The attached paper concerning the conditions which might call for a U.S.
declaration of war has a direct bearing on the questions of mobilization and
execution of war plans. It seems to me that the subject is appropriate for
consideration in connection with them.
The paper embodies suggestions made by George Kennan and he concurs in the
conclusions and recommendations. The legal aspects of the paper were gone
over by Mr. Yingling, a senior officer of “L”, and it embodies some
suggestions made by him.
[Attachment]
Draft Memorandum by Mr. Carlton Savage, Member of the
Policy Planning Staff1
top secret
[Washington,] July 27, 1950.
Possible Generalization of Hostilities
With the possibility of the enlargement of hostilities in Korea and of
the inauguration of hostilities elsewhere, there has been raised the
question under what conditions a U.S. declaration of war would be called
for. It is appropriate, therefore, to reexamine the implications of such
an act.
In the two world wars of this century we have not “declared war”, but the
Congress by joint resolution has recognized that a state of war has been
thrust upon us. Typical of these resolutions is the following of
December 8, 1941:
“Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked
acts of war against the Government and the people of the United
States of America: Therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the state of war between the United States
and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon
the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is
hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and
military forces of the United States and the resources of the
government to carry on war against the Imperial Government
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of Japan; and, to bring
the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of
the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United
States.”
Two points should be noted in this resolution: (1) the initiative does
not come from the United States;
(2) “all of the resources” of the United States are pledged to the
successful termination of the conflict.
The state of war established by resolution is customarily terminated by
peace treaty. There has been no peace treaty between the United States
and Japan nor between the United States and Germany; a technical state
of war exists with those countries, although the President has
proclaimed the cessation of hostilities (see L memo attached.)2
The consequences of the declaration of a state of war are clear from the
terms of the resolution. With its approval by the President, we start
down a road from which there is no turning back. We pledge all our
resources, human and material, to winning the war. We will to fight
until one of the parties capitulates or there is a negotiated peace.
What would be the outcome if the United States entered into a state of
war against the Soviet Union? While it is assumed that the Soviet Union
could not now win a war against the United States, it is improbable that
the United States could now fight a war against the Soviet Union to the
point of the latter’s unconditional surrender. This is recognized in
NSC 20/4,3 which
states that we should endeavor in such a war to accomplish our
objectives “without a predetermined requirement for unconditional
surrender”. It should be a war of limited objectives, and one which
might be terminated without a peace treaty.
With this in mind, and realizing that since it is not Communist practice
to issue a declaration of war the initiative would have to come from us,
we should use the device of recognition of a state of war only as a
final resort. We should not thus generalize hostilities and restrict our
freedom of action unless the Soviet Union affronts us in such a manner
that no other course is possible, or unless we decide that a
generalization of hostilities is in our National interest.
We should leave ourselves free to take limited military action against
Soviet forces without a declaration, if this seems advisable. We have
considerable maneuverability for this purpose.
The President’s Proclamation of unlimited national emergency of May 27,
1941 is still in effect. In it the President (1) proclaims that
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the emergency requires U.S.
military, naval, air and civilian defenses be put on the basis of
readiness to repel acts or threats of aggression directed toward the
Western Hemisphere; (2) calls upon citizens engaged in production for
defense to give precedence to the needs of the nation; (3) calls for
cooperation to assure internal security; and (4) calls upon all “loyal
citizens to place the nation’s needs first in mind and in action to the
end that we may mobilize and have ready for instant defensive use all of
the physical powers, all of the moral strength and all of the material
resources of this nation.” There are also some hundred war-time statutes
still in effect.
The United Nations Charter does not require the member nations to enter
into a state of war in case of aggression, but merely to take such
military action as is necessary to “maintain or to restore international
peace and security,” as is now being done in the case of the conflict in
Korea. The Charter leaves each nation free to determine how it will
carry out its obligations under the Charter. Consequently, it is a
domestic matter whether we carry them out with or without a declaration
of war.
The Atlantic Treaty is in effect a defensive military alliance, but it
does not require the parties to enter into a state of war as did the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the United Nations Declaration of
1941. It merely provides that in case of an attack on one of the
parties, the others will assist that party with appropriate action
including the use of armed force. If Russia or a Russian satellite
attacks one of the nations party to the Atlantic Treaty, our coming to
its assistance would not necessarily call for a U.S. declaration of war.
However, if there was a resultant generalization of hostilities, a
declaration almost certainly would be required.
conclusions
- 1.
- Extensive hostilities can be carried on by the United States
without a formal declaration of a state of war.
- 2.
- Such a declaration should be made only when required by
overwhelming National interest.
- 3.
- The National interest might require that we carry on limited
hostilities against the military forces of the Soviet Union without
a declaration.
recommendation
The Secretary should discuss this matter with the President.
