Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 54 Series

¹

Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Iran²

top secret

[Washington,] July 21, 1949.

NSC 54

The Problem

1. To review, for the information of the National Security Council, the position of the United States with respect to Iran, with particular reference to possible future developments affecting U.S. security.

Analysis

Basic U.S. Position

2. Because of its resources, strategic location, vulnerability to armed attack and exposure to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective in the Soviet program of expansion. If Iran should come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other countries of the Middle East would be directly threatened. Specifically the USSR would (1) acquire advance bases for subversive activities or actual attack against a vast contiguous area including Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; (2) obtain a base hundreds of miles nearer to potential US-UK lines of defense in the Middle East than any held at present; (3) control part and threaten all of the Middle Eastern oil reservoir upon which the western community draws to conserve limited western hemisphere resources; (4) control continental air routes crossing Iran, threaten those traversing adjacent areas, and menace shipping in the Persian Gulf, and (5) undermine the will of all Middle Eastern countries to resist Soviet aggression.

3. This Government has concluded (November 1947)^* that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States; that the security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of Iran; that the United States should assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran; that in carrying out this policy the United States should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective; and that before resorting to the actual employment of force the United States should exhaust political and economic means, including recourse to the United Nations.³

4. Hence the primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent the domination of that country by the USSR and to strengthen Iran’s orientation toward the West. Secondary objectives are (1) to encourage relations between Iran and other countries calculated to elicit United Nations support for its continued independence; (2) to maintain conditions of internal security, thereby increasing respect for Iranian sovereignty and avoiding a pretext for Soviet intervention, as well as making indirect Soviet aggression more difficult; (3) to foster an expanding economy with the purpose of alleviating economic discontent and strengthening allegiance to the central government; (4) to encourage the improvement of democratic institutions and processes in Iran so that Iranians may increasingly feel an affinity for the western world; and (5) to induce influential Iranians actively to support U.S. interests in Iran, the Middle East, and the United Nations.

Evaluation of Current Policy

5. Our objective of preventing domination of Iran by the USSR has so far been achieved, by means of diplomatic action. After first following a policy of procrastination, evasion and compromise when confronted by an aggressive Soviet attitude, Iran has for the past two years, with strong U.S. encouragement and support, stood up firmly for its independence in the face of persistent Soviet threats. The United States took the lead in restoring Iran’s full independence of foreign control following wartime occupation, particularly by supporting in the Security Council the Iranian complaint against Soviet interference in Iran’s internal affairs. We have informed Iranian authorities that we are prepared, so long as the Iranian Government demonstrates a willingness to stand up for its independence against external pressure, to support Iran not only by words but also by appropriate acts. We have suggested that Iran be prepared to communicate to the Security Council, at an appropriate time, recent instances of Soviet pressure. We have told the Iranians that we are not in a position to make any commitment as to our action if the Soviet Union should take aggressive measures against Iran, but have pointed out our obligations under the United Nations Charter. In response to Iranian inquiries, we have authorized the Embassy in Teheran to say that in the event of war with the Soviet Union involving both Iran and the United States, Iran may count on all assistance compatible with U.S. resources in a global conflict.

6. Current U.S. efforts to assist Iran internally include two military missions now advising the Iranian Army and the Gendarmerie, the willingness of the United States to support Iran’s efforts to secure financial aid through appropriate agencies (such as the World Bank) for well justified economic development projects, encouragement and advice in connection with the Iranian Government’s consideration of political and economic reforms designed to strengthen popular loyalty to the central government, and the provision of surplus light military equipment on credit for internal security purposes. Iran has been advised that before it could receive any assistance of the type granted Greece and Turkey, political, economic and military considerations must be weighed and Congressional approval obtained.

7. The support of Iranian independence by diplomatic means continues to be an important aim of U.S. foreign policy. In addition to the support and assistance now being accorded Iran, the United States should:

a. Demonstrate by diplomatic and economic acts our interest in Iranian independence and our willingness to take appropriate action in support of Iran’s stand against Soviet threats to its independence;

b. Provide through all practicable means funds and technical assistance, upon request of the Iranian Government, for the execution of well justified economic development projects which would demonstrate to the Iranian people the advantages of close association with the western powers;

c. Exert every practicable effective pressure upon Iran to facilitate economic and social reform in view of the great importance of the latter as a means of increasing national loyalty;

d. Continue to examine, through the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee⁴ and other appropriate channels, the question of furnishing direct military assistance to Iran.

Possible Future Developments

8. Although the USSR will continue to apply strong political and psychological pressures against Iran in an effort to force the government of that country into submission, it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to resort to direct armed intervention at this time. In the absence of such armed intervention, Iran is expected to maintain successful resistance to Soviet pressure and to strengthen its western alignment, provided it continues to have confidence in U.S. support. However, the Iranian Government must press its planned economic and social reforms or the internal stability of the country may be seriously threatened.

