Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Minutes of the Meeting of the American Members of the
Combined Policy Committee,1
Washington, April 25, 1950, 2 p. m.
Washington, April 25, 1950, 2
p.m.
top secret
Present:
-
Members
- Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson
- Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson
- Acting Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Mr.
Pike
-
By Invitation
- Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser, State Department
- General Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Robert LeBaron, Deputy to Secretary of Defense on Atomic
Energy Matters
- General Burns, Special Adviser to Secretary of Defense on
Foreign Policy
- Gordon Dean, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
- Carroll L. Wilson, General Manager, Atomic Energy
Commission
- Joseph Volpe, Jr., General Counsel, Atomic Energy
Commission
- John A. Hall, Atomic Energy Commission
-
Secretary
Secretary Acheson suggested that the meeting might
first cover specific points on which decisions were needed immediately and
that the members might then discuss how best to proceed on some of the
longer term matters.
I. Raw Materials Problems
A. South African Negotiations.
- 1.
-
Policy guidance for conduct of negotiations for
purchase of uranium. It was agreed that
negotiations with South Africa should continue to be carried on under
the aegis of the CDA along the lines of
the Memorandum of Discussion setting forth the agreement reached in
Johannesburg in November 1949 between representatives of the CDA and the South African Atomic Energy
Board.2 In this connection, Mr.
LeBaron suggested the desirability of a general review of
supply and requirement figures in the near future. It was agreed that such a general review should be made and that
the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission would get
together subsequent to the meeting to formulate a course of action for
this review.
- 2.
-
Intergovernmental negotiations in the event South
Africa requests “a special position” by virtue of its potential
importance as a supplier of uranium. It was
agreed that the proposal set forth in para 4 of Tab A should be
adopted.
[Page 549]
B. Notation of Interim Allocation of
Uranium Ores.
The members took note of the interim allocation of
Congo uranium as set forth in Tab B.
C. Consideration of U.K. Request for
Brazilian Monazite.
It was agreed that the British request as set forth in
Tab C should be approved. Note was taken, however, of the following points:
- 1.
- That this particular request should not be considered as a
precedent for increased demands on Brazilian supplies but that
further requests as they might arise would have to be considered on
their merits.
- 2.
- That the rare earth industry would be told informally of this
proposed action.
- 3.
- That the views of our Ambassador in Brazil as to possible effect
of this action on current negotiations with the Brazilian Government
would be obtained prior to informing the British.
D. Report on Belgian Talks.
The members noted the attached report on the status of
negotiations with the Belgians. (See Tab D)
II. Current Status of Tripartite
Relationships Outside Raw Materials Field
A. British Proposal for Examination of
Comparability of Standards of Security.
It was agreed that the British proposal contained in
Tab E be accepted.
B. Use of the Chalk River NRX Reactor for
Irradiation.
Secretary Johnson expressed the view that the nub
of the question was whether the information that was made available to the
Canadians in connection with certain irradiation projects did or did not
constitute weapons information. Commissioner Pike
stated that in his view the information involved did not in fact constitute
weapons data. He reported that the matter had been discussed at length with
the Joint Committee and the point had been made to it that the information
in question might be considered borderline, but that in view of the immense
advantages to be gained from the proposed irradiations the Commission
considered that the project should go forward. On this basis the Joint
Committee had agreed. Recognizing that this question was a close one on
which honest differences of opinion were justified, it was agreed that Dr.
Karl Compton3 and some other person not
directly connected either with the AEC or
the Department of Defense should be asked to give their judgment as to
whether the
[Page 550]
information involved
did or did not constitute weapons information. Secretary Johnson indicated that the Department of Defense would
be quite willing to go along with the irradiation projects provided the
determination was made that the information incidentally given to the
Canadians did not constitute weapons information. Mr.
LeBaron inquired whether it was contemplated that many more cases
would arise in which it would be desirable to use the Canadian reactor. Mr. Pike replied that it would not be possible to
say at this time, that the number of cases would depend on as yet unforeseen
developments in the hydrogen bomb program. If it seemed clear that valuable
time could be saved in future by using the Canadian reactor, the Commission
would propose that such individual cases be considered on their merits at
the time they arose.
C. Areas of Exchange of
Information—Definition of Weapons Data.
It was agreed that it would not be possible to lay
down a hard and fast line on the definition of weapons data and that
individual cases would have to be considered on their merits as they
arose.
D. U.S. Government Reply to Norwegian
Request of Atomic Energy Assistance.
The members took note of the reply which had been
given the Norwegians by our Embassy and the Norwegian response thereto. (See
Tab F.)
III. Consideration of Future Tripartite
Relationships—Status of Talks Initiated by Presidential Approval of
Negotiating Objectives Dated March 2, 1949
It was agreed that the question of future tripartite
relations should be reviewed in the light of the various events that had
occurred since the talks were placed in suspense with a view toward
presenting to the President in due course recommendations as to the
resumption of negotiations.
