891.0001 Pahlavi [, Reza Shah]/11–1949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)
On the Shah’s invitation, I had breakfast with him this morning at Prospect House. He opened the conversation by asking whether I thought his visit to the United States was serving a useful purpose for Iran. I replied that I did emphatically think so. First, from His Majesty’s speeches, from seeing him, and from the attendant publicity, the American people were probably learning more about Iran than they had ever learned in their lives before. This was very important because it had a bearing on the policies which the United States Government could follow in its relations with Iran. Most Americans [Page 584] knew very little indeed about Iran and the other countries in that general area. Secondly, it was useful that the high officials of the American Government were having the opportunity to meet the Shah personally. It was always easier to understand a foreign country and visualize its problems if one had had personal contact with its leader. Thirdly, the substance of the Shah’s conversations with the President, the Secretary, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was extremely helpful in clarifying our understanding of Iran’s problems and in bringing the lines of operation and thought of the two Governments closer together. We had not yet achieved complete agreement and understanding but I thought these talks would bring such agreement very much closer.
His Majesty then asked me in what respect I thought we were not in agreement. I said I felt that it was mainly a question of degree and of timing. We were not ready to go so far or so fast as His Majesty wished. The Shah interrupted to say that he fully understood our position, especially the difficulties which we would face in asking Congress for new legislation and new foreign assistance. Although he did not say it in words, his tone and manner implied that he was not criticizing or complaining at our failure to give him more concrete and immediate assistance. He went on to say, however, that he also had public opinion to consider and that the Iranian people were constantly asking why the United States was aiding every other country in the world and not Iran. He very much wished that we could find some way to give direct help to Iran, if only to reassure the Iranian people.
In reply, I asked if His Majesty did not think that the Iranian people would be encouraged and reassured by the results to be anticipated from limited direct aid from America combined with the progress Iran could achieve through utilizing its own resources and utilizing its credit with the International and Export-Import Banks. Once material improvements began to appear in Iran through the combination of these factors, would not the Iranian people stop worrying about the lack of large-scale direct American assistance? His Majesty agreed that this was likely, but indicated that he still felt something needed to be done at the present time.
I remarked that we must recognize that the American Government necessarily moved slowly. Any major project took a long time to get under way. His Majesty answered by recalling the Persian legend of Sohrab and Rustam ill which the father, Rustam, mortally wounded his son, Sohrab, without knowing who he was, and then sought medicine to save his life when it was too late. The Shah urged that the United States not be too late in providing the medicine to save Iran. I said that I was optimistic about the general international situation and I believed that in the case of Iran the medicine would not arrive too late.
[Page 585]His Majesty said that one thing he hoped we could do to demonstrate our interest in Iran was to give quick help in the matter of the railroad equipment he had discussed with the Secretary and Mr. Thorp yesterday. Even a small number of items, say 20 Diesel locomotives and 200 freight cars, would have a great psychological effect if they could be provided quickly. I said that I had no technical knowledge whatever on this subject and had no idea whether or not it would be feasible to obtain such items quickly. However, we would certainly do our best. I would make this an item of first priority in our work in the Department. There was, of course, no question of policy involved, but merely the technical and practical question of whether the material could be produced and shipped in time.1
Referring to His Majesty’s opening question about his visit, I asked whether he himself believed that it was serving a useful purpose. He quickly replied that he did. Before coming here, he had formed the impression from newspapers and other things he had read that the United States was a superficial country with a people lacking in depth of character. He had now found that this was an erroneous impression. He found the American people warm and having great depth of character. The American people, he had discovered, had a “heart”.
As I was leaving, Ambassador Ala came in and the Shah said that he hoped the Ambassador and the Department would work closely together in preparing the joint communiqué to be issued by the President and His Majesty. I said that we would look forward to discussing this with the Ambassador next week.2
- In a note of November 29, the Secretary of State informed Ambassador Ala that there were no reasons to expect that Iranian agents would have any appreciable difficulty in ordering rails and freight cars to be delivered within 4 months and diesel locomotives to be delivered within 6 months (891.77/11–2549).↩
- The Department, on November 19, informed Tehran that the “Shah has talked with Pres, SecState, Joint Chiefs, and subordinate State officials. Was given adequate opportunity present his case, which he did satisfactorily and moderately. Believe general impression on him good, though obviously he is disappointed at lack of concrete assurances greater direct aid or aid in specific forms such as tanks.” (Telegram 1043, 891.001 Pahlavi [, Reza Shah]/11–1949)↩