883.20/4–749
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson )
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department has received from the British Embassy the draft (Tab A) of a communication1 which the British Government would like to instruct its Embassy at Cairo to convey to the King of Egypt relative to the Anglo-American staff talks which it is contemplated will take place from time to time at Fayid, Egypt.
The question of these planning talks at Fayid has been the subject of informal conversations between officials of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State Department and Admiral Conolly and officers of the Office of Asssistant Chief of Naval Operations for International Affairs. These conversations resulted in agreement that there was no political objection to visits of members of Admiral Conolly’s staff to Fayid for a short time, but that they “should not be detailed or assigned in any way, nor should they be attached to the British staff.”
In his conversations with the British in London subsequent to the abovementioned discussions, it is understood that Admiral Conolly has maintained that:
- 1)
- The case of the visit of officers of his staff to Fayid should be considered on its own merits;
- 2)
- No tripartite military conversations to include Egyptians will be entered into or even considered;
- 3)
- The explanation of the presence of US officers at Fayid be explained by British only and should not include admission that war planning is being conducted; and
- 4)
- UK-Egyptian bilateral planning for local defense of Egypt’s territory including the Suez Canal is a new matter requiring further consideration and consultation by both US Joint Chiefs of Staff and UK Chiefs of Staff and should be separated from the subject under discussion.
Recently, the British Embassy at Cairo has been faced with the problem of what answer to make in reply to direct questions from the King regarding the presence of Americans at Fayid, and the attached memorandum (Tab A) represents the reply which the British would like to make.
The Department believes that the reply too directly links the U.S. Government with Anglo-Egyptian staff talks, and by implication would create the impression with the Egyptian Government that it was indirectly participating in tripartite conversations relative to the defense of Egypt.
Therefore, the Department proposes to inform the British Embassy it believes that it would be undesirable for the proposed communication to go forward. It is also proposed to inform the British that if it is found that the talks at Fayid are the source of continued embarrassment, it would seem desirable to consider holding such conversations at a point outside of Egypt, such as Malta, Cyprus, or Cyrenaica.
The Department would appreciate the National Military Establishment’s comments with respect to this matter, and an indication as to whether or not it concurs with the Department’s views expressed above.
The National Military Establishment may wish to obtain Admiral Conolly’s comments on this subject. The Department, on its part, is transmitting a copy of this letter to the American Embassy at London with a request that the Embassy’s comments be cabled at an early date.2
Sincerely yours.
Assistant Secretary
- Not printed; the updated draft was left with Mr. Satterthwaite by William Denis Allen, Counselor of the British Embassy, on March 21. It proposed that the British Ambassador speak to King Farouk along the following lines: (1) the British Government was considering preparations to meet Soviet aggression; (2) the British and United States Governments have been keeping in close communication regarding defense questions; (3) the United States Government recognized the special interests of the United Kingdom in questions of Middle East defense but was greatly concerned with arrangements for the defense of the area; (4) the contacts on defense measures by the British Government with the United States Government must be kept private; (5) the British Government suggested that the British and Egyptian Governments discuss measures for the defense of the Suez Canal and Delta areas as they would be key objectives of Soviet aggression, and the British Government would be in close communication with the United States Government to link plans for the defense of Egypt with plans for global defense; and (6) since the British military authorities in the Middle East required liaison with United States authorities, the British hoped that the king would agree to the visit to Fayid from time to time of a small number of United States officers. The hope was also expressed that the King would agree to the initiation of technical defense discussions between British and Egyptian defense authorities on a basis of absolute secrecy (811.2383/3–2149).↩
- The British Embassy sent a further undated communication to the Department, which was received on April 13. The communication, which was intended to clarify the message left on March 21, stated that the British had not intended to suggest that the Egyptians would be associated in any way with Anglo-American planning for the defense of the Middle East as a whole or that the British would discuss with them American plans in the area. The British intent was to discuss with the Egyptians only matters dealing with the defense of Egypt, although British requirements would be those of the combined British and American forces (811.2383/4–1349). The Secretary of State transmitted a copy of the later British communication to Secretary Johnson in a letter of April 19 (883.20/4–1149).↩