Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/135

Minutes of the Briefing Session of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Department of State, September 8, 1950, 10 a. m.

September 8, 1950, 10 a.m.

[Extract]
secret

Representatives and Alternate Representatives

• Ambassador Austin
• Mrs. Roosevelt
• Senator Sparkman¹
• Senator Lodge²
• Mr. Dulles³
• Mr. Cohen⁴
• Mr. Cooper⁵
• Mrs. Sampson⁶
• Members of the Staff

[Here follows discussion of certain items to be considered by the General Assembly.]

3. Atomic Energy (SD/A/C.1/336)⁷

Mr. Arneson began with a review of the melancholy history of negotiations on atomic energy, going back to November 1945 when through the Truman–MacKenzie-King–Attlee Declaration the United Nations was asked to work out effective control plans for atomic energy. He referred also to the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Acheson–Lilienthal report. The principle that prohibition required effective control had been accepted by the vast majority of United Nations members, but the Soviet Union had continued to maintain that prohibition could be achieved by itself, and had proposed a system of control worth absolutely nothing. Mr. Arneson described the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in working toward a system of control. Comparing the Soviet and UN plans, Mr. Arneson noted that both provided for prohibition of atomic weapons, but, while the United Nations plan prohibited nations from owning fissionable materials and operating facilities, the Soviet plan provided simply for periodic inspection of declared facilities to see whether technical rules for exploitation were being observed, and if suspicion arose, the Security Council could call for special investigations, with the obvious objection that under the proposed set-up, it would be virtually impossible for suspicion to arise.

Mr. Arneson reviewed the recommendations in the position paper. The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this question in the Assembly; this position stemmed from the view that questions such as Chinese representation, Korea, and other pressing political problems would be the center of attention. Moreover, the United States record on effective international control was clear.

Ambassador Austin asked whether there should not be some recognition of the suspicion which prevails in the Assembly among all nations that we have not been sincere in our offers, and that we have imposed a control plan which is too difficult to be carried out. He wondered whether at least we should not discuss the matter to prove that we are in dead earnest on this subject and absolutely sincere, that we are continuing to search for better plans, that we are open-minded, that we realize the danger of this terrible force and hope for a solution. Mr. Arneson concurred in this position.

Mr. Dulles, while agreeing that there was merit in Ambassador Austin’s remarks, thought that there was nothing which the United States could do which would effectively dissemble the fact that our entire strategic position was based upon the use of atomic weapons. We had not developed ground forces but had limited ourselves to one thing—the creation of a strategic air force for carrying atomic bombs. Words could not dissemble these facts. We could not deprive ourselves of atomic weapons unless a complete settlement was reached. He was rather skeptical as to whether we should encourage discussion which, however eloquent our words, ran counter to our deeds.

Senator Lodge expressed his sympathy with these views, inasmuch as our basic strategy was based upon the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, we were ready to go ahead with a plan of control but, while our record was clear on this point, it was not clear at all in the mind of the average man, judging from the Stockholm Appeal, and our position, he felt, should be advertised to offset this effect. Mr. Hickerson believed the Korean crisis had done a great deal to expose this phoney appeal for peace. He did not feel that we would have the same difficulty with it as might have been the case without Korea, which had completely discredited the Stockholm Appeal. Moreover, we stood by our plan for control, and nobody would be happier than the United States if that plan could be accepted as a part of a general disarmament plan which would make a corresponding reduction in the forces of the Soviet Union.

It seemed to Mr. Cohen that for the first few years the United States had made an excellent record and gotten tremendous good will by making people genuinely believe that we were working hard to solve the problem of the atomic weapon; since that time we had lost something, although he hoped his analysis might be wrong. He was not defending the Soviet position, but he believed many people had derived the impression that we were not now as eager as we were then to find a solution to this problem. Recalling the Soviet discovery of the bomb, he remarked that people like Barnard⁸ were writing in favor of reconsideration of our position, and while we stated that we were ready to reconsider, he did not know whether we had really thought things through. We could lose a good deal by not thinking this problem through consistently on its merits, even as to how it affects our defense program; certainly we could not afford to play the Soviet game of talking one way and acting another. He did not think we had done all that we could to meet the problem. The situation was further complicated because some of those who had dealt with the problem had written in a way that indicated needs could not be reconciled with effective control. He did not doubt that the United States had superiority through its stockpile, but what concerned him was the damage a few bombs from the other side might do in view of our delicately organized system.

Mr. Arneson pointed out that despite our position not to foster debate, it would undoubtedly develop. It was our position to continue to support the United Nations control plan and at the same time to make clear that we did not contend that we had exhausted all human ingenuity on the subject, and would welcome any other proposals. He indicated that the Department had not “rested on its oars” in this matter and had tried to consider alternatives, following the great debate on the hydrogen bomb and the news of the Soviet discovery. The Atomic Energy Commission had been asked whether, in the light of these developments, the plan still worked; could it be improved upon; and did it cover the hydrogen bomb. The Commission answered that the plan still worked and did cover the new bomb; accordingly we were standing by the United Nations plan.

