Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/8–1849: Telegram

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, August 18, 1949—4 p. m.
[Received August 18—11 a. m.]

1369. Re Contel 1080, June 27 to Department. For AMilAt⁹⁴ from Barrett.⁹⁵ Following from Keon:⁹⁶

Evening August 15 after careful briefing on procedure to be followed he was taken with much cloak and dagger atmosphere to house in north city where he saw Chang, Secretary to Chou En-lai, previously mentioned re Chou démarche. Chang extremely nervous, has aged visibly in past 2 months and kept repeating he was taking big risk in seeing Keon. Chang told Keon substantially the following:

• [1.] Po Yi-po⁹⁷ has worked an elaborate case against Keon with view arresting him on charge being spy and through him striking at Barrett whom he not in position to touch. Plan is bring Keon to an at least partially public trial in which evidence both manufactured and partially true will sound convincing even to foreign newspaper reporter. At present final action this case awaiting decision highest authority presumably Mao Tse-tung to whom all evidence has been presented. Is possible decision of highest authority will be [to] run Keon out, perhaps under humiliating circumstances, but Po may at any moment break case into open by arresting Keon, thus committing party to action from which recession would be difficult. In the party Po can be controlled by Mao alone but even so Po is no longer own master, implication being that he under control of Soviets. If Keon tried, will undoubtedly be convicted and probably sentenced to long prison term but he not likely get death sentence. If arrested, will be forced reveal all circumstances his connection with Chou démarche about which Po fully informed.
• 2. CCP at present torn with bitterest internal strife. Chou group has only slight chance of winning. Whole picture of party since Keon knew it in Nanking and Shantung 1946 and 1947 has changed. Chang convinced Soviets have weapon equal atomic bomb and Chang knows war coming soon but refused hazard guess to more exact time. Chang refused answer question as to state of Mao’s health but reaction to question appeared indicate that chairman seriously ill.
• 3. Soviet hatred of Americans unlimited and will crack whip over CCP in every possible way hurt us. Anti-US action may be expected all over Asia. Had Chou démarche not leaked, some other pretext would have been found for Soviet assumption strong hand in Chinese affairs.
• 4. Chang advised Keon attempt secure exit permit now before final decision highest authority has been made this case. Even now may be unable secure permission to leave. Chang suggested possibility Keon’s friends in Chou faction might be able arrange for him be run out under humiliating circumstances but could offer no assurance Keon would know in whose hands he was if such action taken against him. Once final decision as to action to be taken has been made will be unable leave if arrest included.

Comment: Convinced Keon telling story as heard it. He badly frightened over possibility smouldering [mouldering] in Commie dungeon. As Keon already declared his eagerness leave town, I do not believe any one trying scare him into going. I can afford to take calmer view of case than Keon but I believe that if case has really been presented to Mao he will give Keon chance to leave but the savagery of Po and possibility of Soviet pressure cannot be disregarded. If he tried, might get suspended sentence as did Jimmy Young in Tokyo just before Pearl Harbor.⁹⁸

Sent Nanking 987, repeated Canton 267, Department 1369. [Barrett.]

[Clubb]

94. Brig. Gen. Robert H. Soule, American Military Attaché.
95. Gol. David D. Barrett, Assistant Military Attaché in China.
96. Michael Keon, Australian newspaperman in China employed by the United Press.
97. Communist leader in Shansi.
98. See Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iv, pp. 995–1002.