883.20/3–2249: Airgram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Talks of Field Marshal W. J. Slim with King Farouk and Members of Egyptian Cabinet re UK-Egyptian Defence Cooperation.
A–561. M. N. F. Stewart, Acting Head of the African Department of the British Foreign Office, on March 21 read to an officer of this Embassy two telegrams addressed by Field Marshal W. J. Slim, C.I.G.S., to the Defence Committee reporting on his conversations with King Farouk and members of the Egyptian Cabinet regarding UK-Egyptian Defence cooperation (see Emb’s 1101, March 21,1 and Cairo’s 274, March 192).
2. The first message (dated March 17) stated that Farouk was “cordial and forthcoming”.3 When Slim spoke of good relations existing between British and Egyptian troops Farouk said he was aware of this and hoped relations would improve even more. Slim and Farouk then discussed intentions of the USSR in the Middle East. Farouk said he agreed that Egypt must prepare to play its role in general Middle East defence. Slim expressed the personal opinion that powerful as the USSR is today it is “not so formidable as Germany was in 1939”. Farouk said he was convinced that the USSR would not only attack Europe but that it would also attack the Middle East and agreed with Slim that Egypt would be the main target. Slim took this opportunity to introduce the idea of staff talks. The King said he agreed that such talks were necessary and desirable; that the Prime Minister with whom Slim would speak that evening “knew his full mind”; and that for the purpose of the staff talks the King “would appoint his best man”.
[Page 200]3. According to Slim’s report Farouk on several occasions mentioned his intelligence sources which, among other things, had made him aware of US defence preparations in the Middle East such as “underground US airfields in Saudi Arabia”.
4. Farouk also mentioned the threat of Israel to Middle East security and expressed pleasure at the decision of the British Government to send troops to Akaba. This move he described as the “one good thing which UK has done in the Palestine affairs.”4
5. Farouk said that he had sent Egyptian forces to the corner of Sinai nearest Akaba in order to prevent Israeli penetration of Sinai.
6. Slim reported that at this juncture Farouk mentioned the fact that his “counter-espionage sources” had given him complete information regarding UK’s military and strategic needs in Egypt in the event of war. On the basis of this knowledge Farouk said he had already instructed Egyptian officers in the particular areas concerned to be prepared to evacuate “so that there would be no clashes when British reinforcements arrive”.
7. At this juncture Slim spoke of desirability of advance staff talks to prevent such clashes, the King said he had made up his mind in favor of such talks and closed by reiterating his warm friendship for the UK.
8. Second telegram (March 18) from Slim to Defence Committee reported a conversation March 17 with the Egyptian Prime Minister, War Minister and the Acting Head of the Royal Cabinet.
9. PriMin opened conversation by saying that he was in favor of a closer understanding between Egypt and the UK and that he accepted the idea that Egypt will be a base for any military operations in the area. He said that he was adverse to talks beginning at a purely military level (the initial British idea, see Embs 1030, Mar 17). He said that he wanted to receive at once the “whole broad picture” so that he could study it and give the necessary orders to the Egyptian military (see para 15 below).
10. Slim, with the approval of the British Ambassador, who was present, agreed to follow this method of approach. He said that General Pyman, of General Crocker’s5 staff, would prepare for the [Page 201] PriMin a paper giving the “broad picture” with regard to British requirements for
- (a)
- landing grounds;
- (b)
- when war becomes imminent.6
- (c)
- port facilities,
- (a)
- now, and
- (b)
- when war becomes imminent.6
11. PriMin said that after he has studied and agreed to this paper it would be passed on to the service level. PriMin said he would also like to know something about British plans for general Middle East Defence: e.g. plans for British-Turkish cooperation, and whether Egypt would be on the 1st, 2nd or 3rd line of defence. Slim said he hoped very much Egypt “would not be on the First Line of Defence.” He said distance enemy would be held from Egypt would depend greatly upon what UK had there in way of bases.
12. Slim remarked that UK wanted to see Egypt militarily strong and to this end would give all possible assistance although needs of Western Union might limit the amount of equipment UK would be able to provide.
[Page 202]13. FonOff Comment: Stewart advised Embassy Officer that allowing time for consultation with the British Ambassador the paper promised to the Prime Minister should be ready “in about ten days”. He said the Foreign Office is anxious to assure that the British Ambassador will be jointly responsible with the British military for this paper.
14. Stewart said that the British Ambassador thinks the PriMin will again ask for more information regarding the general defence plans in the Middle East: if so it has been decided that he will be told that the plan is to defend Egypt as far forward as possible—how far will depend upon the efficiency of British bases in Egypt. No specific line would be mentioned, but discussion of the probable direction of Soviet attack would give an idea in this connection.
