Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

891.00/2–2149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran

secret

Washington, February 22, 1949—5 p. m.

us urgent

163. Brit Emb consulted Dept Feb 21 re Shah’s project Constitutional reform, showing copy FonOff instructions to Tehran (London’s 624, Feb 18 and 636, Feb 21¹) and Le BougeteFs report to London (Tehran’s 195, Feb 21²), which communications apparently had crossed.

Tentative Dept position was elucidated as follows, largely against background Tehran’s 176, Feb 17:

(1) We have never advanced, nor are we inclined now advance, any argument against Iranian constitutional reform per se. On contrary, must be clear to any observer Iranian politics that present constitution is faulty in certain respects and legislative processes might be improved by amendment. At same time, constitutional revision is not only means correcting obvious faults present system. Increase of both Shah’s influence and Majlis responsibility might well be achieved by implementation present constitutional provision re Senate. In any event, constitutional reform cannot be expected per se to cure quickly weaknesses which have become traditional in Iranian politics and politicans.

(2) Concerning method of accomplishing objective desirable constitutional reform, we continue feel strongly that Shah in taking initiative should scrupulously avoid procedure which would create serious cleavage in Iranian political life and lessen world sympathy and support for Iran in its international relations. We are convinced both dangers would be run if Shah should take clearly unconstitutional step dissolving Majlis or antagonize Iranian political opposition by creating subservient Govt for purpose defying Majlis. In unfortunate premises Iranian constitution having no amending clause, we believe constitutional change should be initiated only after Shah has gained acceptance idea by preponderance political personages in Iran. Otherwise, Shah might well lose newly acquired prestige and create situation welcome only Soviet Union. Re foreign repercussions, Shah should not lose sight of adverse effect which domestic disorder would have on possibility Iran contracting economic development loans and which appearance of dictatorial methods would have on continued extension kind of support for Iran U.S. has extended in the past. Public opinion in democratic countries is offended by appearance of dictatorial methods, which are typified by illegal dissolution parliaments. On other hand, if Shah should be able gain Majlis support for strengthened Govt which would commit itself to summoning constituent assembly, allegation could not justifiably be made that he is acting against representative political opinion.

(3) Concerning timing, we realize occasion will probably never be perfect and Dept unable judge whether any exact moment more propitious than others. We believe however Shah should take into account in choosing his time as well as methods external factors, such as possible effects of action on world opinion, as well as internal factors such as his degree of political strength at moment.

Urtel 197, Feb 21³ just received confirms above Dept thinking, which Brit Emb has transmitted FonOff. As you suggest, it would seem present govt might well be broadened and so be able itself meet needs of situation. It cannot be called anti-Shah and has shown considerable strength in security measures taken following attempt on Shah’s life, making opium declaration UN and effecting Majlis passage 7–year plan bill.

On basis above, you should (urtel 202, Feb 22⁴) consult Le Rougetel with view to making observations to Shah or his emissaries when and as you consider it desirable.⁵

Acheson

1. Neither printed; the former summarized the Foreign Office’s draft instructions which set forth arguments against the Shah taking action. The latter informed that the draft instructions had been sent to Ambassador Le Rougetel on February 19 (891.00/2–1849, /2–2149).
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed; it advised that the British Ambassador had showed Chargé Somerville a telegram from London to Washington inquiring whether the Department wished to instruct the American Embassy in Iran to make representations to the Shah regarding constitutional reform, in concert with the British Embassy (891.00/2–2249).
5. This telegram was repeated to London as No. 607. The next day, the Department directed London to show the text of No. 607 to the Foreign Office (No. 608, 891.00/2–2349). No. 608 concluded that the parallel instructions sent to American and British representatives at Tehran were substantially in accord and that the concerting of timing, method, and details of approach should be left to the Embassies. Chargé Somerville conveyed the substance of telegram 163 to the Shah on February 24 (telegram 214, February 24, 5 p. m., from Tehran, 891.00/2–249).