Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum of National Security Council Consultants’ Meeting, Thursday, June 29, 1950, 2 p. m.

top secret

Washington, June 29, 1950.

Subject: Situation Resulting from Hostilities in Korea

Present:	Mr. Kennan
	Mr. Bishop
	Gen. Spalding
	Gen. Lindsay1
	Col. Shell
	Mr. Lanphier
	Mr. Stalheim
	Adm. Hillenkoetter
	Mr. Lay
	Mr. Gleason
	Mr. Boggs

Mr. Kennan said that the Soviet reply to our note regarding Korea had been received.² This note declared (1) that South Korea, and not North Korea, was the aggressor, (2) that Soviet policy was one of non-interference in the affairs of other states, and hence the USSR could not prevent the North Koreans from defending themselves, and (3) that the USSR did not fail to attend the UN Security Council meeting, because there can be no valid meeting in the absence of Communist China. Mr. Kennan said this note was reassuring in indicating that the USSR was not directly involving itself, but it was not reassuring in that it showed a determination by the USSR to involve the U.S. with the Soviet satellites. The Chinese Communist reaction to our measures had been hostile and provocative, indicating a possible intention to attack Formosa. Mr. Kennan said we would need to watch the Chinese Communists very carefully.

Mr. Kennan referred to the possibility of a gradual build-up of naval strength supplied to the Chinese Communists by the USSR. He said this highlighted the importance of the islands near Formosa. His feeling was that we should communicate to Chiang Kai-shek³ substantially as follows: Chiang’s support or evacuation of these islands is a question to be arranged with our naval commander in the Far East. We should not take the responsibility of telling Chiang that he cannot defend these islands, nor do we want to assume the responsibility for defending them. Mr. Kennan also referred to the possibility that Chiang might be overthrown at any time, and said this raised the question of direct U.S. military liaison with subordinate Chinese commanders.

Mr. Lay asked whether the most likely next steps might be Chinese Communist involvement, either by an attack on Formosa and nearby islands, or by the introduction of forces into North Korea. Mr. Lay said that if Chinese Communists in uniform moved into North Korea, we would be in a better position to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel. Mr. Kennan agreed. He said that if we caught Chinese Communists in South Korea we could go north of the 38th parallel and even bomb in Manchuria. He said we would take the position that we would not recognize any Chinese Communist declaration of war against us, but if they interfered with our mission in Korea we would take any necessary action. In other words, we would ignore their words but not their deeds. Mr. Lay wondered whether we should say this to the Chinese Communists. Mr. Kennan thought this question should be considered further.

General Lindsay warned that if we bombed in Manchuria with conventional bombs we would lose some of our capability of using atomic weapons if they later became necessary. He said, however, that it would be desirable to destroy lines of communication and bases in North Korea. General Lindsay also indicated the current approach of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was that our operations should be limited to South Korea in principle, but that General MacArthur should be left free to operate north of the 38th parallel if he considered it necessary to the success of his mission.⁴

Mr. Lay said it was the consensus of this morning’s meeting that Yugoslavia was one of the chief danger spots. Mr. Kennan said he did not believe that the USSR would attack Yugoslavia unless the Soviets became very jittery. Mr. Lay asked whether our actions in Korea would create jitters in Moscow. Mr. Kennan thought the Russians were not yet jittery; on the contrary, they were cool and calm, and somewhat surprised by our reaction in Korea. He thought there was no logic indicating a Russian attack on Yugoslavia, except that if the Russians were planning World War III they might wish to liquidate Tito first. Admiral Hillenkoetter thought that if the Russians planned World War III they would attack Germany first and let Tito sit. Mr. Lay said the question was if the Russians planned to start war what would they do first? Mr. Kennan said that if Russia were ready for war they might put satellite forces on the Yugoslav border to keep Tito quiet. Mr. Gleason asked whether the USSR would not wait for a quiet period before going after Yugoslavia. Mr. Kennan said his preliminary view of our position on Yugoslavia was that whether satellite or Russian forces attacked Yugoslavia, we ought to keep out except for limited assistance to Tito. It was agreed that this was consistent with present NSC policy.

Mr. Kennan said if an attack was made on Yugoslavia it would be necessary for us to brief the press to indicate that our prestige was not involved, by such an attack. Admiral Hillenkoetter said he had no evidence that the USSR was prepared to support the North Koreans. There appeared to be little Soviet military activity anywhere in the Far East. Mr. Kennan indicated his belief that no new Communist move was impending in either Indo-China or Burma.

