891.20/8–949: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran
754. Urtel 999, Aug 9. Dept concurs your view essential review objectives MAP in Iran and is undertaking with National Mil Establishment thorough examination Iranian mil needs in light General Evans analysis.
Dept considers it important that it be made clear that allocation of assistance under proposed MAP of necessity based upon distribution available supplies in amounts and kinds proportionate to need for assistance, ability to utilize and maintain equipment and immediacy and extent of threat to security of nations involved. Important in this connection to note that Iran only nation to which it is proposed to provide assistance on a grant basis which has a favorable dollar balance. Comparison of amounts of assistance on dollar basis misleading since equipment priced for purposes of program on different bases dependent [Page 556] upon its availability from either excess, war reserves or new production. Necessarily estimate had to be unilateral and tentative in advance Congressional action to permit extension of assistance. These tentative estimates being restudied in view Evans data. Our expectation has been and continues to be that following enactment MAP and completion our studies we would undertake bilateral discussions with Iran to perfect program of assistance which wld be mutually beneficial. Legislation wld also permit the program of grant assistance to be supplemented by Iranian purchases of equipment if she so desires.
In view foregoing believe any conclusion that mil assistance program inadequate for Iranian needs premature. Dept trusts you will endeavor make this clear to Shah. For your info NME estimate re amount and character equipment justified for Iran on strictly mil grounds will have pol factor applied before US views as to Iranian program are finalized. If dollar costs of adequate program exceeds amount available under current year’s program plan, consideration will be given to extension of assistance over longer period or possibility transfer of additional sums from amounts allocated to other countries. No assurance can be given that either course would be feasible.
Dept somewhat disturbed your statement present MAP for Iran will result in “chagrin, disappointment and even resentment.” Any indication that Iran resents our freely offered help wld, of course, have serious effect on American public opinion and Congressional action. After consideration explanation given above, and such further discussion with Iranians as you think appropriate, pls give Dept your judgment as to whether program of type presently envisaged wld further achievement US objectives.
Hope you will be able to convince Shah that US mil aid planning for Iran will be based on our best estimate Iranian forces immediate needs and ability to absorb and on size and character army we believe Iran economically able support and train. (You might point out Turkish Army has been substantially reduced since beginning American aid and that such reduction was one of objectives of aid program.)
Know you will keep in mind and stress whenever appropriate that US Govt considers economic and social progress as first and most important line defense against USSR. Just as in Europe ERP is given first priority and nothing proposed in mil aid program which might interfere with economic recovery, we consider Iran will insure its own safety best by economic development and social reform and that a large mil estab, even with US aid in form of equipment, would add to danger rather than to security by adverse effect on economic program.
Wld like ur comments on foregoing together with ur estimate of course Iranian leaders might follow if in the end amount mil aid still falls short of meeting what they consider Iran’s minimum requirements [Page 557] and what they consider sufficient to prove continued American support.1
- In reply on September 5, Ambassador Wiley advised that he had orally outlined various aspects of the arms credit to the Shah the previous evening and that the Shah had seemed pleased. He concluded that “your 754 indicates that MAP will meet Shah’s minimum requirements provided we yield to Shah’s more than insistent demand for medium tanks. He wants 150. I suggest we let him have 50 to begin with.” (Telegram 1085, from Tehran, 891.20/9–549)↩