15. Stewart said Foreign Office was at first alarmed by idea of putting everything down on paper at the outset (para 9 above) but that the British Ambassador in reply to a Foreign Office query in this regard indicated that although the course suggested might be somewhat rash it was a fact that Egyptian military authorities in any case would have to turn to the Prime Minister at every stage of the talks, and that there was an advantage in obtaining his broad clearance at an early stage. The Ambassador also commented that he was struck by the fact that the PriMin said flatly that he favored Anglo-Egyptian military cooperation and spoke of British bases in Egypt as a matter of course. The Ambassador said he could not guess what reservations, if any, were in the mind of the Prime Minister.
16. EmbOff put to Stewart substantially the same question described final para Cairo’s 274, Mar. 19.8 Stewart replied that the British Ambassador believes that the important thing is having both the PriMin and the King working together because on this basis the talks “probably could get through”.
(Note to posts: Above information supplied for Department only: consequently knowledge of its repetition to posts should be withheld from British Missions.)
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed; it conveyed information from an officer of the British Embassy that Marshal Slim’s visit to Egypt had cleared the ground for Anglo-Egyptian staff talks on military problems, projected the previous November during the talks between Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed Khashaba, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs (741.83/3–1949). Regarding the Bevin–Khashaba talks, see editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 85.↩
- Cairo, on March 25, advised of information from the British Ambassador that King Farouk had taken the initiative in proposing Anglo-American military talks (telegram 292, 883.20/3–2549).↩
- For documentation on the sending of British troops to Aqaba in January 1949 after the Israeli shooting down of five British planes, see pp. 594 ff.↩
- Gen. Sir John T. Crocker, Commander-in-Chief of British Middle East Land Forces.↩
- The
completed paper covered the following: “(1) The
strategic aspects of the Middle East in the event of war
with Russia. The strategic importance of Egypt would be
emphasized. It would be pointed out that Russia in the
event of war would undoubtedly strike for the Delta, the
control of which would be essential to Russia. It would
be thus indicated that the presence of the British in
the Canal would not be the reason for Russian attack,
but that on the other hand, the presence of the British
in Egypt would be an asset in its defence.
“(2) The role which Egypt should play in the defence of Egypt. This section concerned itself with suggesting the needs for training and organization of the Egyptian forces, together with proposals as to how this might be accomplished.
“(3) Requirements of Great Britain now and in the imminent threat of war. The number of troops would not be stressed but rather the organizational set-up. Thus, a headquarters staff, probably rather large, would be required; a certain amount of troops, organized on a skeleton basis with adequate administrative staff; certain technical troops, by which it was understood he meant technicians in radar, radio, and other fields. There would also be an expanded RAF installation with enlarged administrative set-ups. Expansion of installations slightly outside of the Canal Zone might be asked in order to provide for the new arrangements. The creation of airfields outside would also be suggested.
“(4) The creation of a liaison group of Egyptian and British officers to carry out any program which might be agreed upon, to discuss differences of opinion and to plan in case of future developments, including war.” (airgram 373, March 30, from Cairo, 883.20/3–3049)
The “he” cited in paragraph numbered 3 was Donald D. MacLean, Counselor of the British Embassy in Egypt.
↩ - The
completed paper covered the following: “(1) The
strategic aspects of the Middle East in the event of war
with Russia. The strategic importance of Egypt would be
emphasized. It would be pointed out that Russia in the
event of war would undoubtedly strike for the Delta, the
control of which would be essential to Russia. It would
be thus indicated that the presence of the British in
the Canal would not be the reason for Russian attack,
but that on the other hand, the presence of the British
in Egypt would be an asset in its defence.
“(2) The role which Egypt should play in the defence of Egypt. This section concerned itself with suggesting the needs for training and organization of the Egyptian forces, together with proposals as to how this might be accomplished.
“(3) Requirements of Great Britain now and in the imminent threat of war. The number of troops would not be stressed but rather the organizational set-up. Thus, a headquarters staff, probably rather large, would be required; a certain amount of troops, organized on a skeleton basis with adequate administrative staff; certain technical troops, by which it was understood he meant technicians in radar, radio, and other fields. There would also be an expanded RAF installation with enlarged administrative set-ups. Expansion of installations slightly outside of the Canal Zone might be asked in order to provide for the new arrangements. The creation of airfields outside would also be suggested.
“(4) The creation of a liaison group of Egyptian and British officers to carry out any program which might be agreed upon, to discuss differences of opinion and to plan in case of future developments, including war.” (airgram 373, March 30, from Cairo, 883.20/3–3049)
The “he” cited in paragraph numbered 3 was Donald D. MacLean, Counselor of the British Embassy in Egypt.
↩ - This paragraph read as follows: “In reply to question [by an officer of the American Embassy] if British Embassy was not afraid to push conclusion of such arrangements with Abdul Hadi lest it be repudiated by Wafd if it came into power after elections he [British Embassy Counselor MacLean] replied that important fact was now that King and Prime Minister were in agreement. Believed this advantage should be pressed home. He promised to keep Embassy informed.”↩