501.BB Balkan/5–2549
The British Minister (Hoyer Millar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United
Nations Affairs (Rusk)
top secret
Washington, 25th May,
1949.
(G.10/ /49)
Dear Rusk: When we discussed Greece on the
19th May you very kindly gave me, for communication to the Foreign
Office for their comments, a copy of a paper which had been drawn up
in the State Department for submission to Mr. Acheson for his use,
if he approved it, as a brief in his discussions in Paris with Mr.
Bevin on the Greek and Balkan situation.1
2. I now send you two papers which we have just received from the
Foreign Office containing
- A)
- their general comments on the Russian overture including their
suggestions regarding the line which our counter-proposals might
take (paragraph 20 in the State Department document); and
- B)
- their detailed comments on paragraphs 1 to 19 of the State
Department document.
3. The Foreign Office have asked us to explain in sending you these
papers that, while they have been sent to Mr. Bevin in Paris, they
have not yet been approved by him and, like your own paper at the
time when you gave it to me, should be regarded as no more than an
expression of the Departmental view.
4. The Foreign Office assume that the next step will depend upon the
outcome of any discussion between the two Secretaries of State in
Paris.
Yours sincerely,
Enclosure A
[London, undated.]
Paper Prepared in the British Foreign
Office2
top secret
The Russian overture is made from weakness only to the extent
that developments in Greece itself have not been in their
favour. There is no evidence whatever that the Kremlin is
anxious to bring about settled conditions in the Balkan area as
a whole. The Hungarian, Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments are
still hostile and intransigent, the Soviet radio war on Turkey
has not relaxed and pressure on Tito continues.
2. If and when we do reply, our counter-proposals should be
designed not only to guarantee the end of all interference in
Greece but also to bring us advantages in other fields. They
should include our maximum requirements so as to leave room for
bargaining.
3. In so far as they directly concern Greece, Greek support must
be assured. To that end we might first ask the Greek Government
to state their conditions for declaring a fresh amnesty and new
elections following upon the surrender of the rebels. They
should, however, not be asked to agree to any form of
international supervision either of the surrender or of the
amnesty and the elections, or to re-legalise the
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Greek Communist Party. We should
stick to the principle that these are matters of internal Greek
concern.
4. On the purely Greek aspect, our counter-proposals might be
limited to a re-statement of the two requirements that all
assistance given by the Northern neighbours to the rebels should
cease and that the rebels should surrender with all their arms.
We might however add that if U.N.S.C.O.B. were allowed access to Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia and Albania in order to establish that aid to the
rebels had really ceased, this might make it easier for the
Greek Government to order new elections.
5. We could then go on to mention other points in neighbouring
territories on which in our opinion a Soviet initiative could
contribute towards the establishment of peaceful conditions. Our
requirements could be stated as follows:—
-
a)
- in Albania, a cessation of interference in Greece and (for
the United Kingdom) a settlement of the damages due from the
Corfu incident.
-
b)
- in Bulgaria, a cessation of interference in Greece and
fulfilment of obligations towards Greece in the matter of
reparations, etc.
-
c)
- repatriation of Greek children.
-
d)
- a cessation of the war of nerves against Turkey.
-
e)
- a firm guarantee that the Soviet Government will refrain
from intervening in the domestic affairs of Cyprus.
6. Counter-proposals of this kind would no doubt be rejected by
the Russians but they may lead them to make fresh suggestions
rather less remote from what might be acceptable to us than
those recently put forward by Gromyko. Meanwhile the Greeks will
have derived further encouragement from our continued support
and the disintegration of the rebels would continue.
Enclosure B
[London, undated.]
Paper Prepared in the British Foreign
Office3
top secret
The following are the detailed comments of the Foreign Office on
the State Department document:—4
We agree with paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17 and
18.
2. Paragraphs 2 and 19. The Greeks have no
confidence in Dr. Evatt’s ability to negotiate a settlement with
their Northern neighbours and according to our latest
information Dr. Evatt has himself
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admitted the failure of his efforts.
U.N.S.C.O.B. has also
proved ineffective as a conciliator. The Greeks would probably
not object to a solution brought about by the intervention of
the Great Powers provided it was effective.
3. Paragraph 6. We agree, but see no
useful purpose in explicitly stating this principle in our reply
to the Russians.
4. Paragraph 10. If the Greek Government
ever agreed that there should be international supervision of
elections they might be advised to consider entrusting the task
to powers which had not hitherto been involved in Greece, e.g.
the Scandinavian.
5. Paragraphs 11 and 12. We believe that
Tito’s internal political opposition is fairly strong and that
he has almost ceased helping the Greek rebels. We also believe
the situation of the Albanian Government to be precarious. On
the other hand, there have been no favourable developments in
the other satellites where propaganda is still the only weapon
available to us.
6. Paragraph 16. One of the purposes of
the Soviet approach is to make us withdraw material support from
the Greeks. On the analogy of the Berlin airlift we must be
quite certain that a final and effective solution has already
been reached before contemplating any diversion of
resources.
