Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–449

Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 4, 1949

Washington, March 4, 1949

top secret

Mr. Acheson said that after the last Ambassadors’ meeting he had received the expected communication from the Norwegian Ambassador and had given him the reply which had been agreed upon at the meeting. The Norwegian Ambassador would be joining in the discussions later on in the morning.

A discussion took place on the subject of Italy.

Mr. Van Kleffens repeated his previous statements, that the Netherlands Government would welcome Italy’s admission if the majority thought it advisable to invite her. The inclusion of Algeria in the Pact, which already covered Corsica, had strengthened Italy’s case.

Mr. Bonnet said that it was hardly necessary for him to repeat the views of his Government on this subject. He had received instructions from his Government the previous evening which confirmed everything he had said at the previous meeting.

Sir Oliver Franks said that the British point of view on Italy was also known to the other representatives at the meeting. The British Government were, however, prepared to modify their view if there was a strong sentiment of opinion on behalf of the other representatives against it. It now seemed that there was a balance of opinion in favour of the inclusion of Italy in the Pact; the balance was made up of opinions varying from a strong to a faint desire; and the British Government were prepared to associate themselves with that general feeling and abandon the position which they had held for so long.

Mr. Wrong said that the Canadian Government were prepared to agree to the participation of Italy as a full member at whatever time might prove most appropriate.

Mr. Le Gallais said that the Luxembourg Government had given its agreement that Italy should be included in the Pact.

Baron Silvercruys spoke in the same sense.

Mr. Acheson said that he had been discussing this subject with the President and with the Senators. So far as the executive branch of the United States Government was concerned, he had the President’s authority to agree to the inclusion of Italy in the Treaty at the appropriate time. For purely technical reasons, however, he did not wish to give this formal agreement at the present meeting.

The United States Government, Mr. Acheson explained, operated two ways in making treaties. The President negotiates them and the Senate advises and consents to their ratification. He had had a certain amount of trouble with the Senators on the subject of Italy. He thought it would be possible to surmount this but it would take a little time and he wished so far as possible to be protected against premature press leaks and discussion.

Mr. Bonnet said that he hoped Mr. Acheson would succeed in convincing the Senators.

Mr. Acheson then raised the question of the moment at which Italy might join the Treaty. As the Treaty was now drafted, other countries could accede to it by the unanimous agreement of the parties. During the debates on ratification the Senate might try to provide that the President of the United States could agree to accessions only with the advice and consent of the Senate. It was necessary therefore to consider carefully whether it might not be best to let Italy come in at the start; there was a risk involved in having countries come in one by one if that would mean having to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate in each case. Mr. Acheson said that he had no final opinion about this but thought that it might be better to admit Italy in one act at the time of signature. He would like to talk with the Senators about this and report again to the Committee.

Mr. Bonnet said that he wished to support strongly Mr. Acheson’s view that it would save difficulty to decide courageously to admit Italy, as well as the other countries, in one blow. He thought that it would be best to be frank and friendly with Italy over such a matter and to put them on exactly the same footing as other nations outside the seven represented at the table which would become original signatories.

He asked Mr. Acheson to inform President Truman of his gratitude at the decision of the United States Government on Italy.

Mr. Van Kleffens said that, leaving out of account for the moment the questions of Portugal and Italy about which a decision would probably require more time, he saw three possible solutions for the procedure of admitting Norway, Italy and Denmark. The first possibility was to invite the three countries as original signatories. This solution would prevent communist activities in these countries (especially in Italy) from endangering their participation. The second possibility, which was advocated by the Permanent Commission in London, was accession after the signature of the Treaty by the representatives of the seven countries, now involved in the conversations. It was not quite clear to him whether this accession should, in the view of the Permanent Commission, take place immediately after signature by the original signatories or only after ratification by their parliaments. If Norway, Italy and Denmark were to accede immediately after the signature of the Treaty, he, personally, thought they might as well be invited to become original signatories. If, on the other hand, these countries had to wait until after the Treaty had entered into force, the delay which this would entail would give the Soviets the opportunity to try to prevent, at the last moment, these countries from acceding. The third possibility was to invite Norway and Denmark as original signatories and to extend an invitation to Italy to accede at a later date. He was not sure whether this was a procedure commending itself. In view of the need for the Secretary of State to consult the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Italy it might deserve consideration.

