330/3–750
Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council
| Participants: | H. E. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations |
| Mr. Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to Mr. Lie | |
| Mr. A. H. Feller, General Counsel and Principal Director of Legal Department of the United Nations | |
| Mr. Wilder Foote, Director UN Press and Publications Bureau | |
| Ambassador Ernest Gross, United States Mission | |
| Mr. John C. Ross, United States Mission |
We had dinner with Lie on his invitation. Most of our discussion centered around the Secretary-General’s idea that there should be a “periodic” meeting of the Security Council under Article 28(2) of the Charter. We also discussed the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, but we did not discuss in this connection Lie’s memorandum on legal aspects of representation in the United Nations.
Chinese Representation
Lie expressed his strong fears about the damage being done to the United Nations by the continued absence of the Russians and the risk [Page 234] that unless the problem of Chinese representation were settled quickly the Russians would stay out of the United Nations altogether. Lie and his colleagues based their concern primarily on the fundamental “universal” character of the United Nations, assuming by implication that the United Nations was of no use without Russian participation. Second, Lie and his associates emphasized very strongly their feeling that since the Communists are in effective control of most of China it should be the Communist Government which should represent China in the United Nations. At one point in the conversation Lie observed that the United States had made a fundamental mistake in its China policy five years ago, implying that we had perpetuated this mistake since then. We did not permit ourselves to be drawn into any discussion of our China policy but I think we left clearly with Lie the impression that we did not agree with his observation. Lie, with references to our domestic political situation, said that he fully understood the reasons for our position concerning recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. He implied, however, that somehow or other we had made a mistake in handling the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. He implied that he did not feel our recognition policy necessitated our using pressure on other governments to prevent seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations. He hoped, in effect, that we would let nature take its course, nature being his own efforts to get enough votes in the Security Council to seat the Chinese Communists. He seemed confident that the French, as well as the Ecuadoran and perhaps the Cuban Governments would see the light as he saw it.
Referring to his all-day visit in Washington on March 6, Gross avoided discussion of our Chinese recognition policy but stated our position with regard to Chinese representation in the UN in the following terms: Observing that the present situation was hardly one that resulted from mistakes made by the United States but rather was the result of illegal action by the Russians in walking out of the Security Council and other UN bodies, Gross said he thought the fundamental question we must all consider was how much price we were willing to pay to avoid Russian blackmail. We were clearly now being blackmailed by the Russians. If we yielded to this blackmail and the Russians returned to the United Nations, what blackmail might they not attempt next? Would they perhaps, for example, at some future time refuse to sit in the Security Council, if it suited their purposes, with governments which recognized the Bao Dai Government of Indochina [Viet-Nam]?
So far as the United States position was concerned, Gross went on to say that there had been no change whatever in our policy as he had stated it in the Security Council when the question first arose. [Page 235] We do not recognize the [Communist] Chinese Government; we would therefore vote against unseating the Nationalist Representative and we would not vote in favor of seating a Communist representative. Our vote, in any event, would not be construed as a veto and unlike the Russians we would abide by the decision of the majority. So far as other governments were concerned we would not bring pressure on them nor had we brought pressure on them. We would, of course, express our views frankly and without reservation and there was no question, of course, but that our views carried weight with other governments. We felt, however, and we would tell any other interested government that the question of how they might vote on the matter of Chinese representation was entirely a matter for their own judgment.
Lie and his associates were obviously gratified by Gross’ statement of our position. To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, therefore, we very emphatically made clear to them that if our position might be described as one of neutrality it should not be misinterpreted by them as being anything other than strictly just that. They should not as a result of wishful thinking in their desire to get the Chinese representation question settled and the Russians back into the United Nations, misinterpret our position as representing a change in policy, as one that might be described as benevolent neutrality or as one either more or less sympathetic to Mr. Lie’s efforts to get the question settled. We made it clear by strong implication that we should very much regret any possibility of misinterpretation of our position, however well-meaning or unconscious such misinterpretation might be.
