Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

868.00/5–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 5, 1949.

Subject: Greece

Participants:	Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly
	Mr. Hector McNeil, British Delegation to the General Assembly
	Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State

Preliminary Note: I called on Mr. Hector McNeil in his office in the Empire State Building at 12:15 yesterday to discuss with him how we should respond to Mr. Gromyko’s request for a further conversation. I told Mr. McNeil that I could not enter into any official conversations with Mr. Gromyko but that if Mr. Gromyko wanted to present his views on an informal and personal basis that I would be willing to listen. I then raised with him the question as to whether it might not be desirable to arrange a luncheon or a dinner with other people present, during which the three of us might exchange a few thoughts, and thus maintain the social and unofficial character of any conversations. Mr. McNeil appeared quite surprised and stated that he had already made an appointment for the two of us to see Gromyko yesterday afternoon and that he had been informed by his Washington Embassy that the appointment was agreeable with me. I told him that I had not heard of the suggestion but under the circumstances thought that we might as well go ahead in order not to complicate the matter further.

Mr. Gromyko, Mr. McNeil and I met in Gromyko’s office at 3:45 yesterday afternoon. After a few amenities, Mr. Gromyko recalled that during the course of our conversation at Mr. Trygve Lie’s dinner on April 26,² I had inquired whether our three governments might not use our influence to bring about a settlement of the Greek question. He said that our earlier discussion had been very vague, that he had reported the matter to Moscow, and that his government was ready to discuss the matter further. Mr. Gromyko then said that he hoped we could discuss the matter in somewhat more concrete terms.

Mr. McNeil stated that he had no instructions which would permit him to go into the merits of the question but that he was very glad to listen to what Gromyko had to say. He assumed from what Gromyko had already said that Gromyko had some concrete proposals in mind. Mr. McNeil stated he assumed the three of us agreed that the conversation was personal and informal and should not under any circumstances be disclosed to the press.

I then reminded Mr. Gromyko that I had raised the question as to whether we could not use our influence to help the Greek matter toward a settlement in order that the Greek people might be able to concentrate upon their problems of reconstruction. I stated that I had not intended to imply that we either should or would be willing to change the forum of discussion from existing channels, such as UNSCOB and diplomatic channels, to the great powers. I then stated that I was unable to do more than listen and that I wished to emphasize Mr. McNeil’s point that our conversation was personal and unofficial and should not be disclosed.

Mr. Gromyko stated his agreement that our talks were informal and confidential. He then said he wondered what we thought about the proposals made on April 20 by Mr. Porphyrogenis, the head of the “Northern Interim Government” in Greece. (This is the guerrilla regime of which Markos was formerly the head. A copy of the April 20 proposals is attached.)³ I told Mr. Gromyko that I had not been following the Greek question closely and that I had not in fact seen the proposals. I had noticed in the morning New York Times some reference to such proposals but that I assumed the news account was incomplete and asked Mr. Gromyko what the April 20 proposal in fact was.

Mr. Gromyko then took from his desk a Russian text and said that he had not prepared an English text because he did not wish to alter the meaning in the course of translation. He said, however, that the proposal was that there be a cease-fire in Greece, that there be a general amnesty, and that arrangements be made for a new election. He stated that the northern forces wished to “participate in the arrangements for the election”. Mr. Gromyko then said that he thought a cease-fire and arrangements for an election would be only the first step, that there were other questions which might be taken up and resolved later.

Mr. McNeil then stated that he wished to make it clear that his government could not conceive that the rebel forces in northern Greece could be dealt with as a government. He reminded Gromyko that the Greek Government was a well-established, recognized independent government, and that the northern forces had no such status. Mr. McNeil then stated that he wished to ask a few questions merely in order to understand what it was Gromyko had in mind. For example, he said he had been interested in how Gromyko supposed a termination of hostilities could be brought about. Mr. Gromyko replied that such arrangements could be the subject of further discussion but that he “does not exclude a request by the great powers on both sides in Greece” with respect to such matters.

