868.00/5–549: Telegram
The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State
urgent
897. For Department and Ambassador Grady. Metaxas1 called yesterday on behalf of King to request that he proceed urgently to US to present King’s views on Greek political situation to Ambassador. I replied I felt such procedure definitely unwise since (1) such views should be presented here to Embassy for transmission to Department and Ambassador; (2) political crisis might be induced and King open himself to strong criticism for indulging in unwarranted political maneuver; and (3) ourselves would become involved in such manner as to suggest that any ensuing political solution was imposed by us. Metaxas expressed complete willingness be guided by our views but wished Embassy to know he is ready to make such trip on King’s instructions if and when we think advisable.
Metaxas then went on to give me following views for consideration by Embassy and transmission to Department and Ambassador. King is concerned almost to point of alarm over drift of events in Greece. Unedifying spectacle of political bickering as typified by Markezinis affair has caused revulsion of feeling among people and has lowered morale of army at critical time. He feels that if action is not taken to lift Greek Government out of political morass military effort will be jeopardized. He is afraid that unwarranted accusations such as brought against Markezinis will be made against other leaders notably General Papagos. He alleges that Greek Government cooperation with ECA has been hindered and that action in whole governmental field dangerously slowed down. He does not hide his belief that Tsaldaris is to great extent responsible for this atmosphere.
Specifically he proposes to accept Sophoulis’ resignation “within next two weeks” and immediately request Sophoulis form new government without Tsaldaris, Venizelos and Markezinis. Papagos would continue as C-in-C but be confined strictly to military problems. Government would be broad and able parliamentary coalition and, while slate not yet drawn up, would include many best men already in [Page 310] government such as Stephanopoulos, Melas, Helmis, Rodopoulos, Averof, Tsatsos,2 if these could be induced continue. Deputy PriMins might be Rendis and Canellopoulos, former possibly as MinFonAff and latter Minister Interior. Stress would be on ability and progressive orientation. Government would of course be parliamentary and not at inception what is known as service government. However in case chamber refuses a show confidence it would be dissolved and new elections held when possible (undoubtedly not within 45 day limit prescribed by constitution). King feels strongly his obligation to Ambassador to prevent political crisis during his absence and therefore wishes to have Ambassador’s views before going ahead with plan.
My comments and recommendations follow. There is no doubt that government solidarity has been broken by Markezinis affair and that political jockeying which we had hoped had been eliminated in Sophoulis Government formed in January has again returned to scene. It is probable that efforts will be made to besmirch character other persons. If guns are turned on General Papagos effect on army morale may be serious. There seems little doubt that political bickering in Athens has had distressing effect on civilian and military morale. While ECA officials have had rather good impression ability and integrity individual Greek cabinet ministers they report it increasingly difficult to obtain action, get Greek politicians live up to commitments made and to persuade Diomedes to channel action through steering committee. Berry3 reports situation politico-military field unsatisfactory.4
Under circumstances it seems entirely natural King should desire homogeneous government and elimination harmful political jockeying. Accusation that he is resorting to dictatorship which might have been valid had he proceeded with earlier Papagos-Markezinis combination could cause case lose much of its force in view of parliamentary character of government and its democratic complexion. On other hand elimination of leader of majority party and dissolution of [Page 311] chamber when it is obvious elections cannot be held within prescribed time are serious steps which should be taken only as last resort. On balance, my recommendation is that we inform King we will not stand in way if he wishes to carry out his plan as purely Greek solution in natural evolution of political situation but that at same time we urge him take action only as last resort and after giving present government fullest opportunity to make good. It would seem that King’s plan under such circumstances would be strictly within spirit policy laid down in Policy Planning Staff paper “Report of US Aid to Greece” November 24, 1948.5
I have not consulted British Ambassador and will not do so until learn views of Department and Ambassador.
- King Paul’s political adviser Aristides Metaxas.↩
- Under reference here are the fallowing: Minister of Coordination Stephanos Stephanopoulos of the Populist Party, Minister of Justice George Melas of the liberal Party, Minister of Finance Dimitrios Helmis of the Populist Party, Minister of Health Konstantinos Rodopoulos of the Populist Party, Minister of Supply Evangelos Averof-Tossitsas of the Liberal Party, and Minister of Education Konstantinos Tsatsos of the National Union Party.↩
- Burton Y. Berry, Special Assistant to Ambassador Grady.↩
- In his telegram 945, May 13, from Athens, not printed, Chargé Minor explained that this statement regarding the politico-military situation was not intended to suggest that the military situation had deteriorated or to give cause for alarm but rather to indicate that political factors continued to play an important role in the military field. Minor cited a number of examples including the strained relationship between General Papagos and Minister of War Kanellopoulos and the emotional involvement of Papagos in the Markezinis affair (868.00/5–1349).↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 195.↩