Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

740.00119 Council/5–2549: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, May 25, 1949—10 a. m.

1361. Mytel 1154 May 6.¹

1. As we see it from Moscow, further developments on Greek issue will depend on outcome CFM. Purpose Soviet publication Rusk–McNeil–Gromyko talks clearly intended table question publicly as great power issue, rather than correct erroneous press reports, as alleged, since Soviets previously demonstrated able face with strong disregard apparently inevitable leaks confidential exchanges to American press. Inclusion conditions clearly unacceptable to west, as well as Soviet initiative in publishing indicates to us Kremlin deliberately sought forestall present continuation negotiations.

2. If Soviet policy develops propaganda-wise at CFM, Kremlin will have Greek (and now Japanese) issues to include in campaign showing Soviet struggle for peaceful solution main problems against west unwillingness agree.

3. If CFM reaches agreement on Germany, indicating Kremlin really shifting line and seeking détente in Europe, then believe they would be prepared alter Gromyko conditions, accept face-saving formulae. In this event, Soviet essentials would probably be:

(a) Preservation “leading cadres” KKE through broad amnesty;

(b) Retention legal position party enabling it pursue militant internal political program (as in France, Italy);

(c) Withdrawal British troops.

4. Thus Department’s press release (Deptel 357 May 20²) and British statements probably on lines expected by Moscow and further initiative both unexpected and undesirable pending CFM developments.

5. While we agree generally Department’s reactions Gromyko proposals (Deptel 359 May 20³), we believe if events develop on lines suggested Paragraph 3 above, some modifications may become desirable, especially in nature face-saving formulae. For example, Soviet Government could hardly accept role in “illegal” UNSCOB, but could agree to other ad hoc organ including full participation Greek Government as well perhaps as Bulgaria and Albania, and some lesser representations, at least as observers, of a rebel junta. We do not think however Soviets would be much impressed in this connection by line argumentation suggested Paragraph 19 reference telegram.

6. Any settlement would be temporary détente, as Soviet objective ultimate control Greece would remain unchanged. Present open hostilities in mountains would simply be transformed into classic internal political struggle. Essential decision for us would be whether Greek Government with reduced foreign aid and no foreign troops would be able maintain sufficient political stability and economic health to win this struggle.

Repeated Athens 30, London 127, Paris 210 for USDel.

Kohler

1. In telegram 1154, Chargé Kohler attempted to forecast Soviet strategy at the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. For text of the telegram, see vol. iii, p. 864.
2. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the statement issued to the press by the Department of State on May 20 (see the editorial note, p. 329).
3. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the paper prepared by the Department of State, included as Annex B to Rusk’s May 19 memorandum of his conversation with British Minister Hoyer Millar (p. 326).