155. National Security Council Report1

NSC 161

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF JUNE 30, 1953

[Omitted here are Parts 1–8 of the report.]

No. 9—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.)

I. Coordination

1.
Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential to producing adequate intelligence for national security purposes and to reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is still some duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, but steps are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.
2.
On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16,2 directing the DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and processing of foreign language publications. No other recommendations for coordination have been made to the NSC during the past six months; however, several improvements in intelligence coordination have been accomplished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligence Advisory Committee established by NSCID No. 1,3 nine interdepartmental committees to coordinate important intelligence programs in atomic energy, domestic exploitation, defection, watch procedures, economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, scientific intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign language publications.
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II. National Estimates

1.
The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates continue to operate satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence community is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.
2.
A production program for national intelligence estimates is prepared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatory changes are made. This program provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of U.S. budget estimates and NATO plans.
3.
Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed. This is being done with increasing frequency and directness of application to the policy issues.
4.
Special efforts are being made to get greater precision and clarity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable progress was made in NIE–65, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957”, (16 June 1953), over NIE–64, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1954”, (12 November 1952):4
a.
Greater analytical precision in the section on political warfare capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the world, and which distinguishes between the capability to overthrow governments and the capability to influence governments and peoples.
b.
Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, which occupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE–65.
c.
Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities sections, with fewer figures, more emphasis on military programs, and a more specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic weapons in the U.S.
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III. Political, Social and Cultural Intelligence

1.
The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has been very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate only for the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands have been met only partially and inadequately.
2.
The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from slight to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive coverage and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend. Coverage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite complex, and China, has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priority has been given to research on other areas, with Western Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating downward to Latin America and Africa. The inadequacy of resources has been reflected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained research programs at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficient flexibility to produce individual studies of considerable depth on selected major problems. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, has been satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration into political and social organizations has been less satisfactory.

IV. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the support of current military operations in Korea is generally adequate. There still remains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely identification of or information on the movements or locations of Chinese forces in all areas behind the immediate front line armies in Korea back through Manchuria into China. Information on installations and on developments in Manchuria, such as types and extent of training, reorganization and resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of the Yalu River is inadequate. This deficiency remains substantially unchanged. Reliable information on the enemy’s long-range plans and intentions is practically non-existent.

The extent of our information on Chinese Communist activities in South China is inadequate. The United States is dependent on French and Associated States sources for operational intelligence concerning the Viet Minh and to a lesser extent for information on the Chinese Communists in the border areas contiguous to Indochina. The present level of information would be inadequate for support of operations by U.S. forces; however, inherent in any commitment of U.S. forces would [Page 441]be the rapid development of combat and operational intelligence efforts. The Five-power Intelligence Conference exchanges have increased U.S. knowledge of the Viet Minh.

A possible early augmentation of U.S. intelligence personnel in Indochina should improve present U.S. coverage in that area. However, the picture for the major target area in Asia, i.e., Communist China, is very dark.

The achievement of any major improvement must depend on the increase in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations against military targets.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Communist China and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellites is partial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy restricts our access to such information.

3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on economic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and the Far East; increasing research emphasis continues on military targets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis and to support extended systems analysis to meet detailed service requirements.

Target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic threat continues to be handicapped by gaps in current information on Soviet weapons, stockpiling arrangements, delivery capabilities and specific air base potentials.

Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the satellite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage has been completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other areas is in various stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO requests have been filled with the best available intelligence consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and [Page 442]intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files are provided to the NATO Standing Group and NATO major commands. Releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mission of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.