“Periodic” Meeting of the Security Council
Lie gave us copies of a memorandum apparently prepared by Mr. Feller in the first instance, dated March 7 and entitled “The Resumption of East–West Negotiations in the United Nations”. We endeavored to keep this part of our conversation on a basis of raising questions rather than commenting on Mr. Lie’s ideas and those of his associates, as set forth in the paper distributed to us and in the observations made by them during the course of the conversation. We did not have any detailed discussion of the paper as such. We emphasized generally in our questioning the importance of examining very carefully the principles on which all of these ideas were based and of trying to determine a course of action on the basis of what we feel is the right thing to do rather than expediency. We said, in effect, that our attitude toward Mr. Lie’s suggestion for a periodic meeting of the Council was one of sincere, even-handed open-mindedness.
We discussed rather briefly the question of atomic energy control.1 [Page 236] Gross, referring to his discussion with the Secretary on Monday, raised one of the fundamental problems, namely, what seemed to be the Russians’ mysticism concerning the ‘possibility of making up for the hundred years of lost time in industrial and economic development through the application of atomic energy. This concept involved large reactor piles of atomic fuel. Such large piles could very readily and quickly be diverted to the manufacture of atomic weapons. For this reason it was felt that international “ownership” was absolutely essential. If, on the other hand, consideration were given to a system of control based on inspection alone this would mean that large reactor piles could not be maintained and at the same time allow for reasonable security. If consideration were given to a plan involving the non-maintenance of large reactor piles, would the Russians then not accuse us of trying to retard their development by a century.
There was some discussion of the idea put forward that a periodic meeting might instruct the Secretary-General to call a conference of scientists on the subject of atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction, including biological warfare. Gross, assuming that a meeting of scientists could always find plenty to talk about, questioned whether a conference of scientists such as envisaged by Lie and his associates would serve any useful purpose unless the terms of reference for their discussions were clearly laid down in advance. In the situation confronting us such terms of reference could only be the political postulates on which international agreement might be based. The question of these political postulates was, of course, the essence of the present problem; thus did we not meet ourselves going around in a circle? Lie and his associates saw the point and they indicated that this particular idea, as well as other particular ideas, should not be taken too literally but rather only as illustrative of the kinds of things the periodic meeting might deal with. Their main idea was that there should be a resumption of discussions with the Russians; that this should take place within the United Nations, and that a periodic meeting of the Security Council seemed to them to be the best vehicle for this purpose. They were wholly open-minded on the question of what would be talked about at such a meeting. One reason why they had suggested a conference of scientists was to provide a vehicle for continued discussion after adjournment of the proposed periodic meeting. Another device for this same purpose, as set forth in the Secretariat paper, would be provision for subsequent periodic meetings of the Security Council, perhaps twice a year.
We emphasized in our questioning what we felt was perhaps undue attention in the thinking of Lie and his associates with regard to the essentiality of agreement at a periodic meeting of the Security Council [Page 237] on at least some of the outstanding items of difference with the Russians. While agreement was, of course, by definition a desirable objective, was there not great danger of misleading world public opinion into believing that the road to agreement was easy and quick?
We touched on the question of Chinese representation very incidentally in this context in view of the fact that Lie and his associates seemed to have the feeling that the Chinese representation question might be the first item on the agenda of such a special meeting. They seemed to have the idea that this question might be on the agenda of such a meeting largely as a formality, the essential agreement to settle the question having been reached before and outside the Council.
There seemed to be general agreement as a result of our brief discussion of this point that the question of Chinese representation and a special meeting should not be confused by being tied up together. Lie seemed to have very definitely in mind the month of May as the deadline for a special meeting with the Council.
Before our conversation concluded Gross asked Lie what he would think of the possibility of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union getting together periodically but most informally, perhaps with Lie also, for dinner. The idea would be not to have any purpose of discussing anything in particular with the Russians, at least at the outset, but simply to provide an opportunity for discussion. The press would probably bear about such meetings but would probably lose interest after the first two or three had been held. Lie and his associates responded very favorably to this idea.
Our discussion concluded on the note sounded by Lie that he, of course, understood that we were not in a position to give him any definitive comment on his idea of holding a special meeting of the Security Council and that we would want an opportunity to consult the State Department. He expressed the hope that the United States might take the leadership in developing his idea, particularly among some of the smaller delegations. It should be noted, however, that in the course of our conversation enough was said by Lie and his associates about his responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter to indicate that Lie himself would not consider it in any way improper for him to propose a special meeting of the Security Council in a formal way to the Council.2