711.93112/11–2149
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President
With reference to the suggestion that the blockade of Communist coal shipments be utilized in the Angus Ward case,69 there is no evidence that Shanghai is receiving any significant shipments of coal by coastal vessel from Tientsin or Chinwangtao. Shanghai draws its coal supplies from the Hwainan mines in Anhwei Province and from the Kailan mines in Hopei Province. These coal supplies have for some time been moving to Shanghai primarily over inland transport routes, principally rail, a consequence in part of the National Government’s port closure. It is reported that the coal thus available to Shanghai is adequate to meet the present minimum requirements of the city for generation of electric power.
The National Government “blockade” of central and south China coastal ports has reduced coast-wise shipping to a low level, most of which is carried on by traditional junk traffic with which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to interfere. A relatively small but active foreign trade is carried on out of Tientsin, the only major coastal port in China proper that is not within the effective scope of [Page 1016] the National Government’s port closure. A large proportion of this trade is between Hong Kong and Tientsin and is heavily dependent upon foreign-flag vessels, many of which are British. The number of Chinese-owned coastal and ocean-going vessels available to the Chinese Communists is believed to be small by virtue of their earlier transfer by the Nationalists to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Despite the low level of China’s coast-wise and foreign trade, a “blockade” of all shipping out of China ports, if it could be undertaken effectively, would of course hurt the Chinese economy. Nevertheless, in view of the basic self-sufficiency of the Chinese economy at present low standards of living, such action could not create an economic crisis in the Chinese Communist regime. On the contrary, it might well prove useful to the Communists as a propaganda weapon, both at home and abroad, in support of their argument concerning the imperialistic intentions of the United States.
Preliminary examination of our legal position in a blockade of Communist-held ports indicates that a state of belligerency would be necessary for such blockade to be legal. There is some precedent for establishment of a “pacific blockade”, i.e., blockade as an act of reprisal without a state of belligerency, but it is clear that such a blockade could be legally effective only as to Chinese Communist vessels and not against the vessels of third powers trading in ports controlled by Chinese Communists. The United States in the past has never resorted to a “pacific blockade”. There are strong grounds for believing that such a blockade, even where a party to the UN is not involved, might be inconsistent with the principles of Article 33 of the UN Charter under which the parties to a dispute undertake to seek solution of it short of force.
We strongly recommend against the use of force against other foreign vessels.70
- See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, November 14, p. 1008.↩
- The Secretary of State stated in a memorandum of November 21 to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth): “I left with the President the memorandum recommending against blockade procedure. It was agreed between us that for the time being we should await the developments following from the circular note sent to the countries having diplomatic or consular representation in China.” (123 Ward, Angus)↩