501.BB Balkan/5–2549: Telegram
The United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Drew) to the Acting Secretary of State
1026. Combal 431. From Drew. Re 760, May 20.1 Following comments on reference telegram are submitted solely from UNSCOB point of view and without consultation with any American agency Greece and any discrepancies with reports from such sources, particularly military, should be evaluated accordingly.
I concur fully points 1 to 9 except No. 4. Greeks are becoming increasingly bemused by their own insistence on “unconditional surrender” policy toward repeated guerrilla peace proposals. While obviously no one could question full legal and moral justification for such stand it is hardly realistic especially when one considers that hard Communist core of guerrilla forces never estimated over 25 per cent. Such adamant stand tends force remaining 75 per cent of conscriptees, waivers or adventurers to join ranks of last ditchers. By accepting US military support and international political intervention—read UNSCOB—Greece has to that extent accepted derogation of full sovereignty. Protracted intransigent harping on unconditional surrender theme must eventually tend to discourage war weary Greek public opinion and jeopardize continued support of US public and congressional opinion not to mention US sympathy.
[Page 340]There can, of course, be no question of Greece negotiating with the so-called democratic government or leaders of guerrilla movement but obviously any agreement for laying down of arms will require certain conditions. It is believed that these conditions should ostensibly be fixed by the Greeks but the fulfillment of the conditions supervised on an international basis.
On point 10, we should reserve freedom to urge on Greek Government holding of internationally supervised elections as this might well prove to be essential key to eventual solution of Greek problem. At Paris Tsaldaris repeatedly told me his government would welcome elections and he did not seem to exclude possibility of international supervision.
On points 15 and 16 agree that current situation northern Greece justifies restrained optimism re military situation.
I returned May 23 from one week tour Yugoslav frontier region (see Combal 428 of May 252). While even minor military reverse, not to be discounted, such as bandit seizure of one or more recently re-occupied villages would seriously deflate prevalent optimism, I am convinced military civilian morale now at highest tide since start of 1948 Grammos campaign. Situation in Thrace and eastern Macedonia relatively rosy but liquidation of Vitsi Grammos bastion appears almost insurmountable task given continued all out supply and territorial backing from Albania. Similar support from Yugoslav while channelized definitely not ended.3 Therefore, military successes remote from border must not blind us to simple fact that border areas will remain focus of infection until international developments induce northern neighbors to cease aid and perhaps even more important cause Soviets and satellites to withdraw moral support to guerrillas.
I heartily applaud line suggested in point 20–b. To my knowledge neither Soviets nor Poland have ever stated in so many words that they would not take seats on UNSCOB, which I have always considered highly significant.
Easiest face-saving formula for them would be to do so. From such front seat position they could easily encourage neighbors and Soviet bloc to recede gradually from current attitude, even send observers, gain their acceptance across northern border and reach through UN channels goal of appeasement they seemingly suggest through three [Page 341] power device. I recommend we seize earliest opportunity try out this formula.
Following fade-out of Evatt effort UNSCOB remains sole duly constituted UN agency for formal conciliation effort. If outright UNSCOB participation unpalatable to Russians they might be sounded out on possible acquiescence in designation by UNSCOB of non-member mediatory group under Article 10–c of November 27 resolution, which might comprise two “westerners” and one “neutral” palatable to Soviets.
Assuming Greek acquiescence and full participation we might yet develop with Soviets formula for preconcerted resolution at next GA to replace UNSCOB by new body in which they would participate charged essentially with conciliatory function and subsidiary observation role. Unilateral Greek decision on such internal problems as amnesty elections etc., could well constitute essential concomitant.
From this distance my personal interpretation that aside from international factors, such as Atlantic Pact, European recovery, etc., Gromyko feelers prompted by: (1) success in Greece of Truman Doctrine in both military and economic spheres; (2) successful Tito diversion; (3) boomerang of the Macedonian venture, we should endeavor to capitalize on our present position of strength.
Sent Department 1026, repeated Paris 48.
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of the paper prepared by the Department of State, included as Annex B to Rusk’s May 19 memorandum of his conversation with British Minister Hoyer Millar (p. 326).↩
- Telegram 1021, Combal 428, May 25, from Athens, not printed. Drew was accompanied on his tour by the Acting Australian and Brazilian Representatives on the U.N. Special Committee (501.BB Balkan/5–2549).↩
- In asserting his view in his message Combal 428 (cited in the previous footnote), Drew disagreed with the opinion attributed to the British Foreign Office in telegram 1987, May 20 from London, not printed, that Yugoslav aid to Greek guerrillas had practically stopped (868.00/5–2049).↩