V. Economic Intelligence

1.
Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material of variable quality and from the multiplicity of sources. For the Soviet Bloc, however, such intelligence is far from adequate. The Soviet government does publish some aggregate statistics of uncertain reliability which, however, can be profitably utilized by careful analysis. Apart from this source, the intelligence community is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low-grade data, much of which is becoming increasingly out of date. Only by taking advantage of every possible item of information in the course of a comprehensive, thoroughly planned and coordinated study can national security needs for knowledge of the Bloc’s economic capabilities and vulnerabilities by met. This may mean the subordination of short-term requirements to the long-range program and a resolute and imaginative attack on problems of centralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials, whether overt or classified. Individual industry studies now being produced will form the foundation for interindustry and other over-all analyses. Maximum utilization of available data will result from the application of improved statistical and other techniques.
2.
In the field of economic warfare and support for allied collective controls, intelligence coverage of movements of carriers engaged in trade with the Soviet Bloc is excellent; however, information on the cargoes of these carriers is inadequate. Machinery has been established to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into intelligence on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and the covert services. In this regard, increased attention is being given to current trade transactions. There has been established a coordinating committee which is assisting in bringing available intelligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising under this program.
3.
The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section IV, Armed Forces Intelligence, continue to involve the large-scale processing of foreign economic and technological data.
4.
The heavy research requirements in the economic field make it imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum. Closer integration of research programming among the various agencies concerned with economic research for intelligence is being developed through the Economic Intelligence Committee.
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VI. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1.
Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953. However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimates is still dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluation of available information; however, the flow of information of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly in the past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the fields of non-communication electromagnetic interception (“noise-listening”) and photographic reconnaissance.
2.
A review of the effects of DCID 3/45 (which allocated primary production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to provide more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the review has been postponed until August 1953.
3.
Through detailed studies of Soviet scientific personnel, scientific literature, and through improvements in long-range detection techniques, continued improvement has been achieved in knowledge of Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials which form the basis of the Soviet atomic weapons stockpile. A reasonably good basis has been established for estimates of plutonium production to date and for predicting Soviet capabilities for future expansion in the production of this material. However, the absence of sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions on installed or planned isotope separation capacity for the production of uranium–235 results at the present time in one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the Soviet atomic energy program. Of equal significance is the lack of evidence in the thermonuclear field. In the face of increasing difficulties in the collection of relevant information, studies in depth of personnel and research activities looking toward the selection of additional useful targets offers some hope of further improvement in our knowledge during the forthcoming year. To protect sources of intelligence in this field, and assure the availability of a maximum amount of significant technical intelligence data, the DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC, [Page 444]on 11 April 1953 issued a directive establishing controls for the dissemination of information on the detection of atomic weapons tests within the USSR.6
4.
Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional Soviet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned. However, intelligence on weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive and defensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information regarding Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor, although certain projects based on German developments are becoming better known. In general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and trends in military research and development remains too inadequate to be a sound basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.
5.
While the existence of a Soviet biological warfare program has not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indications supporting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of a Soviet chemical warfare program has been confirmed; however, very little additional information related to this program has been received in the past six months. The limited progress obtained in chemical warfare intelligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open literature in related fields. The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both fields offers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological surprise.
6.
Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific development programs is similarly poor. Information on the quantity of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reasonably adequate, but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view of the increasing importance of such basic scientific information to the prediction of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improve intelligence in this field is planned for the coming months.

VII. Psychological Intelligence

1.
Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framework of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organization of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in analysis.
2.
The Department of State has created a Psychological Intelligence Research Staff designed to increase coordination of governmental and private research in this field.
3.
The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development Board recommended methods by which research in these fields might be better balanced and integrated within the Department of Defense. Because of the pending reorganization of the research and development structure in the Department of Defense, the report has not been acted upon.
4.
A major deficiency in this field is the lack of information and of coordinated effort among intelligence agencies in determining resistance potential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our propaganda effectiveness with respect to target audiences behind the Iron Curtain. Encouraging progress has been made individually by intelligence agencies in the development of an intelligence basis for the support of psychological warfare activities. The results produced thus far do not meet operational requirements, in part because of the difficulty of defining those needs.

VIII. Geographic Intelligence

1.
Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, including evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing (a) regional studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of covert operations, and (c) staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordinated geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in support of the National Intelligence Survey program.
2.
Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet Bloc and adjacent areas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence research gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic facts that are required in support of planning and operational intelligence for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the exploitation and utilization of available Russian technical literature in filling critical gaps. Within CIA, particular attention has also been given to the study of current developments in Soviet mapping activities and programs.

IX. Basic Intelligence

1.
The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was intended to meet the U.S. Government’s demands for encyclopedic factual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was begun 1,729 individual sections have been produced on 66 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 26 complete NIS. Of this number, 1,224 have been published. For the first time during the history of the program, the rate of production by contributing [Page 446]agencies equivalent to 8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was attained in fiscal year 1953. Based on this performance, a similar production program has been established for fiscal year 1954.
2.
NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have precluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made it necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However, NIS production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of highest priority is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire program is about 28% complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for NIS has been excellent.
3.
In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are published under the Maintenance Program which was started in fiscal year 1952. However, the time lag between production and publication still remains a problem. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintained with the JCS.

X. Warning of Attack

1.
Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn from inadequate evidence. They must usually be based on estimates of the overall situation, adjusted to available current factual information.
2.
The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mechanism for assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled and evaluated. Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate information. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources against an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.
3.
In general there has been improvement during the past two and one half years in the ability of intelligence to provide prompt notice and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly areas.
4.
Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations. Under certain circumstances, some indications of defensive and offensive preparations on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected. Capability for detection of indications of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair in the border areas of Germany and Austria to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus and [Page 447]Far East. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is received.

XI. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service have been satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These deficiencies have been generally attributable to a lack of specialized personnel in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress concern:

a.
the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational programs in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the psychological and sociological fields, and,
b.
the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the national intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instructions.

As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for basic scientific information are being carried out.

