Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

891.20/11–2949

The Iranian Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

Iran is deeply grateful to the Government of the United States for its concern for her independence and integrity, for its valuable support at a time of crisis and for the material assistance recently extended under the Military Aid Program—thus recognizing the importance of Iran’s strategic position and the vital role she has played and must continue to play in holding the line against Communist domination of the Middle East.

The people of Iran ardently desire that the visit of His Imperial Majesty The Shah may serve to draw closer the bonds of friendship between the two nations, to result in a complete understanding on all points of common interest and to bear fruit in all fields: political, military, economic and cultural to the mutual benefit of Iran and the United States.

Politically, Iran is under incessant pressure and is constantly under the threat of aggression. Pressure is not only overt but is also exercised insidiously through infiltration and by inciting dissatisfaction and disunity within the country with the object of weakening the State and paving the way for its disruption and eventual domination by the aggressor.

The Iranian Government is determined to resist overt attack with all the means in its power and to take firm and adequate measures against subversive activities.

It is naturally a matter of concern to the Iranian Government to know, as far as possible, to what extent moral and material support will be forthcoming from the Government of the United States in case of attack, whether incidental to a general conflict in which the United States is itself involved or whether directed solely against Iran: as a step towards further expansion in other directions.

In order to combat the aggression and the subversive activities it faces, the Iranian Government must possess a military force, not only for internal security, but powerful enough in defense to be a factor to be reckoned with by the aggressor. To enable it to become such a factor, it is necessary to give the Iranian army adequate equipment, suitable modern weapons of defense, and sufficient mobility.

Having assigned its entire oil royalties to the execution of the Seven Year Plan, Iran neither has the economic ability nor the foreign exchange to enable her to purchase the necessary arms and equipment herself. The Military Aid Program is therefore most timely and for that reason is doubly appreciated. To be effective, however, it must be substantial enough to fulfil its object and continue for some years. Needless to say, too little help will not achieve its objective and will therefore be useless and wasteful.

The limited amount allocated this year under the Military Aid Program to the three countries, of which Iran is one, would appear to be inadequate for the purpose. Iran therefore hopes that its share will be supplemented substantially from the $50 million credit left at the discretion of the President; also that the equipment to be delivered being in the main surplus, will be included in categories supplied at a nominal charge.

While the assistance given to rearm and reequip the Iranian army is most helpful, the Government of Iran wishes to point out that it is desirable for the Government of the United States to supplement that aid politically by extending the Truman Doctrine to Iran and by adopting a policy in the Middle East, as in Western Europe, of encouraging the creation of a union of peace-loving nations, strong enough collectively, to resist Communist domination and capable of serving as effective allies against aggression in the event of a general conflict.

The necessity for assistance to rehabilitate the railway, ports and industrial plants and to raise the standard of living of the Iranian people is so well known that it is superfluous to dilate on the economic needs of Iran. As far back as 1943 these were fully recognized in the Declaration of Tehran, which bears the signature of the late President Roosevelt. Unfortunately its promise of Economic Aid has so far remained unfulfilled. For obvious reasons referred to in this Embassy’s Memorandum of August Fourth 1948,¹ the Iranian Government can only look to the Government of the United States for the implementation of the Aid promised and implied by that Declaration, and it would appear that the present visit of His Imperial Majesty The Shah would be a most suitable occasion for such a gesture.

It is suggested that Economic Aid might be extended by the United States Government in the following ways:

1. By the inclusion of Iran in the Act for Aid to Greece and Turkey and in future enactments for economic assistance to other countries.

2. By the extension of a line of credit of $100,000,000.—from the Export-Import Bank over a period of seven years at the rate of about $15 million a year, partly to guarantee American investments in Iran in terms of Point Four and partly to finance self-liquidating projects to be carried out by private Iranian enterprise.

3. By giving urgent and special consideration to a barter or lend-lease agreement to supply wheat to Iran to tide over the present scarcity and famine conditions in many parts of the country.

4. By the act implementing Point Four of the President’s inaugural speech. Special consideration should be given to Iran under this act because her development program is under way, whereas other beneficiaries have still to undertake their preliminary studies.

5. By the inclusion of Khouzistan in any development of the nature adumbrated by the President in a recent speech. It is to be noted that its geographical and strategic situation, its proximity to highlands, its fertility and its oil and mineral resources give Khouzistan potentialities far superior to any other area in the Middle East.

Promise of financial and economic aid within the scope of the above-mentioned suggestions will not only give moral strength to the Iranian Government but will also serve as the best answer to insidious communistic propaganda among the masses.²

Washington, November 29, 1949.

1. The editors are unable to identify this memorandum.
2. A memorandum of conversation of November 29 by Mr. Ferguson stated that this aide-mémoire was handed to Mr. Hare by Ambassador Ala with the hope that Iranian desires as set forth in the paper would be included in the joint communiqué. The memorandum also noted statements made by Messrs. Hare and Jernegan that the Secretary, in agreeing to the issuance of a joint communiqué, “had made it quite clear that the United States would not be in a position to go farther than it had in the past and that it would merely consist of a, restatement of past public statements regarding Irano-Ameriean relations. Mr. Ala replied he hoped the United States Government would go ‘much further’ in the proposed communiqué than it had in the past.” (891.20/11–2949)