perkins on July 15th).
2. In that message I said I hoped that we could find common ground on
three points. The first was that North Korean troops must go back to
the 38th parallel, the second that Russia must come back to the
Security Council and the third that the question of Chinese
representation in the United Nations should be considered in that
body and not in relation to any possible Soviet blackmail connected
with Korea.
3. What we now have to consider is what will happen if Russia this
time, instead of trying to bludgeon others into acceptance of her
view, behaves in a normal fashion and puts forward the question of
Chinese representation for consideration on its merits. This would
create a situation which has not so far been in our calculations.
The fact that Russia has returned to the Security Council and that
the return of the North Koreans to the 38th parallel is not likely
to happen for some considerable time will make it very difficult to
argue that the latter question must be settled before the question
of Chinese representation is considered.
4. As Mr. Acheson knows not only from my reply to him but from the
reply which was sent to Pandit Nehru, I have been and am still
opposed to linking the question of Chinese representation with that
of Korea. And I shall still be opposed if there is any attempt on
the part of Russia to make the question of Chinese representation an
indispensable prerequisite for the settlement of the Korean
question. What I am concerned with now is what is to be done if the
question of Chinese representation is raised in the Security Council
purely on its merits. It is true that this would mean a considerable
departure from the attitude hitherto adopted by the Russians, but
they have been known before to change their tactics when this suits
them.
5. I think it would be a very serious development if this question
was considered in the Security Council and resulted in the exclusion
of the Central People’s Government’s representative. For such a
result would mean that Russia was able to demonstrate clearly to
China that she was beyond the pale and could hope for nothing from
the West. India would feel bound to adhere to the attitude which she
has already taken on this question in the Security Council and we
should be faced with the very grave danger of a cleavage between
East and West which could only be to Russia’s advantage and might
bring very much nearer the possibility of an extension of the
present conflict to China with adverse consequences for us all, and
particularly for the United Kingdom, both in Hongkong and Malaya,
and in her relationship with the Asian members of the
Commonwealth.
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6. Mr. Acheson is familiar with my views on Chinese representation. I
am on record as saying in the House of Commons on 24th May that “We
think it is better for the new China to be inside the United
Nations” and that “We do not wish to ostracize anyone on political
grounds”. I should therefore find great difficulty, if the question
of Chinese representation is considered in the Security Council on
its merits, in going back on what has been declared publicly as the
policy of His Majesty’s Government.
7. It has been reported to me that the United States have recently
reaffirmed their attitude on this question and have said that they
would abide by the decision of the majority, and though they would
vote against the exclusion of the Nationalist representative, they
would not use their veto. I should like you to obtain precise and
official definition of the United States attitude on this point.
Tab C
Chinese Seating
- 1.
- US position remains that of opposing the seating of the
Chinese Communist regime, for reasons already furnished. We have
not recognized this regime, and only 16 of 59 UN Members have done so.
- 2.
- Even those members of the Security Council which have
recognized the Peiping regime should take into account the
outrageous support given by the Peiping regime to aggression in
Korea and its defiant and cynical disregard of the action of the
SC to halt the aggression in
Korea.
(Read Chou En-lai’s statement)3
- 3.
-
SC should not act on this matter
at this time.
