Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

868.00/5–749: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

Athens, May 7, 1949—noon.

902. Embtel 897, May 5. In considering reply to King we should be mindful of danger that our advice may be taken as license to carry out suggested plan without delay. It is regrettable that King has around him not single mature adviser especially now that Tsaldaris–Pipinelis–Levides¹ group has been eclipsed by new combination consisting of impatient Papagos, egocentric and controversial Markezinis and young, untried Metaxas whose flip and shallow approaches are hardly reassuring. While I believe advice recommended mytel 897 is sound, one cannot be sure how it will be interpreted by King.

I cannot disagree strongly with view that Tsaldaris has played politics in reprehensible manner and that Chamber is source never-ending friction and disunity. Under certain conditions disappearance both may be necessary but one wonders whether this could at present be justified. Prevailing situation when there are many hopeful signs on horizon would seem to call for patience and restraint rather than for radical change involving possible charges of dictatorship, which are already being bruited about by Greek public. Radical solution now may be likened to man who has come successfully through long and critical illness only to take overdose of aspirin. I personally do not find local situation as alarming as King appears to consider it. Although there are certainly numerous elements of danger in present situation my principal concern is that elements near King may take action prematurely and in capricious manner unconscious of far reaching effects.

I suggest therefore that in replying to King we place emphasis on need for restraint and patience and suggest that present hopeful time when termination Greek travail may be brought about through force of arms or even by international agreement would hardly seem time for radical solution.²

Minor

1. Dimitrios Levidis, Court Grand Chamberlain to King Paul.
2. In his telegram 903, May 7, from Athens, not printed, Chargé Minor reported that British Ambassador Norton was in complete agreement with the views expressed in this telegram. Norton expressed the view to Minor that King Paul was badly informed both as to the necessity of drastic action and the state of public morale. Norton felt strongly that the King’s contemplated drastic course of action would be wholly unacceptable to British opinion. (868.00/5–749)