9. Nevertheless, the possibility of other developments which would dangerously alter the situation in Iran cannot be entirely ruled out. The effects which certain unexpected but possible contingencies would have on the security interests of the United States and our position in the event such possibilities materialize are analyzed in the following paragraphs.

10. First Contingency: The establishment of pro-Soviet provincial governments in Iran by subversive or other means not involving the use of military force.

a. There is no immediate likelihood of this occurring in the absence of some serious breakup of central authority such as might occur in the event of the death of the Shah or of some violent outbreak of dissension among highly placed people in the Iranian Government. The provincial administration in Iran is subject to a high degree of centralized control from Teheran. The local communist machine in northern Iran was largely broken up when Soviet forces retired in 1946,⁵ and many of its leaders are now in the Soviet Union. These people could hardly be reinstalled in any way in the provincial administration except by order of the Central Government in Teheran or by renewed entry of Soviet forces. Thus, the action which this Government might take would relate to one or the other of those contingencies, and will be discussed below.

b. If contrary to expectations this contingency, did occur we would be faced with the intensification of subversive Soviet activities in the remaining areas of Iran and in Near East areas contiguous thereto and with an increased tendency on the part of Middle East countries to seek strengthened security arrangements with the western powers. Should security arrangements considered satisfactory by them not be forthcoming from the western powers, the Middle Eastern countries might in time seek a compromise with the USSR.

c. Hence, if this contingency did occur, we would wish to review the priority accorded to Iran for the receipt of military equipment and consider what steps would be appropriate to counteract the adverse effects engendered in the surrounding areas. We might also wish to consider reference of the matter to the United Nations provided sufficient evidence of Soviet complicity were available to justify charges against the Russians.

11. Second Contingency: The overthrow of the present Iranian Government and the establishment of a pro-Soviet puppet government by subversive or other means not involving the use of military force.

a. Here, again, there is no immediate likelihood of this occurring. The Tudeh Party, now outlawed by the Iranian Government and functioning underground, does not have the capability of overthrowing the regime from within at this time. It is not likely to obtain that capability unless something should happen which would seriously Aveaken the strength and unity of the Iranian Government. The death of the Shah would not necessarily have this effect, but might possibly have it. The Government might also conceivably be weakened by rivalry between highly placed figures, of whom one or the other might be inclined to seek and use Soviet favor in order to fortify his position. In either of these contingencies, however, we would probably have ample warning before the course of events could lead to the complete establishment of a regime really subservient to Soviet interests. This means that we would have time to determine our policy in the light of the details of the prevailing situation, which cannot possibly be forecast before the contingency arises.

b. Presumably, the victory of pro-Soviet elements would not be immediate and complete, and for a long time some element of the old legitimate government would resist the communist uprising. If this element proved incapable of restoring its position in the country at large, our policy would presumably be to assist it to install itself in the south, preferably in the neighborhood of the oil fields, and to retain that whole area under its sovereign control. This we would have to do in conjunction with the British, since it would involve the cooperation of various of the local tribes, some of which could better be influenced by the British and some by ourselves.

c. Should this contingency result in the loss of all of Iran, in addition to the immediate effects of Soviet domination which are listed in paragraph 2 above, we would find ourselves faced with powerful secondary developments, the consequences of which could not be ignored. Denial of the oil output of the affected area would seriously jeopardize the ERP program, which under current estimates will in its last years depend on the Middle East for 80 percent of its oil. Furthermore, the loss of the output of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in which the British Government owns the controlling interest, would have a crippling effect upon the economy of the UK, and would place increased demands upon the dollar area. At this point positive steps in collaboration with the UK to prevent the spread of Soviet domination to the remaining oil-producing areas of the Middle East would be necessary. We might also wish to consider reference of the matter to the United Nations provided sufficient evidence of Soviet complicity is available to justify charges against the Russians.