2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in the Soviet Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable information, although under the restrictions imposed on them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be considered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthened since the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service Attachés by the development of new collection guides and techniques.

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive information. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germany and Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Commands from returned PW’s, escapees and refugees.

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Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on friendly and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China and Eastern Siberia.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of the overriding considerations of other than intelligence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capabilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; corrective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soviet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development effort is being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles (“guided missiles” and satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribution for security reasons.)7

6. Domestic Collection

As a service of common concern for the entire intelligence community, CIA collects foreign intelligence information from nongovernmental organizations and individuals in the U.S., through field offices and resident agencies in 28 cities. During the past six months, the rate of production of intelligence information reports has dropped slightly, due to: (a) increased emphasis on quality and selectivity in reporting, (b) distribution of information of limited interest to one or two consumers only, rather than wide dissemination in report form, and (c) servicing of special requirements for information in support of intelligence operations. To improve the collection of foreign technical information, arrangements have been made with the Air Technical Intelligence Center for the assignment of three air technical officers to three CIA field offices, in accordance with the provisions of NSCID No. 7.8 Methods of exploiting foreign nationality groups and aliens within the U.S. are being intensively studied in an effort to increase the flow of information on the Soviet Bloc.

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7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

CIA’s world-wide monitoring network provides rapid and voluminous coverage of foreign news, information and propaganda broadcasts as a service of common concern. Speed in field operations and in reporting of important information to Washington is such that the intelligence agencies may receive, by wire service, the translated text of the first part of a long Moscow broadcast while the Russian station is still transmitting the final portions of the broadcast. The Soviet Orbit is well covered, except for Central Asia and the Baltic States. During the past six months, the possibility of establishing a station in Pakistan to monitor Central Asian broadcasts has been explored but the plan is now tabled, with IAC concurrence, in favor of further developing Asian coverage from existing stations in Cyprus and Japan. Tentative discussions have been held with Japanese Government officials concerning eventual joint monitoring operations, and a survey made of the monitoring potential on the west coast of Honshu. Coverage of Baltic and northwestern USSR transmitters by the British Broadcasting Company still awaits BBC budgetary approval.

b. Propaganda Analysis

Requirements of estimating offices and psychological warfare activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the propaganda analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly reviews of the whole propaganda field and towards the production of more numerous specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence problems.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has increased appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data to economic and scientific intelligence and to the factory markings program. While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture of many important military end-items since January, plans are under consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis of captured explosives, propellants and other material available in the Far Eastern theater. Significant information on aircraft components was obtained from inspection of the MIG 15’s which landed in Denmark. Nonmilitary items recently acquired through covert channels include several Soviet electronics measuring machines and a teletype printer of the type currently used in the Soviet communications system. The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed the functions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the collection and exploitation of foreign materials.

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9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/19 the agencies undertook the construction and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being established. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, concentration of the jamming stations, and related information must await the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

10. Travel Folder Program

The IAC has instituted a program for guiding and facilitating the collection of intelligence information through U.S. and U.K. official travel within the Soviet Orbit. Travel briefs to orient travelers and training of potential travelers to observe industrial, military and scientific facilities should improve collection.

XII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligence material that was collected during and after the war, both in the United States and overseas. The sheer volume of these materials presents difficult problems of storage, analysis, and collation before they can be made readily available for research analysts and current intelligence purposes. The use of microfilm and machine techniques is providing assistance in dealing with these problems.

2. Reference Facilities

CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC agencies through its collection of basic intelligence documents received from all sources. In addition, separate files of specialized intelligence data and materials are maintained to supplement the basic collection of the IAC agencies. These include biographic data, industrial data, photographs and motion picture films.

3. Library Facilities

Library services in the IAC agencies should become increasingly effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary cooperation in publications procurement, indexing and reference service.

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Another measure, stemming from the scarcity of Soviet Orbit publications, is CIA sponsorship of publication by the Library of Congress of the Monthly List of Russian Accessions and the Cyrillic Subject Union Catalog. Both services are based on cooperative reporting of holdings by all major U.S. libraries specializing in Slavic publications.

4. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains a file of biographic data on foreign personalities in the categories for which they have been assigned basic responsibility, and makes such data available to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, military, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of coverage varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability of source material. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is not easily obtained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive coverage of the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature. There are extensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons, returning PW’s, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a knowledge of personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to include in dossiers that biographic information which is needed by intelligence researchers, such as political orientation, ability, susceptibility to psychological warfare, probable course of action, past career, religion, marital status, associates, membership in cliques, location, etc.

5. Industrial Information

Specialized data to meet departmental needs are maintained by the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign industrial information, including research establishments doing industrial research and development work. The material is maintained by individual establishment and is controlled by a tabulating card indexing system. References to industrial end-products are being indexed by tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of data being supplied to all IAC agencies.

