Policy Planning Staff Files
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Pace), the Secretary of the Navy (Matthews), and the Secretary of the Air Force (Finletter) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)1
Under date of July 31, 1950, you requested the views and recommendations of The Joint Secretaries on NSC 73/1 as a matter of priority.2 The Joint Secretaries already had under preparation a memorandum covering a subject somewhat similar to NSC 73/1 which, with slight modifications, we submit herewith as responsive to your request as stated above.
1. The Joint Secretaries believe that the Korean incident has created a situation under which there must be an urgent and frank re-appraisal of the global position of the United States military potential. The geopolitical security of the United States requires diplomatic, psychological and military coordination of the highest order. There is no margin left. No additional commitments of United States support should be undertaken in the diplomatic field, nor should executive members of the United States Government make any statements or take any action from which may be implied a moral commitment on the part of the United States until such a re-appraisal is complete. Then, in light of such re-appraisal, re-examination of existing commitments and review of all possible moral commitments must be accomplished. Based on this re-examination and review, we must make clear through diplomatic and other channels the extent to which United States support may be expected. Having made such declarations, there should be no deviation therefrom until such time as world conditions moderate or the military potential of the United States is substantially increased.
2. In this connection it should be emphasized that the Korean incident has clearly revealed the new pattern of Soviet aggression and demonstrates that the Soviets have moved openly into the use of force through puppets in their attack on the non-Communist world. It is to [Page 354] be recognized that the Soviet movement is monolithic. Satellite troops are just as much Soviet in this sense as if they were members of the Red Army. The use of satellitic force, however, provides a convenient cloak for Soviet activities and leaves the initiative in the hands of Moscow to associate or disassociate themselves from such use of force as it serves their own ends at any given time. Following this pattern, satellite thrusts are possible particularly in the following areas:
| Formosa | Hong Kong–Macao |
| Yugoslavia | Greece |
| Berlin | Trieste (if Yugoslavia falls) |
| Burma | Philippines (if Formosa falls) |
| Indo-China | Austria (if treaty signed) |
| Thailand |
3. Should the Soviets use the device of satellitic force in any of the above quarters or elsewhere and thus attempt to destroy the leadership and dissipate the strength of the United States and the UN they might then feel confident that they could move, without interdiction or with relatively limited reaction, directly with Russian forces particularly in any of the following areas:
| Iran | Afghanistan |
| Saudi Arabia (if Iran falls) |
And they conceivably might be emboldened to take greater risks by attacking
| Berlin | Japan |
| Turkey | Pakistan |
4. Furthermore, North Korean successes or any additional moves as mentioned above increase the possibilities of internal Communistic coup d’etats particularly in the following areas:
| Burma | Trieste |
| Formosa | Malaya |
| Thailand | Philippines |
| Indo-China | Berlin |
| Indonesia | India |
| Afghanistan | Pakistan |
| Iran | Italy |
| Iraq | France |
| Saudi Arabia | Austria |
| Yugoslavia | Iceland |
5. The magnitude of the more obvious “soft spots” is indicative of the impossibility of the United States undertaking alone the protection of the free world from Soviet aggression be it direct, satellitic or internal. In fact, we emphasize strongly that the situation in Korea is unique. There is no other place in the world—except those where [Page 355] Allied troops are present—where we possess military strength in any way comparable to that which was available in Japan for use in Korea.
6. The question, therefore, arises as to what we as the United States Government can do. Our view is that we must not attempt to build up United States military power to defend all these areas where the Soviets in one guise or another might attack. We would badly dissipate our strength if we did so. What then remains to us? Here are some of the alternatives:
- a.
- There might be a declaration by the President that we will not permit any further expansion by the Soviets or their satellites in these so-called “soft” areas. This seems to us to be an unsatisfactory step. In the first place, it is easy to get around by the coup d’état method (viz. Czechoslovakia): in the second place, it commits the United States to take on the Russians or their satellites if our challenge is met.
- b.
- Another alternative might be to recommend to the United Nations—probably the Security Council—that it issue such a statement, warning the Soviets that a move in these areas would be regarded as an act of war and that the United Nations would call upon all member states to resist it with armed forces. This, too, seems to us to be unsatisfactory. It is dubious that we could count on all the other nations to go along with the United States at this point and if the Soviets use the satellitic or coup d’état method, there is doubt whether there would be general agreement among all the other nations that this was in fact Soviet aggression. For these reasons, the Joint Secretaries cannot convince themselves that this way of handling the situation would be satisfactory.
- c.
