146. National Security Council Report1

NSC 142

[Omitted here are a table of contents and Section I, “Objective,” consisting of a quote from the National Security Act of 1947 outlining the duties of the CIA.]


[Omitted here are Parts 1–6. Part 1, The Military Program, was prepared by the Department of Defense. Part 2, The Mobilization Program, was prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization. Part 3, The Mutual Security Program, was prepared by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security. Part 4, The Civil Defense Program, was prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Part 5, The Stockpiling Program, was prepared by the Department of Defense. Part 6, The Psychological Program was prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board.]

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No. 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

II. Coordination 2

Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential to producing adequate intelligence for national security purposes, is generally good. Although no recommendations on this subject have been made to the NSC during the year by the Director of Central Intelligence, several improvements in intelligence coordination have been accomplished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and others. Such activities are under constant review and improvements can also be expected during 1953.

III. National Estimates

The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates have now been proved in practice. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence community is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.
A production program for national intelligence estimates has been initiated. It provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Special effort is being made to schedule the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of budget estimates and NATO plans.
Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed.
“Post-mortems,” designed to reveal deficiencies in the preparation of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective action, have been continued. The experience of past months in this procedure, particularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, indicates that the results are beneficial.

IV. Political, Social, and Cultural Intelligence

The status of political, social and cultural intelligence is very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the [Page 412] Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, are adequate only for the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands can be met only partially and inadequately.
The principal deficiency in this field is in the effort devoted to the exhaustive research on which sound estimates and analysis on current development depend. Only the USSR can be regarded as adequately covered in this respect, the European Satellites and Western Europe nearly so. The agencies have applied special effort to developing intelligence on China. Surveys of present programs both within the Government and in private research are making possible an integrated and maximal use of resources. On medium priority areas, such as Iran, Indochina and India, there is considerable lag between production of immediate interpretation and analysis of longer term factors. On low priority areas, such as Africa and Latin America, such factors receive even less study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, is satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration into political and social organizations is inadequate.

V. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence needed in support of current military operations in Korea is generally excellent. Information on installations and on developments in Manchuria, such as the movement and activities of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of the Yalu River, is inadequate. Reliable information of the enemy’s long-range plans and intentions is practically non-existent. Little improvement in these deficiencies can be expected in the near future despite our efforts.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Communist China, and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellites is partial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Information on the navies of the Soviet Bloc is, however, in general, satisfactory and adequate because of the greater accessibility of naval forces to observation. Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy restricts our access to such information.

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3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on economic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and the Far East; increased research emphasis is being placed upon military targets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis. In particular, target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic threat is handicapped by gaps in current information on Soviet weapons, stockpiling arrangements and delivery capabilities. Production of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the Satellite and approach areas. Finally, extensive tactical target coverage has been completed on areas adjoining the Korean theater but on other areas is in various stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO requests have been filled with the best available intelligence consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files for the NATO echelons are provided to the NATO Standing Group. Releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mission of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.

VI. Economic Intelligence

Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material and multiplicity of sources. For the Soviet Bloc, however, such intelligence is far from adequate. Apart from aggregate statistics of uncertain reliability published by the Soviet government, the intelligence community is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low-grade data, much of which is becoming increasingly out-of-date. Only by taking advantage of every possible item of information in the course of a comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated study can national security needs for knowledge of the Bloc’s economic capabilities and vulnerabilities be met. This may mean the subordination of short-term requirements to the long-range program and a resolute and imaginative attack on problems of centralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials, whether overt or classified. Within the limits of available materials, the next twelve months are expected to see the production of individual industry studies of greater substance than any now available. These will form the foundation for inter-industry studies and other over-all analysis.
In the field of economic warfare and support for collective controls, machinery has been established to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into intelligence on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and the covert services. There has been established a coordinating committee which is assisting in bringing available intelligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising under this program.
The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section V, Armed Forces Intelligence, involve the large-scale processing of foreign economic and technological data.
The heavy research requirements in the economic field make it imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum. An even more determined effort to accomplish this objective will be made during the coming year.

VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites made important progress during 1952; however, current knowledge is still inadequate in terms of national security needs. In order to obtain sounder scientific estimates in many fields, it is now more apparent than ever that there is a need for serious interagency study and development of new and unconventional technical means of collecting scientific intelligence information. Efforts with this type of collection show considerable promise, and the development and expansion of these and other techniques is being explored.
With the concurrence of the IAC, the DCI on 14 August 1952 issued a directive delineating areas of dominant interests in the general field of scientific and technical intelligence,3 allocating primary production responsibility between CIA and the intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense. At the same time he established a Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), primarily concerned with integrating scientific and technical intelligence opinion for the production of national intelligence. Coordination of technical intelligence for purposes other than the production of national intelligence is the responsibility of the military intelligence agencies, with CIA and the SEC maintaining appropriate liaison.
There has been continued improvement in our knowledge of Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials and their conversion to atomic weapons. Intelligence estimates on the status of USSR plutonium production are now reasonably sound, and good bases have been established for estimating Soviet capabilities for [Page 415] future expansion of the production of this material. However, the absence of sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions on installed or planned isotope separation capacity for the production of U–235 is one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Atomic Energy Program. Also, the evidence on activities in the thermonuclear field is poor. Extensive collection and research programs have been undertaken which may result in improvement during the coming year.
Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional military weapons and equipment of all types is good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned. Necessarily, knowledge of weapons improvements in many cases must await Service use. In regard to development of air weapons, information is partial and inadequate. Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is poor, although certain projects based on German developments are fairly well known.
While our knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs continues to be poor, the agencies have undertaken collection and research programs which may result in improvement during 1953.
On basic scientific research, which is CIA’s responsibility, major gaps exist in the intelligence in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, and present estimates of long-range development are very weak. However, knowledge of the current status of over-all Soviet scientific research and development is believed to be more nearly adequate. During 1953, further improvements, particularly in long-range predictions, are expected to result from present plans for improving overt collection of pertinent information, a more complete and systematic exploitation of open scientific literature, and a concerted intelligence research effort on basic foreign scientific activities.

VIII. Psychological Intelligence

Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framework of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organization of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in analysis. State is initiating a reorganization designed to increase coordination of governmental and private research in this field. Inasmuch as research contracts of military operational agencies involve social science projects of use to intelligence, the coordination of these with intelligence agencies is important. The Research and Development Board has established a psychological warfare committee to integrate such contact within Defense. Liaison between State, Defense, and CIA should insure coordination for mutual benefit.

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IX. Geographic Intelligence

Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, including evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing regional reports and staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordinated geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in support of the National Intelligence Survey program.
Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet Bloc and adjacent areas is grossly inadequate. Geographic intelligence research gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic facts that are required in support of planning and operational intelligence for these areas. Within CIA, emphasis is also placed on the study of current developments in Soviet mapping activities and programs.

X. Basic Intelligence

The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was begun in 1949 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was intended to meet with U.S. Government’s demands for encyclopedic factual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was begun 1,490 individual sections have been produced on 59 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 23 complete NIS. Based upon the rate of production established during the last quarter of FY 1952, a production goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 complete NIS has been set for FY 1953, and production to December 31, 1952 indicates that this goal will probably be attained.
NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have precluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made it necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However, NIS production on the group of 24 areas of highest priority is approximately 48% complete, whereas the entire program is about 22% complete. NIS on ten individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for NIS has been excellent.
In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are published under the Maintenance Program which was started in FY 1952. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintained with the JCS.

XI. Warning of Attack—Current Intelligence

As noted above, current information on the Soviet Orbit is partial and inadequate. Accordingly, conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn from inadequate evidence. They are [Page 417] often based on estimates of the over-all situation rather than on detailed factual information.
The IAC Watch Committee provides a sound foundation for extracting intelligence from partial and inadequate information. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources against an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.
In general there has been improvement during the past two years in the ability of current intelligence to provide prompt notice and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly areas. This improvement is attributable to increased skill and knowledge of intelligence analysts and to a deepening sense of common purpose among the IAC agencies.
There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to give adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations. Under certain circumstances, some last-minute defensive and offensive preparations on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected. Opportunity for detection of indications of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair in the border areas of Germany and Korea to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus and Southeast Asia. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is received.

XII. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service are satisfactory. Intelligence needs are met most adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These deficiencies are generally attributable to a lack of specialized competence in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress concern:

the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational programs in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the psychological and sociological fields; and
the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the national intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instructions.

As a result of a recent study measures to meet the needs for basic scientific information are being carried out.

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2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in the Soviet-bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable information although, under the restrictions imposed on them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be considered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthened since the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service Attachés by the development of new collection guides and techniques.

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive information. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zones of Germany and Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Commands from returned PW’s, escapees, and refugees.

Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on friendly and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite Agreements among the respective service agencies for exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia have considerably enhanced collection capabilities in the area and are expected to improve this situation.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of overriding considerations of other than an intelligence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capabilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair, as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; corrective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soviet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development effort is being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles (“guided missiles” and satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribution for security reasons.)4

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6. Domestic Collection

Through offices located in key cities throughout the U.S., CIA performs a service of common concern in actively collecting foreign intelligence information from business, financial, educational, and other nongovernmental organizations and private individuals. The cooperation of these organizations and individuals has consistently been, and continues to be, excellent. Particular effort has been recently directed to the collection of data on foreign scientific and technical developments, and to the exploitation of the dwindling sources of economic and political information on Communist China. Because the interests of the intelligence-producing agencies have become more sharply directed toward the Soviet Orbit, the domestic collection effort is increasingly pointed in that direction, with particular emphasis on foreign nationality groups within the United States, defectors, and other recently arrived aliens.

7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

Immediate and extensive coverage of foreign news, information, and propaganda broadcasts is provided by a world-wide monitoring network, maintained by CIA as a service of common concern. A Moscow broadcast can be received in Washington in translation or summary within one hour. Coverage of the Soviet Orbit is excellent, except for parts of Asia and the Baltic States. Progress made during 1952 towards closing these gaps included: the activation of a station at Hokkaido, Japan, to monitor northeast Asian broadcasts; negotiations with the British Broadcasting Company for monitoring of Baltic and northwestern USSR transmitters by the BBC under existing reciprocal arrangements; and a monitoring survey in Pakistan to explore the possibilities of covering hitherto unmonitorable Central Asian broadcasts.

b. Propaganda Analysis

Propaganda Analysis in support of psychological warfare activities and overt programs such as the VOA, has been further improved. Quantitative and content analysis of radio propaganda has been supplemented by some analysis of published propaganda and press material. More rapid and specialized support on radio propaganda is now provided to “watch” groups and estimating offices.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

The collection and technical analysis of Soviet Orbit products has continued to aid in the assessment of USSR scientific, economic, and technological capabilities, although the procurement during 1952 of significant items has not come up to expectations. Foreign materials and equipment are vital to the factory markings analysis program. Owing to the relative stability of the fighting front in Korea, the amount [Page 420] of captured materiel of intelligence importance has declined. At present the most productive channels for selective procurement of Soviet manufactured items and raw materials are official U.S. missions and covert CIA components overseas. Items procured reasonably successfully through such channels during the year included power tools, pharmaceuticals, rubber products, and metallurgical samples. Improvement in the coordination, through the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency, of technical analysis requirements and exploitation activities has resulted in a greater yield of information from Soviet objects acquired.

9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/15 the agencies undertook the construction and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being established. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, concentration of the jamming stations, and related information must await the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

XIII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence, both raw and finished, is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligence material that was collected during and after the war, and from other collections in overseas files. The sheer volume of these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved problems. No IAC agency, utilizing existing techniques, is in a position to record and store all this material and to make the information contained therein readily available to analysts requiring it. Remedy for this problem is being sought through the refinement of agency responsibilities and the development of machine indexing techniques.

2. Library Facilities

While the libraries of the IAC agencies are not yet self-sufficient, they are equipped to satisfy most of the major needs of their users. Their utility can be increased and their effectiveness can be improved in connection with current plans for improving central reference facilities.

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3. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains files of biographic data on foreign personalities for its own particular purposes and makes such data available to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, military, and scientific personalities outside the Iron Curtain; coverage within the Soviet Orbit is necessarily partial and inadequate. Personalities in the economic and industrial fields are poorly covered at present although there is considerable information available. Means of improvement are currently being studied. As a result of recent arrangements between the State Department and CIA, the latter is discontinuing biographic intelligence in the political, social, and cultural fields and will in the future depend on the Department of State for such intelligence.

4. Photographic Files

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic and related documentary libraries consistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Material in each library is available to the IAC community. Continuing effort must be exerted to increase the quality and quantity of this source of intelligence.

5. Map Procurement and Reference Services

[2½ lines not declassified] Results during the past three years have proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related information through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché program. Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché channels are also being used. The currently published foreign maps required for intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those of an operational character maintained by the Military Services. Excellent map reference services in support of intelligence requirements are maintained by close working arrangements between the map libraries.

6. Foreign Language Publications

The exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes is presently undertaken in varying degrees by each agency. [2½ lines not declassified] Currently, the IAC agencies are considering plans with reference to the exploitation of foreign language publications which might result in improved coordination in procurement, exploitation, and indexing for intelligence purposes.

Translation is also done by each agency, though coordination is effected to prevent duplication. Overseas abstracting from foreign language [Page 422] publications is presently performed at a number of diplomatic posts. This work is coordinated with similar CIA and departmental activities in the U.S. to avoid duplication and to make the maximum use of available linguists.