6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic and related documentary libraries, including motion picture films, consistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Except for postwar coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photographic support is nearly adequate for present needs.

7. Map Procurement and Reference Service

Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on mapping abroad is coordinated by a staff within CIA serving an interagency map committee. Results during the past three years have proved the [Page 452]effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related information through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché program. Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché channels are also being used. The currently published foreign maps required for intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those of an operational character maintained by the Military Service. Excellent map reference services in support of intelligence requirements are maintained by close working arrangements between the map libraries.

8. Foreign Language Publications

Approval of NSCID 1610 has given new impetus to cooperative IAC activity in this field, and definite progress is being made toward implementation of the directive. An interagency advisory committee and its subcommittees are working on methods of improving the coordination of procurement and exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centralize its library, reference, and indexing services for foreign language books and periodicals, and to facilitate the use of such services by other agencies. Efforts are being made to coordinate operations, apportion the workload, and reduce duplication between the following activities: overseas abstracting by US missions to satisfy the local and departmental needs; exploitation by various agencies of technical and other publications to fulfill specific requirements; and exploitation by CIA of foreign language publications for information of interest to more than one intelligence agency. A central index of translations, maintained by CIA, prevents duplication between the translating activities carried on by each agency, and makes the translated product accessible to other intelligence consumers.

Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the intelligence effort is now being obtained, although further intensive collection action should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc and Communist Chinese publications.

9. External Research

Plans for developing further coordination of external and contractual research in the social sciences (i.e., non-governmental) of interest to intelligence suffered modification when the Department of State felt obliged to cut back severely its expenditure in the External [Page 453]Research Staff. Contributions from CIA and the Department of Defense will permit continuation of the existing program, but by no means full realization of the scale of operation which seemed to be in sight before the current budgetary allocations were determined. For the foreseeable future, therefore, there will continue to be imperfections in the efforts to minimize duplication in external research, to insure community benefit from such research and to facilitate the rational letting of external research contracts.

Positive recommendations for a better balanced and integrated program of research in the fields of psychological and unconventional warfare within the Department of Defense have been made by an advisory group to the RDB. Action on the report has been deferred pending reorganizations of the research and development program of the Defense Department.

The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile a report of all government sponsored economic external research on the Soviet Bloc classified through Secret. The report would include completed research, research in progress, and contemplated research.

Note: In lieu of a financial statement, not included in the above report, the Director of Central Intelligence will make an oral report to the National Security Council on CIA’s expenditures. The oral report will pertain only to CIA data and will not include expenditures on intelligence made by the other members of the intelligence community.

Attachment11

Paragraph 5, “Espionage”, of Part XI, “Collection”, in No. 9, The Foreign Intelligence Program

Since the submission of the last report, the difficulties incident to the collection of covert intelligence within the Soviet and Satellite orbit remain unchanged. Basic control procedures exercised by the various opposition security services make it more and more apparent that “black” penetration of denied areas is increasingly hazardous, and because of its illegal nature does not insure accessibility to strategic targets. In addition, the pressure of these control procedures is a continuing and serious threat to the limited assets painfully created by successful operations in the past. Although the situation is relatively less critical in Satellite areas, particularly East Germany, recent events may even endanger this coverage.

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In an effort to meet this situation, the covert mechanism has maintained a high degree of flexibility in order that all possible avenues of approach are carefully examined in relation to changing conditions. In this regard steps have been taken to exploit the recent tempering of controls on foreign travel to the Soviet orbit. The validity of this approach will depend largely on the extent to which the Soviet Union wishes to push its “peace offensive” by a relaxation of travel controls, and the availability of properly motivated individuals who will naturally blend into this framework. These contingencies do not permit an optimistic outlook but represent a possible alternative, and perhaps in time may serve to avoid an almost complete dependence on illegal entry.

Suffice it to say that progress in the delicate and highly specialized field of covert intelligence collection is hardly perceptible on a short-range reporting base and significant successes in the immediate future do not seem likely. At the same time meaningful and usable intelligence is being produced, support facilities developed and strengthened, and valuable experience, both in operations and career development of personnel, is being acquired.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 161 Memoranda, Box 74. Top Secret; Security Information. NSC 161 replaced NSC 142. For NSC 142, see Document 146. Although NSC 161 was dated and circulated on August 14, Part No. 9 was completed, concurred in, and dated August 4.
  2. Document 258.
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 432.
  4. Extracts of NIE 65 are printed ibid., 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Document 599. A declassified text of NIE 64 is in National Archives, RG 263, National Intelligence Estimates.
  5. Document 126.
  6. Not further identified.
  7. A handwritten note at the end of this sentence reads, “(see next page).” The inserted page was filed at the end of the report and is printed below as an attachment.
  8. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 427.
  9. Document 44.
  10. Document 258.
  11. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Security Information. See footnote 7 above.