- We do believe, however, that there is one thing that could be done by the United Nations, and that is this: The United Nations on the motion of, say, the United States could take cognizance of the fact that the Korean venture demonstrates that the Soviets have developed a new pattern in the use of force through their satellites. The United States statement could then go on to recommend to the Security Council that possibly the best way of defending specific areas from aggression by the Soviets or their satellites would be to establish a United Nations force in each country that might appeal for such protection under Article 35 of the UN Charter, forces which would be very small in number, composed of troops from various United Nations countries, including America, and which would be the counterpart of the thin line of khaki which runs across the dividing line between Eastern and Western Germany and which to date has been such a formidable barrier to the Soviet aggression. If such a force were in existence it would serve notice in the most effective way upon the Soviets that any crossing of these particular borders would bring down upon the Soviets all the strength of the nations whose forces were overrun and, indeed, probably most of the strength of the free world. This proposal, however, raises certain other questions, particularly if the Soviets should return to active participation in the United Nations. There is a serious question that the United Nations with the Soviets participating would create a United Nations force in view of the probability of Soviet veto. Alternatively, in the event that Soviet veto power is not used, it probably would be impossible to create a force without Soviet [Page 356] and satellite troops being included. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful whether some of the nations which can be classified as “soft spots” would welcome the presence of such a United Nations force. Therefore, there should be available to countries appealing to the United Nations for assistance a provision that such a country could request assistance by submitting a list of nations whom they would consider friendly to their interests from which the United Nations might request token forces who would serve under the flag of the United Nations on the frontiers of that country.
- In the event a veto prevented the above mentioned steps, it may be taken as presumptive evidence of possible intent to attack and resort may be had to collective self defense provisions of Article 51 and token forces provided by individual nations as above.
7. We cannot leave this question without pointing out the danger which in our opinion exists that a Soviet attack on Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines or Japan might produce a situation where we alone were fighting the Soviets. No special United Nations action has committed the United Nations as such to the defense of these areas. There are, we understand, nothing but American troops in them with the exception of some minor Australian forces. We all know from personal experience how strong is the feeling for a third force in Europe, the urge toward a neutrality which would keep Europe out of any conflict between the two superpowers, Soviet Russia and the United States. Even in the United Kingdom this force has revealed itself on several occasions and we believe that, with the increase in Russian striking power and the demonstration of satellite strength in Korea, more and more will be the tendency of the Europeans to keep out of a conflict which they might feel would only result in their destruction as participants. For this reason we believe full recognition of the diplomatic difficulties of the problem is necessary. We think that steps should be taken to bring the new Far East line of Japan, Korea, Formosa, Okinawa and the Philippines under the United Nations legal umbrella. If and when we propose that the above areas be brought under the legal umbrella of the United Nations, we must recognize the possibility that the United Kingdom may wish to bring Hong Kong and Malaya under a similar umbrella, that France may request such action with respect to Indo-China and that Portugal may request protection for Macao. The United States Government therefore should predetermine its position with respect to such possible requests before taking action with respect to its own interests.
8. With the increased possibilities, due to recent developments, of coup d’états by Communistic forces in certain of the “soft spots”, the necessity for an all-out psychological warfare effort on the part of the United States Government and an association of our Allies becomes even more urgent. We will discuss this problem in somewhat [Page 357] more detail when we give you our reactions to NSC 74,3 but we should like to stress at this time the integrated nature of the problem and the urgent necessity for recognition of the fact that we have already been engaged in active psychological warfare with an enemy since 1946, if not before, and therefore, that any treatment of this problem as an “interim” or “intermediate” problem is not realistic.
9. The Joint Secretaries therefore recommend:
- a.
- That the Secretary of Defense inform the other members of the National Security Council that United States military power is greatly limited as to availability in the event of incidents in other so-called “soft spots” of the world; that based on National Security Council study 73/1, further study be undertaken involving particularly the Joint Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, (1) to re-appraise the global position of the United States military potential in view of present circumstances, (2) to re-examine existing commitments, actual and moral, that have been made by the United States Government in support of other nations, and (3) to prepare a policy paper delineating the limits of commitments that can be maintained and under what circumstances so that such information may, if desirable to the maintenance of United States prestige abroad, be communicated through diplomatic channels to the nations involved.
- b.
- That the Secretary of Defense request the National Security Council to develop a policy bringing the United Nations into the active defense of the so-called “soft spots” of the world: that this be done by a United States recommendation to the Security Council of the United Nations for the establishment of small United Nations forces for utilization at the frontiers of the “soft spots” which appeal for protection against possible direct or satellite invasion or coup d’état tactics of the Soviets.
- c.
- That it should be adopted as United States policy the placement of the defense of Japan, Formosa, Okinawa and the Philippines under the United Nations legal umbrella.
- d.
- That the Secretary of Defense recommend to the President, through the National Security Council, that he direct as a matter of urgency the Secretaries of State and Defense to collaborate in carrying out the foregoing policies.
10. We recognize that this is a most serious subject, that the above suggestions are far-reaching. We therefore hold ourselves open to discuss the matter with you any time at your convenience.
- Transmitted to Jessup and Nitze on a personal basis by Edward T. Dickinson, Assistant to the Joint Secretaries, on August 8.↩
- Secretary Johnson’s request has not been found in the files of the Department of State. NSC 73/1, July 29, is not printed. For NSC 73, July 1, see p. 331; for NSC 73/4, August 25, see p. 375.↩
- NSC 74, “A Plan for National Psychological Warfare,” July 10, 1950, a report submitted by the Department of State for NSC consideration, is not printed.↩
- File copy not signed.↩
- File copy not signed.↩
- File copy not signed.↩