Most publications needed for the intelligence effort are now being obtained, though major gaps exist in regard to Soviet Bloc materials. Through overt and covert channels there is an increasing effort to improve procurement in this latter category.

7. External Research

External research in the social sciences of particular interest to intelligence has presented difficult problems of coordination. In order to improve coordination CIA and the Department of State are jointly strengthening the latter’s External Research Staff, and the Department of Defense has taken steps to ensure necessary coordination of external research contacts on psychological warfare among military agencies. It is expected that liaison arrangements between the Department of Defense, Department of State, and CIA in this field will produce substantial progress during the current year in minimizing duplication, ensuring community benefit of finished research and facilitate more rational letting of external research contracts. Evaluation of this program as it affects the Department of Defense cannot as yet be given.

No. 8. The Internal Security Program6

Recent information regarding the feasibility of hand-portable atomic weapons makes possible their clandestine use and thus requires a complete reappraisal, which is underway, of virtually the whole internal security program. Action on initial countermeasures, approved by the President on December 29, 1952, is being taken by the IIC, the ICIS, and the AEC.

Domestic counter-intelligence has been improved by a great expansion of informant coverage, with emphasis on subversive movements and key industrial facilities. By vigorous prosecution of functionaries of the Communist Party, USA under the Smith Act, and by action to compel registration of the Party as a Communist action organization under the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Party’s National Board has been neutralized, its leaders convicted or forced into hiding, Party and bail funds depleted, membership reduced appreciably and recruitment drastically hampered. However, such vigorous action [Page 423] has also driven the Party further underground and made counterintelligence and continued prosecution more difficult. Investigative agencies assert the need for more intelligence regarding Soviet and satellite espionage and sabotage organizations, additional manpower, and additional funds for military internal security programs.

In the event of war, plans are ready for immediate apprehension of 20,000 dangerous civilians. Related programs are being prepared to neutralize dangerous U.S. military personnel, enemy aliens and diplomatic personnel. Accordingly, most potentially dangerous individuals should be neutralized within the initial period of a Soviet attack.

Although Executive Order 102907 on the safeguarding of classified security information is in force, an acceptable degree of security for such information will not be achieved until satisfactory standards of clearance are established for access to such information by government employees and consultants, by non-government personnel in classified contract work, and by representatives of foreign governments. ICIS recommendations on personnel security and access have been made but not adopted. (The ICIS has not participated in the Loyalty program.)

There is a high degree of installation security for some sensitive government buildings and areas, but uniform standards have not yet been generally achieved. Some progress has been made in industrial installation security, but protective programs do not include control of sub-contracting plants of classified contractors nor essential civilian wartime industrial facilities. Legal sanction is lacking to remove security risks in industry and there is difficulty in preventing strikes by Communist-infiltrated unions. Plant visitors are inadequately identified and checked. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise if acts of sabotage occur.

The port security program, limited to major ports, has not achieved reasonable security as regards fire protection and harbor entrance guarding. No effective security program is in force for telecommunications.

Control over the entry of dangerous aliens has not been achieved, largely because of personnel limitations in the Coast Guard and the Customs and Immigration Service, lack of control over alien crewmen, inadequate surveillance of foreign vessels, and poor control over foreign diplomatic and official personnel. The Omnibus Immigration Act, effective December 24, 1952,8 provides authority for remedying some inadequacies in entry control. There is little control over illegal entry by coastal or plane landings. On departures from the U.S., there are few effective exit controls operative, although there is limited screening of [Page 424] crewmen under the Magnuson Act. Export and monetary controls present no significant problems.

Arrangements to report unconventional attacks have been made, but countermeasures provide little security against clandestine AW, BW and CW unconventional attacks.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 142, Box 69. Top Secret, Security Information. NSC 142 consisted of eight parts, each prepared by the agency having primary responsibility for that particular national security program. The composite report was circulated to the NSC by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on February 10. Only Parts 7 and 8 are printed. Part 7 was prepared by the CIA, dated February 6, and concurred in by the IAC. Part 8 was not found attached but a text from another Record Group is included here.
  2. There is no section I.
  3. Document 126.
  4. Not found.
  5. For NSC 66/1, “Intelligence Support for the Voice of America With Regard to Soviet Jamming,” see Document 44.
  6. Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC Representative on Internal Security, NSC 142, Box 46. Top Secret; Security Information. Prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. An attached statement on the objective of the internal security program, consisting of a quotation from NSC 142, is not printed.
  7. For E.O. 10290, see 3 CFR 1949–53 compilation, pp. 790–797 or 16 FR 9795.
  8. 66 Stat. 163–281.