Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BC Kashmir/5–1049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. F. D. Collins of the Division of South Asian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] May 10, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Michael Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. E. G. Mathews, Chief, Division of South Asian Affairs
	Mr. F. D. Collins, India Section

Mr. Walker, at the request of his government, visited the Department and presented a telegram containing the following views of the Commonwealth Relations Office regarding the current status of Kashmir truce negotiations:

1) We believe that UNCIP have adopted correct course in presenting their truce proposals to Governments of India and Pakistan for acceptance as they stand with a time limit and in declining to engage in further discussions. We judge from our contacts with Indian and Pakistan Ministers and officials in London that both Governments will find it difficult to reject proposals provided that Commission maintain their position firmly. It is unlikely that either Government is prepared to take risk of being reported to Security Council by Commission as responsible for breakdown. Indeed we doubt whether it will be possible to get agreement on this as on other points without implied use of this threat.

2) In the event of one or both Governments rejecting Commission’s proposals we do not see what more Commission can do. They are now themselves deeply committed on all points which arise on Truce Agreement. They would have obvious difficulty in obtaining acceptance of any departures from their present proposals which either Government consider to be to their detriment. Moreover, if they now withdraw from position that further discussion would not be fruitful, neither Government would believe that they mean business if they take up any fresh stand.

3) We agree that we should like to avoid reference of matter by Commission to Security Council. This is however course which might have to be adopted in last resort. In any case there is tactical value in its possibility being kept before both parties.

4) In the circumstances we suggest for State Department’s consideration that in event of one or both parties failing to accept present proposals and Commission proving unable to shake them, least objectionable course would be for Commission to invite Admiral Nimitz under paragraph 8 of their Resolution of 5th January to take over their functions in respect of negotiations of Truce Agreement. We appreciate State Department’s doubts about this, but feel that in accepting this invitation Admiral Nimitz could make it clear that he is uncommitted to various suggestions and proposals made by the Commission for implementation of their Resolution of 13th August or to the various clarifications given by Commission of their Resolutions of 13th August and 5th January. He could then start with clean slate. Problems which will confront him in organising plebiscite are just as likely as deadlock on Truce Agreement to involve him in difficulties with one or both parties and we would see little advantage in his services being kept in reserve. It is in any case difficult to separate questions which arise on Truce Agreement from those arising in creation of conditions for fair plebiscite e.g. withdrawal of Indian troops and policing of Azad Territory. Admiral Nimitz might find his task as Plebiscite Administrator less difficult if he has had handling of these two questions from outset.

5) Moreover, if Admiral Nimitz undertook this task and by his firmness succeeded in getting a settlement that would in our view enhance his prestige from the start.

Mr. Walker was informed that the Department hopes that both parties will agree to the Commission’s truce proposals but in the event of a rejection by one or both it might be possible that such rejections would contain provisions whereby the Commission would be in a position to continue their efforts at negotiation (subsequent information as of this date would indicate that both countries may accept the Commission’s truce proposals with certain reservations). We were hopeful that it would not be necessary for the Commission to refer the issue to the Security Council. With respect to Admiral Nimitz being called by the Commission to take over their functions in respect of negotiations for a truce agreement (re point 4 above) the Department still held to the view that his services should be reserved for the difficult job of organizing and conducting the plebiscite. We were inclined to feel that in the event that Admiral Nimitz were to take over as truce negotiator he would be committed to a certain extent by the previous proposals made by the Commission, as the January 5 resolution formed the basis of agreement on principles between the two parties.

Although we realize that the Commission may be finally confronted with a choice between reference to the SC and calling upon Admiral Nimitz we did not feel at this stage we could recommend one step in preference to the other, particularly since so much would depend upon the contents of the replies from the GOI and the GOP. Mr. Walker was told that the Department would be glad to keep the British informed as to our subsequent thinking on this issue.