891.20/11–1849

The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

secret

No. 281

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s correspondence on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as it pertains to Iran and to forward herewith the program for Iran for M.D.A.P. fiscal year 1950 as recommended by the joint State–Defense Survey Group composed of Mr. Edward D. McLaughlin (State), Lt. Col. Phillip D. Brant (Army) and Lt. Col. Thomas E. Hutchinson (Air Force).1

This Group has arrived at a balanced program which meets military requirements to the extent possible by the limited funds available. To this extent and to this extent only, I heartily concur in its recommendations.

I strongly urge that the Director take such extraordinary measures as may be necessary to include in this first year’s program the six (6) 75 mm recoilless rifles requested. I realize that this weapon is in short supply and that we do not have sufficient numbers for our own forces. Its use by the Iranian Army, under the instruction of our Military Mission, will be of tremendous psychological value and will balance to some extent the bitter disappointment of the Shah and the Iranian Government in what both they and I regard as a totally inadequate program.

I have advised the Department of the Shah’s early ambitious plans and of my successful efforts to reduce them to something within reason. [Page 583] The Shah remains adamant, however, on the subject of tanks. His position amounts to an obsession. I believe he will be satisfied with 50 M4–83 medium tanks equipped with a 76 mm gun. It has been impossible to furnish these tanks within the present program. Therefore we should seek some means outside of the program to satisfy the Shah’s minimum desires for tanks. This should be justified on political grounds. I fear that we must take this question most seriously. A “token aid” approach is worse than no approach at all.

In submitting, with my approval, the recommendation of the Joint Survey Group, I request that the Director give special consideration to the situation of Iran and provide that additional assistance which will support our present investment and permit us to achieve our military and political objectives.2

Respectfully yours,

John C. Wiley
  1. Mr. McLaughlin was attached to the staff of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. He was scheduled to depart from New York on November 10 to coordinate with Ambassador Wiley and General Evans regarding problems of the Military Aid Program. Concurrently, the Department of Defense was to send Army and Air Force officers to Iran to consult regarding the lists of equipment under the program. All conversations were to be exploratory and to be held only with United States personnel (telegram 990, November 9, 7 p. m., to Tehran, 89120/11–949).
  2. Enclosed with this despatch was the recommended list of the Survey Group covering Iranian aspects of the proposed Mutual Defense Assistance Program for fiscal year 1950. The list was divided into two parts. The Department of the Army list comprised some 28 items with a delivered cost of $9,732,635. From this amount, a deduction was made for items to be delivered after fiscal year 1950, leaving a total amount of $8,621,210 for the “present program.” Recommended additionally were six recoilless rifles and cartridges, whose cost was estimated at $73,915 and a miscellaneous item whose cost was unknown. The Department of the Air Force list contained some 42 items, whose costs were estimated at $1,719,780.

    In a letter of November 19 to James E. Bruce, Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in the Department of State, Ambassador Wiley explained his position that “the original concept of extending ‘token aid’ to Iran was a mistake. Such aid would be as provocative to the Russians as real aid but ineffective to accomplish our purposes here from either a military or political point of view. However, I have approved of the programming of the Joint Survey Group but I make that reservation. The position of Iran is very special and in the mosaic of our military thinking it should occupy an important place.” (891.20/11–949)