Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

891.00/2–1749: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Somerville) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Tehran, February 17, 1949—3 p. m.

176. Deptel 140, February 15.¹ It is generally agreed the recent attempt on Shah’s life changed political situation in following major respect:

(1) Shah’s own standing with Iranian people immensely improved, and there was greater disposition accept his leadership. This was all more true because of heightened realization by the people of extent to which their welfare and security were dependent upon him and of what would have happened if attempt had succeeded. Restraint and moderation shown by Shah in public statement following incident have increased public respect and affection for him.

(2) In new situation created by incident, it became possible take measures control subversive and disruptive elements, notably banning Tudeh Party, which had not hitherto been feasible.

Shah’s decision take early drastic action regarding constitutional reform (my 126, February 6,² and 161, February 14) should be viewed against following background:

(a) For some time Shah has been convinced that in order have a workable government able carry through economic and social reforms, which he feels necessary to save Iran from Communism, certain measures of constitutional reform, requiring calling constituent assembly, are necessary. He has held this view a long time and in recent months has become increasingly convinced action could not be delayed much longer without disaster.

(b) About three weeks ago he came to conclusion time to take action would be when decree calling for elections to next Majlis were issued and he so informed British Ambassador (Deptels 84 and 85 February 1).

(c) As result parallel representations from both US and UK, which were primarily based on view that while we did not disagree with objective we thought timing was bad, Shah was persuaded, reluctantly and against his own judgment, to defer for a time his decision call constituent assembly (Embtels 112 and 113, February 3³).

(d) A few days later, attempt on his life occurred.

(e) In consequence of two major changes in situation, (1 and 2 above) both of which were favorable to his plans but might prove transitory, Shah decided if he was ever to act, time was now.

Shah’s view is that of man who has long determined on a course of action, who has been waiting for most propitious moment to put it into effect, and who is now convinced that present moment is more favorable than is likely to be case at any foreseeable future date.

If he is to be deterred by any arguments, they must be either against constitutional reform per se, against this method of accomplishing his objective, or against timing of his action.

He is no longer disposed to listen to any arguments against first, i.e., action toward effecting some constitutional changes. The need for such seems clearly to exist, and we have told him in past we are not opposed in principle (Embtel 1249, November 1⁴).

From conversations with British Ambassador and Ebtehaj in last few days, I have impression Shah’s mind regarding method may still be fluid. There is no provision for amendment of present constitution, hence some extraordinary procedure is essential if change is to be made. There may be some precedent in his father’s action for calling constituent assembly. However, it now seems he may be thinking in terms of having the new Majlis and the Senate themselves constitute the constituent assembly, rather than following procedure outlined Paragraph 6, mytel 161. He still appears to have in mind dissolving present Majlis. This step might provoke considerable opposition that would not otherwise be expressed against constitutional reform as such Shah would obviously lack constitutional authority to dissolve Majlis. Moreover, present Majlis in passing Seven-Year Plan law this week has shown itself in better light.⁵

Regarding timing, Shah is no longer disposed to listen to any general arguments. He is convinced that he is now in position to deal with any internal dissension. As regards the argument that the Seven-Year Plan might be delayed, its passage by the Majlis has now been effected, and in the Shah’s view one of the main reasons for his plan of action is that rapid progress in implementation of Seven-Year Plan cannot be realized under existing political procedures.

British Ambassador tells me he has sent a further telegram to London emphasizing importance reaching definite decision on policy to be followed. He feels any temporizing advice at this stage would be a mistake and we should either oppose the whole project in principle or let the Shah go ahead, now that circumstances have made the present a more favorable time.

Le Rougetel seems convinced situation, has deteriorated to point where only drastic action can avoid disaster. While I do not recall his having made comment attributed to him in paragraph 4 London’s 561 to effect nothing useful can come from Majlis during next three months, it is conceivable his pessimism with regard to present situation may be influenced in some degree by difficulties British Government is encountering in its current negotiations with Iran on two highly important matters: AIOC and IBI.

As regards Le Rougetel’s view that situation is such that regime might be overthrown in a few months’ time, I think it is true weakness of government and general lack of cohesion are such that if Shah had been assassinated, complete chaos would have ensued, creating a situation of which Soviet Government would have known how to take advantage. Such a development, however, does not appear as imminent now as prior to attempt on Shah.

This telegram has been drafted after consultation with General Evans⁶ and Colonel Drury,⁷ who concur.

Sent Department 176, repeated London 35.

Somerville

1. Not printed; the Department advised that it was “Puzzled by Shah’s sudden decision take drastic action at this time,” as set forth in Tehran’s telegram 161, February 14, p. 478. The message also stated that “Le Rougetel’s apparent about-face and particularly his comment present regime in imminent danger incomprehensible to Dept (London’s 17, Feb. 14).” (891.00/2–1449) London’s 17 to Tehran was a repeat of No. 561 to the Department, not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 480.
2. Not printed.
3. No. 112 not printed.
4. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 191.
5. The Majlis, on February 15, passed a law which authorized the Government to proceed with the Seven–Year Economic Development Program. The legislation authorized the expenditure of 21 billion rials, or the equivalent of $656 million, at the official exchange rate of 32 rials to the dollar. The major categories involved social and municipal reforms ($188 million), agriculture ($164 million) and railroads, roads, ports, and airports ($156 million) (airgrams 63, February 18, and 79, March 3, from Tehran, 891.50/2–1849, /3–349).
6. Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, Chief of the American Military Mission with the Iranian Army.
7. Frederick W. Drury, Military Attaché in Iran.