It was further agreed that it would be useful for the members to get together
again briefly prior to the departure of the Secretary of State for
Europe.4
As a starting point for a current evaluation of the situation, the Secretary
of State suggested that a memorandum which had been prepared for him by
Messrs. Fisher and Arneson might be circulated to the other members.5
[Page 551]
[Annex A]
Memorandum Prepared for the American Members of the
Combined Policy Committee
South African Negotiations
1. The United Kingdom Government has informed the United States
Government* that in January the South
African Minister for External Affairs raised with the British Foreign
Minister the question whether South Africa would not, if it became an
important supplier of uranium, be entitled to a “special position” in
the field of atomic energy.
2. The United Kingdom Government considers this conversation as a
diplomatic approach. The South Africans have not so far made a
diplomatic approach to the United States Government, although they
indicated intention to do this in due course.
3. The United Kingdom Government states a disposition to reply to the
Union of South Africa along the following lines, providing the American
and the Canadian Governments agree:
That there is no objection in principle to including in a raw
material agreement with the Union provisions according some special
relationship to the latter as a producer of uranium. These
provisions might have the same effect as paragraph 9a of the Belgian Agreement, and might
eventually have to be extended to include other advantages which
might be granted the Belgians.
4. There is presented for the consideration of the American members of
the Combined Policy Committee, the following alternative proposals in
which the United Kingdom and Canadian members would be requested to
concur:
- A.
- That the arrangements with South Africa, if possible, be
confined to a straight commercial contract between the CDA and the South African Atomic
Energy Board, covering production and procurement of uranium,
along the lines of the memorandum developed by the negotiators
of the Agency and the Board in Johannesburg last fall.
- B.
- That in the event the South Africans insist on a “special
position”, a combined approach be arranged under the auspices of
the Combined Policy Committee which would:
- 1.
- Be independent of the contractual negotiations.
- 2.
- Inform the South Africans of the basis for United
States-United Kingdom-Canadian CPC and CDA
arrangements.
- 3.
- Consider what special position in the atomic energy
field might be granted South Africa on the basis of her
potential uranium production and in the light of her
scientific and technical capabilities.
April 18, 1950.
[Annex B]
Memorandum Prepared for the American Members of the
Combined Policy Committee
Notation of Interim Uranium Allocation Agreement
for 1950
The uranium allocation agreement approved by the Combined Policy
Committee on January 7, 19486
expired December 31, 1949. Since it became apparent late in 1949 that an
overall Tripartite agreement in the atomic energy field would not be
reached before the expiration date of the raw materials agreement
referred to above, the British were asked for assurances that the United
States would receive in 1950 a sufficient tonnage of uranium ore from
the Belgian Congo to meet the expanded requirements of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission.
In response, the British on December 22, 1949 proposed an interim raw
materials arrangement7 which the American side of the Combined Policy
Committee agreed to accept under certain conditions.
On being informed of these conditions,8 the British incorporated them into a draft interim
allocation agreement, which was submitted by the British Ambassador,
under the cover of a letter of March 20, 1950 to the Secretary of
State,9 for the
consideration of the American members of the Combined Policy
Committee.
Following receipt of the written approval of the Secretary of Defense and
the Atomic Energy Commission of the terms of the agreement as they
stood, the Secretary of State advised the British Ambassador by
letter,10 with a copy to the Canadian Ambassador, that the
agreement was acceptable to the American members of the Combined Policy
Committee, and that therefore the agreement should now be considered as
in effect. A copy of the agreement is attached for notation.
[Page 553]
[Subannex]
Interim Uranium Allocation Agreement for 1950
- 1.
- Sufficient raw material to meet the full expanded U.S. requirement
of 2,934 tons for 1950, after allowing for supplies from other
sources, shall be shipped and allocated to the United States of
America from Congo production.
- 2.
- If, as estimated, the total quantity available from U.S., Canadian
and Congo sources exceeds the figure of 2,934 tons by 131 tons, 130
tons of material shall be shipped from the Congo to the U.K. If the
excess production is less than 130 tons, the lesser figure will be
shipped to the United Kingdom.
- 3.
- It is understood that this interim allocation does not apply to
stocks presently unallocated.
- 4.
- This arrangement shall be subject to immediate review at the
request of any of the three Governments.
- 5.
- The U.S. members of the Combined Policy Committee wish to have it
recorded that in the event that the above-mentioned U.S.
requirements cannot be met from supplies from other sources, they
will be obliged to request an allocation to meet the deficiency from
presently unallocated stocks in the U.K.