12. Third Contingency: Direct military invasion and occupation of Iran.

a. This is also regarded as highly unlikely unless the Soviet Government has really decided to unleash a new world war and the occupation of Iran should be a first step in the process. This would be an act of naked aggression, and all the implications of a third world war would be added to the consequences discussed in paragraph 2 and 11–c above.

b. The Iranian Government would undoubtedly appeal for our support under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Our Government would then be faced with the question of whether or not to go to the assistance of Iran and whether to do so immediately or to await action by the United Nations. This decision would have to take into account not only that the Soviet action was probably the beginning of a new world war, but that preliminary considerations by the United Nations would place us in a strong position before world opinion and would afford us a brief respite for preparations prior to actual entry into a state of war with the Soviet Union, … Therefore, unless there were overriding military considerations, it would be preferable that the matter first be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations, where action would presumably be vetoed by the Russians. Simultaneously with consideration in the Security Council or immediately following a veto in that body we might wish to pro pose consideration of the matter by the General Assembly or the Little Assembly. Meanwhile, we would probably desire consultation with the other members of the North Atlantic Pact.

c. We would probably also wish to consider continued recognition and support of the legitimate government of Iran even if it were forced into exile, and we might also wish to review the priority for the receipt of military equipment of such groups still resisting in Iran.

d. The final decision with regard to actual entry into a state of war with the Soviet Union would depend upon a number of variable factors, including the international situation at the moment, the pretext for Russian entry, the: state of international opinion as reflected in the United Nations, our own analysis of Russian motives, the state of our commitments elsewhere in the world at that particular moment, and the reactions of our closest allies. Therefore, no hard or fast course can be prescribed at the present time. Ultimately, of course, any decision involving war could be made only by Congress, in the light of recommendations from the Chief Executive. In framing such recommendations the President would have to make his decisions in the light of our over-all military and diplomatic strategy in anew world war.

e. The recommendation that final decision be deferred, if possible, pending United Nations action, assumes that Russian invasion of Iran would be unaccompanied by action elsewhere. However, Soviet invasion of Iran might be accompanied by other action which would require an immediate military reaction on the part of the United States and its allies prior to completion of consideration of the matter by the United Nations.

13. Fourth Contingency: The introduction of Soviet troops into Azerbaijan or other areas of Northern Iran under alleged 1921 Treaty rights.

a. While this eventuality is also not now regarded as likely, in the light of available intelligence, it is perhaps the one that would offer the greatest temptation to the USSR, and the one with which it would be the hardest to cope. The situation would be particularly difficult if the Russians should re-occupy the northern province of Iran swiftly and with very little bloodshed and then stop there and go no further. The matter would undoubtedly be referred to the Security Council, which is still seized of the Iranian case, and consideration there would probably revolve principally around the obligation of members of the United Nations to settle their differences by peaceful means, the validity of the 1921 Treaty and the existence or non-existence of conditions in Iran necessary to bring into effect the operative clauses of that Treaty. Action by the Security Council would presumably be vetoed by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Iranian Government would probably be appealing for our support under Article 51 of the Charter. Following a veto in the Security Council, we might wash to propose reference of the matter to the General Assembly or the Little Assembly. If the opinion of this body confirmed the fact of Soviet aggression in defiance of United Nations principles, we would be faced with the question whether or not to go to the assistance of Iran under Article 51. This decision, of course, could be made only by the Congress, in the light of recommendations from the Chief Executive. In framing these recommendations, the President would have to take into account a number of variable factors, including the international situation at the moment, the state of international opinion as reflected in the United Nations, our own analysis of Russian motives, the state of our commitments elsewhere, and the reactions of our closest allies.⁶ Therefore, no hard and fast course can be prescribed at the present time.

b. Soviet occupation of Northern Iran might well be only a prelude to an attempt to overthrow the legitimate Iranian Government and we should, therefore, have plans capable of immediate implementation along the lines discussed in paragraph 11–5 of Contingency Number 2.

1. Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
2. Prepared at the request of the Acting Secretary of the Army by the staff of the National Security Council with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of other high officials of the United States Government; transmitted by Admiral Souers to the National Security Council in his note of July 21, which recommended that “the Council, after discussion and agreement upon any proposed revisions, note the enclosed report as an integrated assessment and appraisal of the national security objectives, commitments and risks of the United States with respect to Iran, in relation to the four contingencies affecting U.S. security outlined therein.”

   The Council, on August 4, “Noted NSC 54, subject to the amendment of paragraph 13–a as proposed by the Secretary of State.” (Action 240, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95) Regarding the amendment proposed by the Secretary of State, see footnote 6, p. 551. Lot 66 D 95 is a collection of administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation for the years 1947–1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

3. NSC Action No. 13. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. These conclusions were arrived at during “The Pentagon Talks of 1947” between high officials of the United States and British Governments; see particularly, “The American Paper” and Acting Secretary Lovett’s memorandum of November 24, 1947, to President Truman, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 575 and 623, respectively.
4. For a description of the composition and functions of this committee, see footnote 2, vol. i, p. 250.
5. For documentation on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 289 ff.
6. At this point in the report as prepared on July 21 appeared the following: “(the latter probably obtained through consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Pact)” (S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1). It is this material that was omitted at the request of the Secretary of State; see footnote 2, p. 545. Lot 62 D 1 is a serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.