Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/337

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

secret

[Washington,] September 2, 1950.

Regulation and Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces

the problem

What should be the position of the United States with regard to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments?

recommendations

1. The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this question in the General Assembly.

2. If debate develops, the United States should take the following position:

(a) Continue its support of the objective of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

(b) Support continuation of the planning activities of the Commission for Conventional Armaments proceeding on the basis of its approved plan of work and currently engaged in the consideration of Item 3 thereof.

(c) Insofar as there are attempts to link planning activities of international control of atomic energy with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, press the view that, although the system for international control of atomic energy is necessarily different from the system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, and their formulation and elaboration must be kept separate, the two must be coordinated in their implementation once agreement has been reached on the respective systems.

comment

While attempting to avoid a substantive debate on the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, the United States should not hesitate to defend its record and attack the Soviet record. The underlying cause for the lack of real progress in negotiations looking toward the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces stems from Soviet policies, methods, and aims. There are no indications that the U.S.S.R. will change such policies, methods, and aims in the foreseeable future, or that it will make any effort to negotiate constructively in the field of armaments regulation and reduction. Soviet objectives include the use of the armaments field as one facet of its subversive program. The most effective means for dealing with Soviet moves in the conventional armaments field is for the United Nations to continue support of the Commission for Conventional Armaments proceeding in accordance with its approved plan of work.

The Commission for Conventional Armaments is currently engaged in discussions on Item 3 of its plan of work despite the absence of the representative of the Soviet Union. Item 3 consists of “consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions”. The United States attaches great importance to the thorough consideration of Item 3. The United States has introduced into the Commission for Conventional Armaments four papers expressing the general views of this Government with respect to the scope and nature of the “safeguards” field. These papers constitute the core of substantive consideration of this problem since the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly, and in fact represent the substance of the Commission’s report to the Security Council for its activities since the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly. The four United States papers constitute general guidance on the substance of Item 3—“Safeguards”.¹

The general views of the United States contained in the four papers will undoubtedly serve as the basis for future discussion in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Any substantive proposals made during the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly should be referred to the Commission for Conventional Armaments for consideration within the framework of its established plan of work.

It is obvious that a system for regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should be put into effect in phase with the implementation of a system of international control of atomic energy aimed at prohibition of atomic weapons. As appropriate, in the debate the United States should re-emphasize the view set forth by the United States Delegation on November 19, 1949 (the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly) in the debate of the conventional armaments as follows:

“At no time has any one denied that the two fields [atomic weapons and conventional armaments]² are closely interrelated—that they are two aspects of the one problem of disarmament. The Atomic Energy Commission has been endeavoring to work out a suitable and effective system for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Commission for Conventional Armaments has been endeavoring to work out the preliminary steps for the development of an effective plan for the regulation and control of conventional armaments and armed forces. If and when the two Commissions succeed in developing suitable and acceptable plans in their respective fields, there will be a necessity for coordinating the two plans in an over-all system of collective security.”³

1. For information regarding the United States papers and the report of the Commission, see editorial note, p. 75.
2. Brackets appear in the source text.
3. See footnote 3, p. 86.