Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum of National Security Council Consultants’ Meeting Thursday, June 29, 1950, 11:30 a. m.

top secret

Washington, June 29, 1950.

Subject: Situation Resulting from Hostilities in Korea¹

Present:	Mr. Jessup
	Mr. Kennan
	Mr. Matthews2
	Gen. Burns
	Gen. Spalding
	Mr. Lanphier
	Adm. Hillenkoetter3
	Mr. Bishop4
	Col. Shell
	Mr. Stalheim
	Mr. Childs
	Col. Johnson
	Capt. Pryce
	Col. Fulcher
	Mr. Lay
	Mr. Gleason
	Mr. Parley
	Mr. Boggs

Mr. Gleason noted that the President had directed a review of United States policy relating to the perimeter around the USSR. He believed this should be on an over-all rather than a country-by-country basis. The purpose of this meeting was to allocate responsibility for preparation of a paper and furnish general guidance to those who would prepare it.

Mr. Kennan understood that the President desired a simple, informal review of the situation which arose as a result of the attack on Korea, i.e., at what other points the USSR or its satellites might attack, and what the United States would do in the event of such attack. Mr. Kennan believed a paper in the spirit of the actions of the last three days was wanted. He thought the chief danger spots were Yugoslavia, Iran and Eastern Germany.

Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed with this general estimate, adding that Soviet maneuvers were again taking place in Eastern Germany.

Mr. Lay (joining the meeting) said that we might also consider what we could do now, in advance of other possible Soviet attack. For example, strengthening the Mediterranean fleet and lifting manpower ceilings had been mentioned. Mr. Kennan thought this raised another and separate set of questions.

Mr. Jessup said there were three main problems, which were related but separate.

(1) An estimate of the danger spots where the USSR or satellites might take military action.

(2) What actions the United States would desire to take in the event of further Soviet military moves.

(3) Whether the United States was in a position to take the actions regarded as necessary under (2).

Mr. Kennan thought Mr. Jessup had listed the problems in order of priority. Mr. Matthews believed it important to consider steps to be taken now without awaiting further attack.

Mr. Kennan summarized current informal thinking in the State Department. If Yugoslavia were attacked there were two possible United States positions: (1) we might regard the attack as vitally affecting United States interests and thus calling for United States military assistance, (2) we might decline to consider communist Yugoslavia as on our side to an extent requiring more than limited assistance. Mr. Kennan thought a Soviet attack on either Iran or Germany would mean the USSR was ready for World War III and we would be obliged to react accordingly. He thought from observation of the Korean situation that the USSR intended to avoid open involvement and did not intend to launch a general war. However, two developments which might conceivably modify Soviet calculations were the firm United States reaction to events in Korea and the great world support which our position had received.

Admiral Hillenkoetter thought an attack on Yugoslavia by Bulgaria was the most likely contingency because the USSR could avoid open involvement there. Mr. Kennan said that Yugoslavia might be attacked either by satellite forces only or by Russian forces in addition.

Mr. Lay, recalling Pearl Harbor, raised the question of a possible Soviet attack directly upon the United States.

Mr. Kennan thought that in addition to a review of danger spots we should set up two hypotheses: (1) The USSR has concluded that war is desirable; we must ask, where and how will the Soviets begin it? (2) the USSR has no intention of provoking war at this time; we must ask, what is the USSR likely to do? For example, the Soviets might seek to eliminate the Yugoslav salient even though not desirous of general war.

Mr. Jessup said that we should include in the problem consideration of joint planning with the UK and other countries respecting Iran, Yugoslavia, etc. He also raised the question of Austria. Mr. Kennan thought it important to consider Austria. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed, but noted that the USSR was moving forces out of Austria.

Mr. Kennan referred to the probability that the Korean matter was displeasing to the Chinese Communists and thought the reactions of that regime should be carefully watched. Admiral Hillenkoetter noted a report that the Chinese Communist Fourth Army was about to be moved into Korea.

It was agreed that a smaller drafting group would meet at 2 p. m. today in Mr. Lay’s office to prepare a report within twenty-four hours. The group would consist of: Mr. Kennan or Mr. Bohlen; General Spalding; Mr. Lanphier; Admiral Hillenkoetter or Mr. Hitchcock.

It was indicated that the paper referred to at yesterday’s Council meeting relating to orders for General MacArthur⁵ was now under JCS consideration and would be handled separately.

Mr. Kennan remarked that the State Department had some new thoughts on the 38th parallel. It might be that we would have to permit air operations, though no ground-force occupation, north of that line in order to dislodge the communist forces from South Korea.

1. On June 25, forces of North Korea invaded South Korea; for documentation on the Korean War, see volume vii .
2. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
3. Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. Max W. Bishop, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup).
5. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan; designated Commanding General, United Nations Forces in Korea, by President Truman on July 8.