893.00/8–1949: Telegram
The Vice Consul at Chungking (McGeary) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 19—1:14 a. m.]
162. From Strong. [In] view of vacillation of Nationalist Government with regard move to Chungking, feel desirable express own views re military situation West China. Although Communist timetable obscure, there are several seriously limiting factors affecting plans for attack on Szechuan, such as need to complete campaign in NW China, existence Pai Chung-hsi and Ma Pu-fang forces intact as military threats on flanks which must be eliminated or securely contained, need for regrouping of forces in both Southeast and Northwest, long supply lines and need to change direction of flow of supplies, very difficult terrain with few and bad roads, addition 2 months of great heat, desirability of two-prolonged [pronged] attack from both North and East, and fact that although bulk Nationalist soldiers this area may not be well-trained or have real will to fight there are large forces being gathered under loyal generals which capable of delaying Communists.
Seems reasonable to expect no sudden Communist attack or collapse Nationalists in near future. Despite dissension in Szechuan and Sikang and unpopularity of Nationalist Government, there is little reason to believe internal coup possible until Communists’ intrusion into Szechuan obviously successful.
Thus feel situation can string along for several uncertain months before end becomes apparent. Experience gained in close observation of several major campaigns in North China supports idea that, although final results inevitable, events take their own time, longer than would seem normal to western observers. An exception in Szechuan would be surprising.
Sent Department, repeated OffEmb Canton 115. [Strong.]