[Annex C]
Memorandum by the British Members11
of the Combined Policy Committee to the United States
Members
Brazilian Monazite
The U.K. members of the Combined Development Agency request the
concurrence of the U.S. members, in conformity with para. 4 of the
Exchange of Notes between Lord Halifax and Mr. Acheson regarding the
Brazilian-U.S. Agreement,12 to
the importation into the United
[Page 554]
Kingdom from Brazil of 250 tons of monazite per annum for a period of
two years. The U.K. members understand that the importation would be by
Thorium Limited and that the monazite would be obtained from various
suppliers in Brazil through the good offices of Orquima.
2. This is the first request made for the importation into the U.K. of
Brazilian monazite. As the U.S. members of the C.D.A. are aware, the
U.K. has not been able to obtain supplies of monazite from India for the
past two or three years. During that time the U.K. has not, therefore,
been able to import any monazite. It is believed that during the same
period the U.S. has imported considerable tonnages from Brazil.
3. The matter is one of considerable urgency as legislation is being
promoted in Brazil to ban the export of monazite. It is therefore
desired to conclude the contracts before this legislation takes effect.
The U.K. members would therefore be grateful if the U.S. members could
give urgent consideration to this request. They suggest that in the
interest of speed it is not necessary to hold a formal meeting of the
C.D.A. to discuss the request but they would, of course, be ready to do
so if the American members wish it.
4. If the U.S. members are agreeable to the U.K. request, it is suggested
that the U.S. Ambassador in Rio should be requested to inform the
Brazilian Government that there is no objection on the U.S. side to the
export of 250 tons of monazite per annum over a two-year period to the
U.K., so that the necessary arrangements can be made by Thorium Limited
with the least possible delay.
[Annex D]
Memorandum Prepared for the American Members of the
Combined Policy Committee
[Washington,] April 18, 1950.
Status of the Belgian Talks
Talks which the Belgians initiated for the purpose of reviewing with the
United States and the United Kingdom certain aspects of the Congo
Uranium Agreement of 1944, with special reference to Section 9a thereof, commenced on January 30, 1950.
In the course of the discussions, it soon became apparent that the
Belgians desired assistance which neither the United States nor the
United Kingdom, because of security considerations, were prepared to
give, and, furthermore, which the United States under the Atomic
[Page 555]
Energy Act of 1946 could not
give. The Belgians, therefore, expressed considerable disappointment
over the Memorandum of Conversation which was presented to them on
February 9, 195013
outlining the type of unclassified assistance the United States and the
United Kingdom felt could be afforded Belgium under present
circumstances.
Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland voiced this disappointment in a
personal message to the Secretary of State14
requesting the latter’s intervention in arriving at an agreement more
favorable to the Belgian Government.
In reply, the Secretary explained the American position and proposed a
text for a Joint Communiqué summarizing the background of the talks and
the maximum assistance which the United States and the United Kingdom
were prepared to render at this time.15 After presenting the
message to Mr. Van Zeeland, Ambassador Murphy informed him orally (1)
that as soon as future developments or any change in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 occurred which might make possible further assistance along
the lines proposed by Belgium, the United States would give sympathetic
consideration to Belgian wishes, and (2) that we would be willing to
consider making a suitable financial contribution toward Belgium’s
efforts in the field of atomic research as soon as a more detailed
program had been worked out.
Mr. Van Zeeland was also informed that the United States and the United
Kingdom were aware of the fact that he must answer an interpellation on
March 7th in the Belgian Senate regarding Belgian Congo uranium, and
that the Communiqué had been drafted with this necessity in mind.
Mr. Van Zeeland subsequently accepted the Communiqué, subject to formal
approval of the Belgian Cabinet, and proposed publication time for March
7 at 10 a. m. Prior thereto, however, Mr. Van Zeeland requested that the
date of publication be postponed until further notice, since additional
time was required by the Belgian Cabinet for considering certain
suggestions it wished to make in connection with the Communiqué, even
though the latter was acceptable in principle. On March 7, therefore,
Mr. Van Zeeland answered the Belgian Senate interpellation by referring
to Mr. Spaak’s previous statement on this subject and promising a more
detailed reply when negotiations were finally concluded.
On March 10, the Belgian Ambassador in Washington conveyed to the
Department certain points which Mr. Van Zeeland wished the Secretary of
State to agree to as a condition of final Belgian acceptance
[Page 556]
of the Communiqué.16 The American negotiators
felt that these points, one of which called for a yearly contribution of
five million dollars toward the development of atomic energy in Belgium,
were in many respects unacceptable and, in any case, required most
careful consideration; especially when viewed against the background of
a Belgian Memorandum dated February 14,17 which, although superseded by the
substance of the points mentioned above, was left with the Department
for notation. The Memorandum was particularly unfortunate in its
tactless phrasing and the impression that it left that the Belgian
Government doubted the sincerity of American assurances concerning the
remoteness of the commercial use of atomic energy.
