891.20/8–949: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
999. August 6 Wireless Bulletin announced that MAP legislation proposes allocation 27 million dollars for group three countries in which Iran linked with Korea and Philippines instead of Greece and Turkey. The funds proposed for former group much less than those for latter. Hence, except for possibilities of fund transfer clause, the limited funds and resultant materiel aid to Iran become readily evident.
During conversation yesterday evening, I gave Shah evil tidings. He was extremely upset. He spoke at once of cancelling his visit to the US.1 I calmed him down somewhat suggesting that if he would work with US representatives to improve efficiency Iranian Army he might possibly hope for some additional aid under 5 percent transfer provision. Shah remained most despondent and manifested greatest bewilderment US “lack of understanding” importance Iran in complex nations confronting USSR.
From fragmentary reports received here revised legislation does provide for some shift of funds from one area to another. Urgently recommend possibility increasing Iran’s share MAP be studied in light this provision. Although I understand no increase total MAP funds could be requested, and that less money than is currently proposed for total MAP will probably be forthcoming from Congress, I feel review of MAP objectives vis-à-vis Iran now essential.
If Iran considered important link in security chain, we are not exploiting to fullest extent possibilities for strengthening this link. I have no specific knowledge part Iran plays in US strategic concept. I assume our present policy toward Iran based on thorough analysis US security interests. We have endeavored, with almost surprising success, to bring Iranians to a feeling of solidarity with Western democracies. Revelation of the small amount of US aid to Iran and the apparently small strategic importance of Iran implied therefrom has, of course, come as a great shock to them. Fact Korea and Philippines both have received substantial military and economic aid from US since war does not make our present policy more palatable to Iran. For reasons well known to Department, military assistance to Iran has evolved slowly particularly in comparison with Greece and Turkey.
[Page 553]General Evans, Chief ArMish, has completed analysis matériel requirements Iranian Army based on absorptive capacities by time matériel might reasonably be expected to arrive. This analysis should be available in Washington.
General Evans estimates Iranian Army can usefully absorb under this program equipment roughly valued at between 25 and 30 million dollars. This matériel, even if provided in addition to equipment already on hand and equipment arriving under 10 million dollar surplus arms credit, would not meet full requirements present Iranian scale of equipment for force of 135,000. Funds required to meet all additional shortages can be computed from analysis submitted by General Evans.
Under revised MAP, according latest information available here, Iran would receive something less than 15 million. This program is presumably designed maintain resolute pro-Western political orientation Iran but in my opinion program this scale will fail to accomplish objectives.
Iranian leaders naturally think of themselves as having acted heroically in resisting Soviet aggression and subversive penetration since end of war. Further, they believe that inasmuch as US has spent and is still spending vast sums for military and economic aid throughout world, Iran has, perforce, acquired moral right to similar assistance. They consider Iran of strategic importance equal to Turkey, and that Iran has been equally stalwart in face of even stronger Soviet pressure. US assistance, military and economic, to Turkey is the yard stick against which they measure adequacy of assistance to Iran. Logical or not, this is background against which efficacy program to reinforce Iranian political orientation must be examined. In my judgment, proposed program will fail maintain Iranian confidence in US support, will strengthen suspicion Iranian leaders of existence of “secret policy” to sacrifice Iran in event of crisis, and will lend support to those who seek to convince Iranian leaders that such indeed is US policy. At this time I consider support Shah’s position cardinal point in maintaining internal stability and positive foreign policy. Shah, convinced of his control over Iranian Army, is determined to build up his military establishment. As previously reported Shah has primary interest in military affairs. His approach, although frequently extravagant in terms of materiel Iran forces can usefully employ, is reasonably sound with regard to basic strategy re Iran, If we provide Iranian Army what it can profitably use, US influence in development Iranian Army can be constructive, with promise real military dividends to both Iran and US. If assistance to Iran falls short of what is necessary to maintain US influence in evolution of Iranian military [Page 554] and economic development, increasing sums from Iran budget, which might otherwise be debited to essential economic and social purposes, may well be spent for military procurement without effective improvement of military potential. Department will recall in this regard Shah’s action in purchasing British six pounder artillery and arranging for procurement British jet aircraft without any consultation with US military advisers. To extent Iranian resources devoted fruitless and erratic military expenditures, possibilities economic development will be correspondingly reduced leaving Iran even more susceptible to subversive penetration with consequent peril all US interests in Middle East.
It is realized that military justification for substantial direct aid, as distinct from political justification, may be speculative. Some doubt exists as to Iranian Army’s will and ability to fight. Progress, though slow, has nevertheless been achieved under able direction US ArMish here. In event substantial US military aid is forthcoming, influence ArMish will increase, and solid basis exists for hope substantial progress could be made within foreseeable future. As available equipment increases, as training improves, Army morale and will to fight will consequently improve. All reports I have received indicate high degree maintenance of equipment within limits technical knowledge of personnel. There is no evidence equipment now arriving has been diverted to other than intended use.
No one imagines that now or in future Iranian Army could prevent Soviet invasion. As we understand it, object of MAP from military point of view is to insure internal security and to increase cost of invasion in terms of personnel and time required, and possibly to maintain with tribal assistance some form of prolonged resistance particularly in southern mountains. It is our feeling that over course of some years Iranian Army might be developed to point where it could make substantial contribution to US security interests in Middle East.
As we see it here, Soviet pressure against Western Europe, Greece and Turkey has, temporarily at least, diminished. Unless we assume USSR has abandoned for foreseeable future any idea seeking and exploiting soft spots along periphery, I consider Iran probable spot for new application Soviet technique as employed in Greece. With infiltration, Soviet intrusion into Azerbaijan could be at least as rewarding and even more confusing (Article 6, treaty 1921) than Soviet efforts in Greece and at no more expense to them. Unless we can accept with equanimity developments this nature it seems advantageous to provide Iran with equipment our military authorities believe can be usefully employed. In this connection reports indicate that as result economic deterioration in Azerbaijan, Mazanderan and [Page 555] Khorassan these vital northern areas are becoming increasingly vulnerable to subversive penetration. These areas constitute breadbasket of the nation. Inadequate assistance to Iran might be interpreted by Soviets as invitation to this type of enterprise. At moment Soviet restraint from incursions and vehement diplomatic moves is an indication, in so far as Soviet policy towards Iran may be gauged, of Soviet sensibility to strong US interest.
There exists no real national unity or cooperation among Iranian leaders. Without strong US inspiration and leadership there is little hope this situation will substantially improve. Time is of the essence in Iran. No one can say how much time we have. If we do nothing Iran will certainly remain a hole in the dyke. US interests in this area are of such importance we cannot afford to neglect any possibility which might tend to improve the stability of Iranian Government, and which might give Iranian people stake in their country and a cause for which they would be willing to fight.
In summary, I believe present MAP program will result in chagrin, disappointment, and even resentment in Iran while nevertheless provoking USSR. Our policy here should be to strengthen the Iranian position while not provoking USSR needlessly. Our announced program will undermine status elements in Iran friendly to us, resulting in decline of US influence. Iran’s international position will be trolled by Shah and government with less confidence in basic sincerity US policy toward Iran.
Please pass to Armed Forces.
- President Truman’s invitation of July 5 to the Shah to visit the United States was sent to Tehran in instruction 51, July 8. The Shah’s, acceptance, by letter, was sent to the Department by Tehran in telegram 962, July 28 (891.001/7–849,/7–2849).↩