I then told Mr. Gromyko that a question or two had occurred to me which might help me to understand what he was saying. I inquired what role he would assign to the United Nations Commission on the Balkans which has the matter before it and on which the Soviet seat is still vacant. Mr. Gromyko stated that he did not believe that UNSCOB could serve any useful purpose, that the USSR considered it an illegal and improper body.

I then asked Mr. Gromyko to clarify what he meant by an election. Did he mean a parliamentary election of a government in Greece under the existing constitution, or did he mean a plebiscite on other issues? He stated that “a parliamentary election is a parliamentary election”. He specified that he had in mind the election of a government and not a plebiscite on other issues, although he reminded me that he had already said that other issues might be settled later.

Mr. McNeil then asked whether in Mr. Gromyko’s view the election would involve any boundary question; Mr. McNeil reminded Gromyko of public discussion and speculation on the issue of Macedonia. Mr. Gromyko said that “Greece has its boundaries and we are talking about the boundaries of Greece”.

I then said to Mr. Gromyko that I was not sure that he was thinking about the Greek problem which was before the United Nations. I asked how he thought his suggestions affected the problem as between Greece and its three northern neighbors. I reminded him that the aid and assistance to rebel forces in Greece from across the northern frontiers had always been the essence of the problem before the United Nations. Mr. Gromyko replied that if there is a termination of hostilities and a parliamentary election in Greece, the relations between Greece and its northern neighbors was one of the other subjects which would have to be worked out. “Obviously,” he said, “a cease-fire in Greece would open the way for a normalization of other relations.”

I asked Mr. Gromyko what he meant by “participation in arrangements” for the elections by the northern forces. I reminded him that the guerrilla forces were in scattered enclaves. I wondered whether he had in mind that the northern forces would make the arrangements in a particular geographic area and that the Greek Government would make arrangements in another area, or whether he meant that the participation of the northern forces would be similar to that of political parties in other parliamentary elections where joint observers were present at polling booths, on elective boards, et cetera. Mr. Gromyko stated that he did not have in mind a division of responsibility along territorial lines. He had in mind that there might be constituted a “higher body” which would have responsibility for the conduct of the elections.

In response to a question from Mr. McNeil, Mr. Gromyko stated that such a body would not have any purpose or authority other than in connection with the election, that it would be “ad hoc”.

I then said to Mr. Gromyko that since he was talking about a matter which is of concern to the Greek Government in its relations with Greek citizens, I wondered whether he knew of any conversations among the Greeks themselves on these proposals. He stated that he did not know of any.

In response to a question from Mr. McNeil, Mr. Gromyko said that he did not think Mr. Evatt’s attempted conciliation was making any headway. He said that Mr. Evatt had been talking to the parties about “old proposals” which had been made in Paris. He said that Albania, for example, could offer “nothing new on old proposals”. In answer to a question from McNeil, Mr. Gromyko said that a Paris frontier question was one of the problems to be resolved.

Mr. Gromyko then summarized his proposal as constituting an end to the war, and the holding of parliamentary elections. He stated that he thought it might be useful for our three governments to agree on the methods by which this could be brought about. He did not exclude Soviet participation in such arrangements.

Mr. McNeil then asked him whether he was suggesting that if a new body be constituted by the United Nations that the Soviet Union would be willing to take part. Mr. Gromyko replied that that is subject to discussion, but that he did not exclude the possibility.

Mr. Gromyko asked Mr. McNeil whether he might have a reply from the British Government. Mr. McNeil stated that he had been glad to have Mr. Gromyko’s views, that he himself was unable to make any comments on the merits, that he wished to repeat that the UK could not treat the northern forces as if they constituted a government of any sort, that the UK could not tell the independent government of Greece how to run its internal affairs, and that we must be careful not to infringe upon United Nations responsibilities on questions directly before that body. He stated, however, that he would let Mr. Gromyko know at an early date what his reaction was.

When Mr. Gromyko turned to me with the same question, I told him that I assumed that we were talking quite informally and unofficially, that we could not change the forum for discussing the Greek question, and that I had originally merely raised the question of the desirability of using our respective influence to assist a settlement within existing forums. Mr. Gromyko then asked me whether he understood he could expect a reply from me or “not necessarily so”. I told him that I could not indicate definitely that I could make a reply, but that I would discuss his conversation with my colleagues in Washington.

