501.BC Kashmir/5–2249
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)
| Participants: | Mr. B. B. Sen, Minister-Counselor, Indian Embassy |
| Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs | |
| Mr. E. G. Mathews, Chief, Division of South Asian Affairs |
Mr. Sen, Minister-Counselor of the Indian Embassy, called at noon today at his request to explain to Mr. Satterthwaite his Government’s reaction to the latest truce proposals of UNCIP. His Government found these proposals unsatisfactory in that they contain no provision for the disarming and disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces and no definite authorization for the stationing of Indian troops in the mountainous northern areas of Kashmir. Mr. Sen pointed out that the GOI had attached great importance to these two matters even before the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, 1948. Unless appropriate provisions were made on these points, India could not discharge its responsibility to prevent internal disorder in and external aggression against Kashmir. He mentioned also that the stationing of Indian troops in northern Kashmir was necessary to prevent infiltration from the north.
As there was no provision for the disbanding of Azad troops, the GOI feels that the residual thirty battalions with supporting units to be left in Kashmir under the terms of the proposal are inadequate. The GOI considered that the withdrawal of Indian troops and the disbanding and disarming of Azad forces should be concurrent. Mr. Sen was unable to state whether his Government had rejected the [Page 1711] proposals for the foregoing reasons or had accepted the proposals with qualifications along the foregoing lines. However, he had been instructed to inform the Department of his Government’s views as it appears that UNCIP would refer the Kashmir dispute back to the SC.
Mr. Satterthwaite stated that he was not in a position to discuss the specific points of the UNCIP proposals but that he could say that it was the impression of the Department’s experts that the proposals as a whole seem equitable and reasonable. Mr. Mathews added that the proposals were not perfect and they did not make every concession desired by either the Indians or the Pakistanis but that they did seem to reach a good compromise. Mr. Satterthwaite then said that the Department was very much disappointed to learn that the GOI had not accepted the proposals as we had hoped that it would be possible to proceed expeditiously toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Mr. Sen replied that he was aware of the Department’s interest in an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute and that he understood our feeling of disappointment. He did, however, want to explain to us the reasons which had impelled India to object to certain provisions of the UNCIP proposals. He again stressed the military aspects of the situation, pointing out inter alia that Pakistan could move troops into Kashmir very quickly from its territory whereas India’s lines of communication into the state were much more lengthy and difficult.
Mr. Mathews commented that there was a feeling among those officers of the Department working most closely on the Kashmir matter that there had been a change of attitude and atmosphere since last December and January when the cease fire in Kashmir was effected. At that time there had seemed to be a determination on the part of both India and Pakistan to proceed quickly toward a settlement of dispute and mutual confidence that this settlement could be arrived at by peaceful means. It now appeared that the confidence of the GOI in a peaceful settlement had diminished. Mr. Sen demurred emphasizing once again that the GOI was not now taking a new position but was merely restating points which it had raised as long ago as last August. He went on to say that the attitude of the GOP toward the disarming and disbanding of Azad forces was very uncooperative and that the GOI felt strongly that provisions relating to this problem should be included in the truce agreement lest the GOP subsequently take the position that it could not or would not assist in the reduction of Azad forces. If India was to have only thirty battalions in Kashmir, the Azad forces must be reduced.
Mr. Satterthwaite remarked that thirty battalions seemed a rather substantial number of troops and that this force should be able to maintain order. Mr. Sen replied that the difficult terrain of Kashmir required that troops be widely dispersed and that consequently a [Page 1712] sizable force was essential. Referring to the fears expressed by Mr. Sen to the fact that the Azad forces might not be disarmed and disbanded, Mr. Mathews gave as his offhand opinion, subject to later confirmation, that the resolutions of the SC and UNCIP contained adequate safeguards to insure a reduction in the number of Azad troops. He went on to say that the Department was fully aware of this problem, which was only one of many which would have to be solved before conditions permitting the holding of a plebiscite could be established. It was obvious that not all of these problems could be solved at the same time and the truce agreement, in the Department’s view, was simply one of a series of steps which had to be taken in moving toward a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem. We had hoped, therefore, that there would be a disposition on the part of both India and Pakistan to regard the truce agreement in that light.
Mr. Mathews then recalled Mr. Sen’s earlier statement that it appeared that UNCIP would refer the Kashmir dispute back to the SC. He said that the Department hoped that this would not be necessary and that it would be possible for UNCIP to continue its negotiations on the subcontinent. Mr. Sen replied that his Government was not pressing for the return of the matter to the SC but that he had assumed this would be the next step since UNCIP had indicated that its latest proposals were final. Mr. Satterthwaite stressed the desirability of avoiding a referral to the SC pointing out that this would give increased prominence to the fact that India and Pakistan had failed to agree upon truce arrangements. This could only have an unsatisfactory effect upon the wider interest of the two countries. Mr. Mathews mentioned that the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund would be very much concerned by any indication that progress toward the settlement of the Kashmir dispute had been impeded and that this would certainly have a bearing upon the two institutions’ attitude toward India’s approaches for loans and further drawings. Mr. Sen replied that he realized that there would be unfortunate repercussions to the failure to agree upon truce terms, but he did not think that these would seriously affect the attitude toward India’s credit needs of the International Bank or the Fund.
Mr. Satterthwaite then commented that it would be unfortunate if the impression were created that the GOI was turning away from peaceful procedures for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Sen responded in the sense that Prime Minister Nehru’s devotion to peace and the general character and objectives of the GOI would make such a development impossible.
Mr. Satterthwaite expressed appreciation for the very helpful information which Mr. Sen had given.