Admiral Hillenkoetter said there was no evidence of a Soviet buildup near Iran except for naval maneuvers in the Caspian Sea. Mr. Kennan believed Russia would not take military action in Iran unless they were ready for World War III, but if the Russians were ready for World War III they would not start it in Iran.

Mr. Lanphier said they would start it with an attack on the United States. General Lindsay said they would attack both Western Europe and the U.S., and also possibly Iran. Mr. Kennan said Russia realizes she cannot move militarily north of China or west of Afghanistan except in Finland, without raising the possibility of a world war. He thought the Soviets would not make a military move unless they were ready for such a war. He thought the Soviets might take military action around the periphery rather than directly against the U.S. if they were ready for a world war, because they believed that would be a better way to start it from the standpoint of propaganda. General Lindsay said the Soviets might take military action on the periphery in order to force us to make the initial attack. Mr. Kennan agreed, but thought that in this case the USSR would lose the element of surprise, and he did not believe they would be willing to give up the possibility of a surprise attack. Mr. Kennan said there was little likelihood of a collapse of the government of Iran in the face of Soviet pressure.

Mr. Kennan then turned to the broader question of over-all Soviet tactics. He said he believed the Russians now intended to exploit the Asiatic satellites against us until Eastern Germany was built up as a satellite able to fight the Western European countries.

In response to a question, Mr. Kennan said Finland was right in the Soviet orbit already. We would not want to intervene if the Russians took over in Finland, nor would we want to do anything to provoke Russian action in Finland or Sweden. He said we had never challenged Russia behind the lines drawn as a result of the settlements closing World War II, but that anything this side of that line engaged our interests. Finland, however, was behind that line.

Mr. Lay asked what steps should be taken now in advance of further Russian moves. Mr. Kennan thought that we might step up military assistance to Western Europe. Mr. Lanphier again raised the possibility of a Russian attack on the U.S. Mr. Lay said he was worried because the Soviet reply referred to at the beginning of the meeting was just the kind of peaceful reply the Russians would make if they were planning an attack on us. Mr. Kennan said he did not wish to discount the possibility of a Soviet attack on the U.S., but he thought the Soviet intention of exploiting the Asiatic satellites against us was more probable because there was no risk involved for the USSR. Mr. Lay said that if the Korean situation went wrong for the Russians, they must realize how difficult it would be for them to reach their objectives without military action against us. Mr. Kennan asked what military action the Soviets would most likely take in case they were ready for World War III. General Lindsay said the Russians would deliver the greatest possible initial attack within their capabilities against critical industrial targets in the U.S. Simultaneously they would attack Western Europe and particularly bases in the U.K. Mr. Kennan agreed that the Soviets would not start a world war unless they felt it within their capability to cancel out North American industrial potential. To him this indicated that a global war now was rather remote, since he did not believe the USSR had the capabilities to attack North America successfully. He thought if the Russians got into a world war now they would have stumbled in, and in the long run this might be the best situation for us.

It was agreed:

(1) That Admiral Hillenkoetter would prepare a draft on an estimate of the danger spots where the USSR or satellites might take military action.

(2) That Mr. Kennan would prepare a draft on what actions the United States would desire to take in the event of further Soviet military moves.

(3) That the group would meet again at 11:00 a. m. on Friday, June 30, 1950, in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC.⁵

1. Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. For text of U.S. note of June 27, see vol. vii, p. 202. The Soviet reply is quoted in telegram 1767 from Moscow, June 29, ibid, p. 229.
3. President of the Republic of China.
4. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive issued to General MacArthur on June 29, 1950, see vol. vii, p. 240.

5. No draft by Admiral Hillenkoetter on possible Soviet military action, no draft by Kennan on United States response, and no record of a June 30 meeting have been found in the files of the Department of State. However, on the 30th, Kennan transmitted a draft report titled “Possible Further Danger Points in Light of Korean Situation” to Ambassador Jessup and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews. Kennan’s covering memorandum read as follows:

   “There is attached a copy of a draft report on possible further danger points which I prepared this afternoon in the light of our discussions with the NSC Consultants, General Lindsay, Chief of the Strategic Planning Staff, and Admiral Hillenkoetter. I am sorry there was not time to clear this with you, but I have shown it to Bohlen and to the S/P Staff.

   “We will discuss the draft at the NSC tomorrow at 10:30 a. m. If you have any suggestions or comments, please let me have them before then.

   “Present plans call for sending copies of the report to all of the members of the Council including the President, tomorrow afternoon. Prior to that stage, there will be no final commitment of our Secretary or of the Department to the report, which will be the report of the special NSC group.”

   A marginal notation indicates that the Kennan draft, not printed, was rewritten in the National Security Council as NSC 73 (infra). (Policy Planning Staff Files)