Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68

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Subject: Initial Questions Confronting the Committee

In a letter of April 12 to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, the President referred the Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense, dated April 7, 1950, to the National Security Council for consideration, with a request that the NSC provide him with further information on the implications of its Conclusions.1 He requested that the NSC give a clear indication of the programs envisaged [Page 294] in the Report, including estimates of their probable cost. The President went on to say that pending the urgent completion of this study, action on existing programs should not be postponed or delayed. Furthermore, the President desired that no publicity be given to the Report or its contents without his approval.

At an NSC meeting on April 20, it was decided that an ad hoc committee be established immediately to prepare a response to the directive contained in the President’s letter of April 12.2 The NSC will take decisions at a subsequent meeting on the questions of reconstituting the NSC Staff and of coordinating the implementation of the programs proposed in response to NSC 68.

There appear to be three major questions requiring the immediate attention of the ad hoc committee; (1) timing; (2) the implications of the Conclusions of NSC 68; and (3) the formulation of the programs under NSC 68.

I. The Question of Timing

The principal issue involving the time factor is whether any of the programs envisaged under NSC 68 will require changes in the FY 1951 budget now before Congress. At first glance, the programs which might have to be considered in the light of this question include (1) any increases in military appropriations above those recommended by the Secretary of Defense on April 26; (2) any increases in the MDAP appropriations for FY 1951; (3) any increase in the appropriation for information programs; and (4) any emergency fund available for use by the President to meet critical situations which might arise, as, for instance, in Berlin, Yugoslavia, Southeast Asia, etc.

In considering this question of timing there would appear to be two alternative approaches: (1) To attempt to obtain increased appropriations at this present session of Congress, in which case decisions on those programs would presumably have to be made prior to June 15, 1950; or (2) to attempt to obtain supplemental appropriations at the next session of Congress in January 1951.

However, even in the event that the latter alternative recommends itself to the committee, the urgency of the situation described in NSC 68 indicates that the programs should be completed not later than August 1, 1950.

II. The Implications of the Conclusions of NSC 68

In order to facilitate the speediest possible formulation of the departmental and agency programs, it would seem desirable for the ad [Page 295] hoc committee, as an initial step, to secure the view of members representing other departments and agencies than State and Defense as to the implications of the Conclusions of NSC 68. If a meeting of minds on the broad implications can be reached without undue delay, the committee will be in a better position to provide guidance to those responsible for the formulation of the programs in the several departments and agencies.

III. Formulation of the Programs Under NSC 68

Thirdly, it would appear very desirable that the ad hoc committee agree on the general nature and broad scope of the programs to be formulated and upon the allocation of responsibility for the drafting of the programs by the several departments and agencies. A suggested list of tentative programs as indicated in NSC 68 and possible allocations follows:

1.
The substantial military build-up of the United States. (Defense, including JCS.)
2.
Substantially increased military assistance to the allies of the United States. (State, Defense, including JCS, and ECA through FMACC.)
3.
Increased economic assistance progams. (ECA, State, NSRB.)
Attention should be given to adjusting these programs to the capacities and needs of the peoples concerned. They involve continuing requests for economic aid after 1952, the implementation of Point IV, and such specific country and area problems as aid to Yugoslavia, the Near and Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
4.
The problem of United States balance of payments, to be handled along the lines already approved by the President. (Mr. Gordon Gray’s staff.)3
Such specific problems as tariffs, shipping, oil, foreign investment, and agricultural support programs will involve State, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, ECA, and possibly other agencies.
5.
Psychological warfare and programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution. (State, through the interdepartmental staff established under NSC 59/1.)4
6.
.…
7.
Internal security. (ICIS.)
8.
Mobilization plans, including civilian defense. (NSRB.)
9.
Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities. (CIA, in consultation with State and Defense.)

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In addition to the above specific programs, to which the committee may wish to add others, the following problems should be considered concurrently by the agencies suggested:

1.
The formulation of a long-term program for the development “of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.” Studies under this point should be of a continuing nature and should be undertaken by the State Department in consultation with Defense, Treasury, ECA, and other interested agencies. The subjects to be considered should include, among others, (a) the United Nations system, (b) the framework of European organization, (c) the Far East, including the Japanese Peace Treaty, (d) the Hear East, and (e) negotiations with the USSR.
2.
Non-partisan legislative support for NSC 68. Consultations with Congressional leaders would presumably be arranged by the White House and the departments concerned.
3.
Public support for the policies of NSC 68. Presentation to the public might perhaps best be planned by the White House staff.
4.
Increased taxes. This would be a matter for consideration by the White House, the Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers.
5.
Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs. This would likewise be a matter for consideration by the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the National Security Resources Board.

It remains to be noted that one definite action has already been taken in connection with the Report. The Secretary of State has asked the Atomic Energy Commission for a current evaluation of the U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy, to determine “whether any technological changes have occurred or are likely to occur in the United States or abroad which would change the technical assumptions which underlie this plan or which would invalidate it or necessitate changes in its control features.”5 Furthermore, consideration is being given by the White House to a State Department proposal that a group of competent individuals outside the Government be asked to assess the views on atomic armaments contained in Section VIII of the Report, particularly on the international control of atomic energy, this review to include also an evaluation of the points in the first seven sections which are basic to the subject of international control. The White House is also giving consideration to a suggestion that national organizations concerned be invited to send representatives to the State Department to present their views on atomic armaments.

James S. Lay, Jr.
  1. For both the report of April 7 and the President’s letter of April 12, see NSC 68, p. 234.
  2. Regarding the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee, see Executive Secretary Lay’s memorandum (p. 297) of its first meeting, May 2, which was directed to the participants.
  3. In March, President Truman asked Gordon Gray, upon his resignation as Secretary of the Army, to head a committee for the examination of United States foreign economic policies. For documentation on the work of the committee and related matters, see pp. 831 ff.
  4. NSC 59/1, a report by the National Security Council of March 9, 1950, concerning “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning,” is not printed.
  5. For correspondence on this subject between the Department of State and the United States Atomic Energy Commission, see pp. 1 ff.