In considering the views expressed by Mr. Gromyko in the above conversation, the following points should be noted:

a) Mr. Gromyko did not raise the question of the withdrawal of British forces or the withdrawal of American military assistance, both of which he had discussed at Mr. Trygve Lie’s dinner.

b) Mr. Gromyko did not criticize the character of the present Greek Government, although he had made remarks on that subject at Mr. Lie’s dinner.

c) Mr. Gromyko seemed specifically to deny that they have in mind a “free Macedonia”.

The combination of what was said and what was not said raises the question as to whether the Russians are not seeking for reasons of their own to reduce their commitments in the West if they can extricate themselves without excessive political costs. Their attitude in the above conversation was marked with an unusual degree of courtesy and affability. He was disappointed that neither Mr. McNeil nor I responded more concretely to his suggestions. With the easing of the Berlin situation in mind,⁴ Mr. Gromyko’s attitude on Greece suggests once again that the Russians may have made recently a major strategic decision which we have not yet fully uncovered. For example, they may have decided to exploit their favorable operation in Asia and, in order to be able to do so with maximum effect, to stabilize their position in Europe. Again, it is not inconceivable that they may have decided that a period of “cooperation” would lead to a weakening of the Western World and the creation of conditions in which a renewal of their political offensive toward the West at a later date might have greater chances of success. In any event, I feel that we have not penetrated to the hard-core of their present policy position. To use a military term, we have not “developed” their position.

I believe the Greek matter should be given very careful study, both because of our desire to be relieved of a $200 million a year military assistance program for Greece and because it might be possible, through the Greek question, to get a better understanding of Russia’s present intentions. The main point is not so much a breathing space in Western Europe as to disclose as soon as possible the next direction and objective of Russian policy in order that we may have as much advance warning as possible and begin to prepare such counter-measures as we consider may be required.

1. The Greek question was one of several questions which Secretary of State Acheson discussed with President Truman at their meeting on May 5. Secretary Acheson’s record of this discussion read as follows:

   “I reported to the President what transpired at the meeting in New York between Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNeil, and Mr. Gromyko, at which Mr. Gromyko made certain statements about Greece. The President was deeply interested in this, was quite clear that we should not engage in any talks on the future of Greece without Greek participation. He also felt that we should not close the door to listening to any comments which Mr. Gromyko might wish to make.” (868.00/5–549)

2. For Rusk’s memorandum of the conversation under reference, see supra.
3. The attachment under reference here, the text of a radio broadcast from Bucharest on April 29 repeating a broadcast made on the radio transmitter of the so-called Greek Provisional Democratic Government (the Greek guerrilla organization) on April 21, is not printed. The Greek guerrilla organization appealed to the United Nations General Assembly and the so-called World Peace Congress, then meeting in Paris, for a peace initiative to halt the civil war and indicated guerrilla willingness to make concessions in that direction. This appeal, which the Department of State officers regarded as the 21st guerrilla peace offer since 1946, was dismissed on April 21 by a Greek Government spokesman. On April 30 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis sent a cable to United Nations General Assembly President Evatt forwarding a request by Miltiades Porphyroghenis, Minister of Justice in the so-called Greek Provisional Democratic Government. Porphyroghenis, then in Praha, asked Evatt to specify the conditions that could bring hostilities in Greece to an end. Clementis also requested a visa for Porphyroghenis to visit the United Nations in New York. On May 2 Porphyroghenis applied at the United States Embassy in Praha for a visa in order to go to the United Nations to discuss a possible settlement of the Greek problem. Porphyroghenis elaborated his peace proposals to various American newsmen during an interview in Praha on May 3. On May 6 the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Praha to explain that Porphyroghenis would be inadmissible to the United States in the absence of an official invitation from the United Nations. On that same day Evatt cabled Foreign Minister Clementis that Porphyroghenis should submit his views on the Greek problem in writing. On the following day, May 7, the Greek guerrilla radio transmitter carried a broadcast which in effect disavowed the Porphyroghenis initiative.
4. For documentation on the negotiations in the spring of 1949 eventuating in the lifting of the Berlin blockade, see vol. iii, pp. 643 ff.