Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

123 [Ward, Angus I.]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)⁶⁵

Washington, 18 November 1949.

The following are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to your oral question as to what might be done by the Department of Defense to assist the Department of State to extricate Mr. Angus Ward from his predicament in Mukden:

a. The Department of Defense can, at little risk and cost, assist the Department of State to extricate Mr. Angus Ward from Mukden by providing transportation by sea or air for a duly accredited Department of State representative to any point for which diplomatic clearance for the visit has been obtained;

b. Other military alternatives involve either threats by the United States Government, coupled with a present apparent intent to carry out the threatened action, or direct military action as may be necessary in the circumstance. In either of these two courses of action there are military implications of such deep significance that they should be examined in detail;

c. Mukden, the locale of Mr. Ward’s confinement, is the seat of government for Manchuria, this government being subordinate to the Chinese Communist Government at Peking. According to intelligence sources, Mukden is also the headquarters of a Chinese Communist army;

d. In accordance with the rights granted under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945,⁶⁶ the USSR has established operating facilities for submarines and for surface vessels at Dairen and Port Arthur. Considerable quantities of Manchurian goods are exported from Dairen by sea; lesser quantities of goods are exported from Manchurian ports in the Gulf of Chihli and in Korea Bay. There is no overt United States trade with Manchuria;

e. It is recognized that political considerations could affect the military considerations involved. Such political considerations would include the nature of the warning and the color of authority (United Nations or the duly recognized Chinese Nationalist Government) under which military action might be initiated. Regardless of the political considerations, however, there are, broadly speaking, only two possible courses of military action; namely:

(1) Forcible measures to remove Mr. Angus Ward from Mukden; and

(2) Military redress;

f. The physical removal of Mr. Ward from Mukden would require the employment of military forces in sufficient strength to force a landing, either by sea or by air, to effect rescue, and to fight their way out of Manchuria or, alternatively, it would require covert operations for the removal of Mr. Ward from Manchuria after forcibly extricating him from custody. The strength of the military forces required to force a landing and overtly to remove Mr. Ward from custody must be adequate, from the inception of the operation, to insure its success under all contingencies, and such strength is probably greater than that presently available. The undertaking of such military action would involve a conflict with the civil forces in that area, and probably the military forces as well. Thus such action might well lead to open war with the Chinese Communist Government. Furthermore, failure of the USSR to become involved, particularly in view of Soviet strategic interests in Manchuria and the presence of USSR units in the Dairen–Port Arthur area, can be regarded only as a remote possibility. In view of the foregoing considerations, there is a likelihood that overt United States military action might lead to global war. It is understood that covert measures to remove Mr. Ward from Manchuria would probably require action beyond the capabilities of the covert strength available to the United States Government. In the case of either overt or covert action for the removal of Mr. Ward, there would be grave doubts as to whether he would be allowed to survive. Moreover covert action, even if successful, would not sustain the attitude of the United States with respect to the treatment of its consular representatives and other nationals, and might be construed as a tacit admission of Mr. Ward’s guilt;

g. The second course of action; namely, redress, would involve the application of retortion, reprisal, or some form of sanction such as embargo or blockade;

h. Since there are no diplomatic representatives of the Chinese Communist Government in United States territory, simple retortion is not possible. Retortion, however, could be accomplished through the kidnapping by covert forces of one or more highly placed officials of the Manchurian Government. Even if such an operation were within the capabilities of United States covert forces, this action would establish a highly undesirable precedent in United States international relations and, by the very nature of its covert form, would fail to provide a clear-cut basis for the extrication of Mr. Ward without at least tacit overt approval by the United States of an unfriendly act carried out by covert forces. Furthermore, retortion of this nature might not alter the decision of the Manchurian Government to hold Mr. Ward rather than to negotiate an exchange. In addition, our covert action or our subsequent retortion might jeopardize the safety of other United States nationals in Communist China;

i. Reprisal would call for seizure or destruction of Manchurian property or that of its citizens. Since there is no Manchurian property in the United States or its possessions, acts of reprisal would have to involve military operations directly against Manchuria and this again would probably lead to war;

j. A United States embargo would be futile in the absence of Manchurian trade with this nation or with nations subject to our influence; and

k. Pacific Blockade. A pacific blockade is a blockade established by one or more states against the ports of another to enforce certain demands, without the intention of going to war. As a rule only vessels of states whose ports are blocked are seized. The United States has never been a party to a pacific blockade.
It is generally conceded—

(1) That a pacific blockade is a legitimate means of constraint short of war.

(2) Those parties to the blockade are bound by its consequences.

(3) As a matter of policy it might be advisable to resort to pacific blockade in order to avoid declaration of war.

(4) That states not parties to a pacific blockade are in no way bound to observe it.

Currently British interests control the greater percentage of ships entering China ports. They would not be affected by a United States declaration of a pacific blockade.

l. Blockade. A blockade is normally employed only in time of war and its institution is commonly considered a belligerent act. It affects shipping regardless of nationality. Such blockade to be recognized would have to be effective. It would involve either coercion of or prior agreement with the British and might eventually necessitate the commitment of strength adequate to deal with the Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East.

In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that direct military action to assist the Department of State in extricating Mr. Angus Ward from his predicament might lead to war and would not of itself insure his timely and safe extrication. They do, however, point out that the Department of Defense can assist by supplying appropriate transportation for the accredited representatives of the Government to negotiate for Mr. Ward’s release. Consideration might also be given to designating a military officer, such as the Commander of the Seventh Task Fleet, to negotiate locally for the release of Mr. Ward.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

65. Copy transmitted to the Under Secretary of State by the Secretary of Defense in his letter of November 21.
66. Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; for text, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585, or United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 10, p. 300.