We had been unable to find any other proposals and would welcome any. We would listen sympathetically to any ideas proposed in this Assembly. He reviewed the background of the United Nations plan. The continued Soviet refusal to accept the plan, in his view, constituted a grave danger since it implied that the Soviets would not cooperate in this case or elsewhere. He emphasized that the plan reflected not only the views of the United States but suggestions by France and others, and had been accepted by nine of the eleven Security Council Members in 1948. Because of the Soviet position, it appeared that the Commission could not continue to work usefully, and the permanent members had been requested to constitute themselves a forum to see whether any basis for agreement existed or could be reached. There had been lengthy meetings during 1949 without agreement, but these consultations had broken down with the Soviet walk-out early in 1950. Mr. Arneson believed that this forum of the six sponsoring powers should be continued. It had flexible rules, met in secrecy, and as often as it wished; it could consider any proposals. Mr. Arneson recalled that a series of suggestions had been made during the last Assembly, but the permanent members had not been able to begin on them before the Soviet walk-out. He did not believe reopening negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission would be useful.

Mr. Arneson described the relationship between this problem and conventional armaments. It was recognized that the two must be brought “in phase” together. Neither could be worked out without a basic agreement on the control system.

Mr. Cohen was still concerned with the fact that, although things could not be changed over-night, we had not gone far enough to satisfy the American people and the world of our concrete thinking on these problems. He thought the situation required at least an explanation of why some changes are not involved due to the Russian discovery of the bomb. He thought the idea of stages now required further study. He had not seen any official or unofficial answer to some of the problems which Barnard raised, and he believed that the Delegation should have the answers to any questions and doubts, even though those with such questions might still vote with us. We had been put at a disadvantage, insofar as public understanding was concerned, when the Russians had desired to put the two problems of conventional armaments and atomic energy together, and we had not agreed. He wondered whether we could not do something to show that we had plans for balanced armaments in the world, once current problems were settled. He thought we lost some advantage by not having our ideas in this field worked out more concretely. Perhaps a panel might be set up in this country, as was the case before, even though this time the report probably could not be made public. He felt a more constructive effort was definitely needed. So far as other countries making suggestions was concerned, he believed they were in doubt and did not wish to make any proposal which might embarrass us.

4. Conventional Armaments (SD/A/C.1/337)⁹

Mr. Shooshan¹⁰ explained that the conventional armaments problem was something of a stepchild. Primary attention had been focused on atomic weapons. However, in the first Assembly the Soviet representative took occasion to attack the United States proposals on atomic energy and suggested immediate steps be taken to reduce armaments and to prohibit the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. As a result, the Commission on Conventional Armaments had been established; it had decided upon a plan of work: (1) definition of conventional armaments and field of competence; (2) general statement of principles governing armaments; (3) general system of safeguards; (4) development of actual plan for regulation and reduction of conventional armaments; (5) extension of plan to non-United Nations members; (6) actual drafting of a treaty. The Soviets had submitted a separate plan of work, but the Security Council had adopted the United States-sponsored plan, the Soviet representative abstaining. The Conventional Armaments Commission had then begun work on the first two items of its program. However, at the third Assembly the Soviet Union submitted a proposal calling for a reduction of armaments by one-third. Out of this resolution had developed a French-Belgian proposal for an arms census. The United States had supported this step. Proposals had been adopted but were vetoed by the Soviet representative in the Security Council. Last year the Commission had been instructed to continue its work, but shortly after it convened, the Soviets had walked out; nevertheless the Commission had carried on. The United States had taken the initiative and submitted four papers; a general paper laying out the field; description of the necessary organization; the field of military and para-military establishments which would have to be subject to control; other safeguards—census and verification of industries. While there had been some opposition to going ahead, it was expected that a report would go to the Assembly for its information. We would hear the views of other delegations, and while we would not push substantive debate, it could be anticipated.

Ambassador Austin suggested that the history of conventional armaments gave evidence of United States sincerity in the field. He was not quite clear as to the coordination suggested between the two fields of conventional armaments and atomic energy by the language “in phase”.

Mr. Dulles agreed that the United States should not encourage substantive debate on these subjects because, at the present stage of world affairs, it was not possible to have a debate in which the United States position could be made with great sincerity. Our control of the atomic weapons and the principal reliance of our government upon them for defense had to be taken into account in considering the problems. Acceptance of the plans we had proposed would involve complete collapse of the iron curtain. When one really stated all the conditions which would have to be met, if one was honest, he simply could not help giving the impression that the conditions were so many and so difficult that this was simply a propaganda move. While Mr. Dulles favored such propaganda when it could be gotten away with, he did not believe this field should be selected for our main propaganda effort.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama, member of the United States Delegation.
2. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, member of the United States Delegation.
3. John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State; member of the United States Delegation.
4. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, 1945–1947; alternate member of the United States Delegation.
5. John Sherman Cooper, Senator from Kentucky, 1946–1948; alternate member of the United States Delegation.
6. Mrs. Edith S. Sampson, alternate member of the United States Delegation.
7. Ante, p. 84.
8. Presumably Chester I. Barnard, President of the Rockefeller Foundation; Member of the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy, 1946.
9. Supra.
10. Harry M. Shooshan, Jr., of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.