Since Assistant Secretary of State Perkins was then about to leave for
London, it was decided that no reply to the Belgians should be made
until he had had an opportunity of discussing with Ambassador Murphy the
points raised by the Belgian Foreign Minister.
At their meeting, Mr. Murphy told Mr. Perkins that he felt there was no
longer any urgency connected with the talks due to the domestic crisis
in Belgium created by the question of the King’s return.18 He felt, however, that he could be of
assistance in working out a reasonable attitude on the part of the
Belgians on the basis of the explanation of our views which Mr. Perkins
had given him.
The subsequent fall of the Eyskens Government and the inability on the
part of the Belgians to form a new government have resulted in a
temporary suspension of negotiations, although the Belgian Foreign
Office has indicated its continuing interest in an eventual resumption
of the talks.
It is thought that the Foreign Office has now been convinced of our good
faith in the position we have taken in the negotiations. It would seem,
however, that the Belgians are less convinced of the practical value of
the assistance we have offered them in contributing toward the
establishment of a reasonable and soundly based research and
developmental program in Belgium.
Mr. Perkins will again be in London soon in connection with the meeting
of Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Pact countries. It is anticipated
that Mr. Van Zeeland, or at least Baron de Gruben of the Belgian Foreign
Office, will also be in London for this occasion. Mr. Perkins plans,
therefore, to try to impress upon the Belgians the positive benefits we
think will accrue to them from the assistance we have
[Page 557]
offered. We will intimate that upon the
establishment of a stable government in Belgium, if that has not already
been accomplished, we would be happy to resume negotiations with a view
toward arriving at a final understanding on the basis of the Joint
Communiqué, which all parties have agreed to in principle.19
[Annex E]
Memorandum by the British Members
of the Combined Policy Committee to the Combined Policy Committee
United Kingdom Ministers have recently considered the desirability,
especially in view of the recent case of Dr. Fuchs, of examining the
comparability as between the United States, United Kingdom and Canada of
the standards of security in the field of atomic energy.
2. The United Kingdom members of the Combined Policy Committee have
therefore been instructed to propose to their United States: and
Canadian colleagues that a meeting should be held in the near future to
examine security arrangements in the field of atomic energy at present
existing in the three countries. As a point of departure for such a
meeting, para, (d) of Section I of the
Memorandum20 drawn
up during the tripartite talks last autumn by Sub-Committee
III—Information at its meeting of September 26, 1949, might be taken.
This paragraph reads as follows:—
“Full exchange of information will depend, as in the past, on
acceptance by each of the three countries of the security clearances
of the other two countries. An exchange of views on the methods and
criteria used in security clearances should be arranged, perhaps
most easily by exchange of visits of security officers. It is not
necessary for the procedures to be identical provided they achieve
the same standards.”
3. If it is agreed to hold such a meeting the United Kingdom members of
the Combined Policy Committee feel that representatives, of the security
services interested in the safeguarding of classified atomic energy
information of the three countries should be included In the respective
teams, together with persons who have a general responsibility for the
direction of the atomic energy programmers in the three countries.
4. The United Kingdom members would be glad to learn the views of their
United States and Canadian colleagues on this proposal.
Washington
, 17th
April, 1950.
[Page 558]
[Annex F]
Memorandum Prepared for the American Members of the
Combined Policy Committee
Subject: Reply to Norwegian Request
- 1.
- In January 1949 Dr. Randers, Head of the Norwegian Institute for
Atomic Energy Studies, made formal request in a letter to the Atomic
Energy Commission for assistance in the construction of the
projected Norwegian heavy water reactor.21 In addition to unclassified information, he
wished to secure from the United States purified uranium and
reflector graphite.
- 2.
- In a letter dated April 12, 1949,22 Dr. Randers was informed by the Atomic
Energy Commission as to the necessary arrangements for obtaining
declassified technical information released by the Commission. It
was indicated that answers to the other questions raised would
require careful consideration and that the United States views would
be transmitted by the Department of State in due course.
- 3.
- In March 1950 Dr. Randers approached the Embassy at Oslo,
requesting some early definite reaction from the United States with
regard to the original requests for uranium and graphite. He
recognized that recent events such as the Fuchs case and the
announcement of the H-Bomb diminished changes that assistance would
be available from the United States to smaller countries for
furthering their progress in atomic energy.
- 4.
- The Department of State is requesting the American Embassy at Oslo
to inform Randers orally and informally that in the present
circumstances, the United States Government is unable to provide
direct assistance to Norway or Norway and its affiliates in
furtherance of their atomic energy development. A telegram
containing instructions for the guidance of the Embassy has been
despatched23 after review by the
Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
- 5.
- The British have been informed of the position the United States
Government will transmit to the Norwegians. It will be recalled that
the United Kingdom, at the insistence of the United States
Government did not agree to refine uranium ores for the Norwegians
in connection with an approach by the latter in 1948.
