501.BB Balkan/5–749: Telegram
The United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Drew) to the Secretary of State
906. Combal 419 from Drew. In my airgram No. 3 of March 10, 1949,1 I advanced certain tentative suggestions regarding future organization of UNSCOB including replacement of non-Big Five members by other countries maintaining diplomatic missions in Athens, chief of mission acting as ex officio representative to committee.
In addition, I desire renew suggestion that serious study should be given to complete internationalization of observer groups under UN, including personnel, equipment and supplies. This would admittedly be expensive, especially if UN had to buy at open market prices the valuable equipment, including radios, trucks and jeeps now on loan from US. If we could continue to lend such items and make planes available at less than commercial rates, budget could be held within reasonable limits and would be chiefly for salaries and per diem of personnel. Plan to place observers under SYG aside from eliminating present charge on NME, would incontrovertibly establish impartial character of observation function of committee which in practice has been and presumably will continue to be sole active role of committee. Our secretariat is beginning study of budgetary implications of this plan which I will pass on to Department when ready.
[Page 313]Following represents my preliminary thinking on substantive aspects of upcoming report and hypothetical Greek resolution at fourth GA.
Conclusions in this year’s report will apparently follow general lines of last year’s but regarding material aid will be based in large part on witness testimony due lack opportunity make direct observation for reasons previously pointed out to Department. Our conclusions will consequently be more vulnerable to attack in event of repetition of last year’s full-scale debate.
It follows that recommendations by committee as strong or stronger than last year’s will rest on less solid ground and conceivably command less universal support at next GA. Less categorical recommendations, however, could not be advanced without representing retreat from our present position not only unjustified by situation but holding dangerous implications for Greek morale and American congressional and public support of Greek aid program.
Even if our conclusions found to justify tougher recommendations than last fall we have already considered and rejected all such extreme proposals as political or economic sanctions against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, invocation of Article 51, etc. This leaves us with repetition of last year’s recommendations and renewal of condemnatory and operative clauses of current resolutions as highest goal to which we can raise our sights.
What, however, is to be gained by mere repetition threatening to become monotonous, of previous admonitions, warnings and recommendations? Their practical effect on Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia has admittedly been nil. On other hand, renewed presentation in GA will inevitably touch off full-scale debate of last year with all of propaganda aspects and further mutual recriminations between East and West.
Even more serious, they will force Yugoslavia to adopt same line as in past tending to nudge her over to Cominform propaganda line and adopt at least in eyes of world attitude of solidarity with Soviet bloc hardly consistent with developments since last June. I further wonder whether by next fall general international situation may not have eased to point where we ourselves would prefer to avoid provoking all out debate on controversial issues such as Greece.
Foregoing considerations induce me to advance tentative suggestion that committee should avoid specific recommendations in this year’s annual report to GA indicating merely that Assembly itself should be left free to formulate own recommendations on basis of facts and conclusions submitted in report. This procedure would leave us full [Page 314] freedom of movement at GA. If we then welcome new wide open contest on Greece, we can come forward with resolution embodying strongest possible recommendations and in effect thrown down gauntlet to Soviets. If on other hand, for reasons hinted at herein, we prefer avoid forcing issue, we could consider resolution which would reaffirm in general terms two previous resolutions and continue UNSCOB in being with addition of organizational modifications suggested. Furthermore, if item on Greece were placed fairly well down on agenda debate could presumably be confined to reasonable duration and content.
I fully realize such course would not be welcome to Greeks. If it should be decided on in concert with our associates in sponsoring last resolution it would be necessary and should be possible to convince Greeks that their own best interests were being served. Adequate measures could be found to convince Greek public that we were not retreating and they were not being let down.
I repeat these ideas are preliminary and being advanced only tentatively. We must hasten our decision, though, as committee begins drafting in 6 weeks and preparatory conversations among members should begin soon if our report is to include type of recommendations desired by US.
I would appreciate Department’s earliest comments on this telegram and A–3 of March 10.
Sent Department 906; pouched Sofia, London, Paris, Belgrade.
- Not printed.↩