Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

883.20/3–1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, March 17, 1949—6 p. m.

1030. Embassy’s 5023, November 27.¹ Glutton brought Embassy up to date for Department’s information only regarding cooperative arrangements for Egyptian defense, stressing top secret character information.

2. Plans envisaged paragraph 5 Embassy reftel² were delayed by worsening Palestine situation and assassination Nokrashy. However, “about two weeks ago”, Farouk again raised with British Ambassador Cairo idea initiating UK-Egyptian technical talks regarding defense matters (paragraph 4, Embassy reftel³). Egyptian Ambassador Amr called on Bevin March 16 to reiterate King Farouk’s interest in these talks. With idea starting talks off properly, General Slim GIGS⁴ will discuss them with Farouk today.

3. Glutton again went over Bevin’s idea regarding defense cooperation (Embassy’s 4556 October 20⁵) he thought personally, although no agenda has as yet been prepared, informal talks with Egyptians at Fayid would begin with general appreciation world political situation followed by taking up easiest questions first. He hoped that as progress was made, the talks would gradually extend to such subjects as maintenance joint fighter bases, joint radar screen, and similar practical developments which in effect would, with full Egyptian cooperation, go far beyond 1936 treaty which is “quite inadequate for our needs”. Regarding treaty inadequacy, Glutton pointed out that it made no provision for use naval facilities or for maintenance British naval personnel in Egypt where, according to present thinking, some 800 naval officers and ratings will be required.

4. Regarding visits US personnel to Fayid (Cairo’s A–290 March 8 and A–301 March 9⁶) Glutton said problem of British Ambassador Cairo was reply he could make to direct questions from Farouk as to what Americans were doing there. It was difficult on one hand to be working out close UK-Egyptian defense cooperation under Farouk’s aegis and at same time to be unable to confirm to Farouk even in general terms what he already knows or suspects. Embassy office reiterated Admiral Conolly’s views (Embassy’s A–390 March 1⁷) and Clutton appeared to accept them.

Douglas

1. Not printed; but for summary, see editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 85.
2. This paragraph read as follows: “Future program is that talk will take place between King and British Ambassador followed by talks between Nokrashy and British Ambassador. If these go well, British CINCME and Egyptian military experts will start at once technical discussions at Fayid along lines sketched by Bevin.” (741.83/11–2748)
3. This paragraph read as follows: “Amr reports success in selling Bevin’s defense cooperation idea to King. Question then arose as to role Nokrashy (since King would not have Nahas). King told Nokrashy he wanted technical talks to begin at once and inquired Nokrashy was agreeable to handle question. Nokrashy asked for 24 hours to think matter over and then agreed.” Abdel Fattah Amr was Egyptian Ambassador in the United Kingdom; Nahas Pasha was leader of the Wafdist Party.
4. Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
5. Not printed; but for summary, see editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 85.
6. Neither printed.
7. Not printed.