123 Ward, Angus I.: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 21—3:26 p. m.]
2044. Opinions along general lines indicated Depcirtel November 9, 2 a. m. were early expressed by staff members in private conversations with Chinese. Chinese contacts themselves profess be unable understand reasons for Communist treatment Mukden Consulate personnel. Would, however, invite attention probable truth of matter lately: (1) matter is being handled by Communists in present way for political reasons and, (2) Chinese Communists may not be concerned either alone or primarily, Soviets may be determining factor and Soviet may regard Ward as counter for Gubitchev.67 In any event, it has to be realized that Communists whether Chinese or other nationality are unresponsive to either reasoning or threats unless they see in compliance economic or political gain or in noncompliance some possible real injury Chinese Communists’ design reduce our political power and prestige and economic holdings China, and incidentally to pressure with what they find on ground to get recognition. Appeals to law, logic or humanitarianism will be generally ineffective. Communists will be halted in any given line action against our interests or people only by superior counter force.
Believe turn case has taken on American side unexpected by Communists who may now realize results will be unfavorable to them in long term. There appears to have been some relaxation controls on communications for Mukden personnel since note to Chou. Per reasoning Contel 1859, October 30, long delay in bringing Ward to trial would seem unfavorable but Communists may now find it difficult dismount from, tiger. If there are to be any favorable results of American official statements and Changtung’s USUN [Chang Tung-sun’s] démarches, they should shortly become apparent. Reference matter in UNGA at this time when American recognition, regime ungranted achieve no more results than efforts re north Korea, but publicity tending to prejudice Chinese Communists’ chances of getting UN membership or at any rate seat on Security Council would probably cause Communist alarm. Communist interest in participating Japanese peace treaty and perhaps getting Japanese reparations should be noted. Peiping uninformed re secret success Meryn case68 but suggest precedent might be helpful.
[Page 1015]Failing release it would seem Ward and others are being held simply as hostages force some desired action. In such case, further public statements or appeals to reason would appear hopeless. Unrecognized consuls on ground can exercise little or no real leverage in own right now denied. Whether Ward, et al., now being used as pawns in game to force recognition of course unknown and can hardly be known without at least contact with high Communist official. Embassy probably now shall [not?] get chance discuss matter with Chou En-lai except incidentally in connection with talk on some subject Communists more desirous of considering. But submit that there exists possibility that without recognition Communists will bow in present case only to force which can make itself felt.
Form sanctions might take of course subject best explored by Department but note that as first step economic pressure proposed Contel 1909, November 4, would seem only weapon which could be used without fanfare and further aggravation political situation but success unassured.
In summation regret state that if present moves fail this office sees no other line of law or logic that would promise results and would consider it clear that more than new representations required to achieve desired results.
- For documentation on the rejection of the claim to diplomatic immunity for Valentin Alexeyevich Gubichev, arrested and tried for espionage, 1949–50, see vol. v, pp. 776 ff↩
- Samuel Meryn, an employee of the American Embassy in Czechoslovakia, was arrested in October on charges of espionage activities; for statement by the Secretary of State, see Department of State Bulletin, November 7, 1949, p. 710.↩