Sir Oliver Franks said that at the moment there was a slightly different approach to this question as between the representatives discussing it in London and those discussing it in Washington. He did not think that it was a difference of principle; it flowed from the concern of the representatives in London lest the discussions over the Treaty be prolonged by the participation in them of additional countries which might raise difficult points. These fears might be exaggerated but what these representatives wanted was that all the other countries, apart from those represented round the table, should, if they wished to join the Pact, be invited to accede immediately after signature. That was the interpretation he put upon the telegrams he had received from London.

Looked at from the standpoint of the time table of the negotiations, he thought that it was more a matter of convenience in arrangement rather than an issue of principle. Now that a decision had been taken on the principle of Italy, the most important business was to get an agreed draft text as quickly as possible. As soon as this was obtained, it could be sent to governments for their views. He hoped that it would be possible to send such a draft to governments by March 7. It might therefore be considered to some extent academic at what moment different countries came into subsequent discussions, provided the text had been agreed and sent to governments. Speaking purely personally, he thought that it might be difficult to ask Norway to join the discussions and at the same time request her not to sign with the seven governments in the ordinary way.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he would concur in any decision which the other representatives thought desirable concerning the moment at which Italy was brought in. But the British Government did not want Italy brought in while active discussion was still going on. They did not think this necessary and they would be glad for it not to happen. But, subject to that, they were prepared to go along with the general sense of things. Everything would be eased enormously on the day when the Committee sent a draft text back to governments.

Mr. Wrong said that the Canadian Government had no strong view on whether Italy should be an original signatory or accede later. He thought that the Canadian Government would probably prefer that Italy should not take part in the drafting discussions; there was a certain apprehension that, if Italy joined the negotiations at this stage, other matters in which Italy had a vital interest might be raised during the final stages of negotiation. He had particularly in mind the questions of the Italian colonies and Trieste. Therefore the view which Mr. Pearson¹ had expressed to him was that if, after agreement, Italy was asked to join in the negotiations in the same way as Norway, there should first be a clear understanding reached that none of these issues would be raised which might be used for bargaining purposes and would complicate the procedure of the negotiations. The Irish had made unacceptable conditions for participation in the talks and we should adopt the same attitude towards any other country which tried to set such conditions on their participation.

On the suggestions made by the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission regarding accession immediately after signature, he asked whether a country could accede to a Treaty which was not in force. He thought that accession could only take place after the Treaty was in force, which would involve considerable delay.

Mr. Hickerson said that he thought the Permanent Commission had meant original signature immediately after the others had signed. He did not think that they could have meant accession owing to the impossibility of acceding to a Treaty not in force.

Sir Oliver Franks said that there were two time periods which were now under consideration and which had been subject to discussion in the Permanent Commission: the first was the period between publication of the text (following agreement between governments) and the moment of signature; the second was the period between signature and the entry into force of the Treaty. The language used by the Permanent Commission had been “accession” and it had been suggested that this should take place immediately after signature. It did seem that the point raised by the Canadian Ambassador had perhaps not been fully considered in the Permanent Commission.

Mr. Wrong said that the text which would be approved by governments at this stage would be a more or less final one but governments would not be committed to every word and comma of it. If there was going to be a gathering of Foreign Ministers for signature, they would probably wish to talk about it. There was another question of practical importance from the Canadian point of view. After the governments had approved the text, the Canadian Government intended to inform the leaders of the opposition in Parliament. It would be difficult for the Canadian Government to tell them that this text had been finally agreed to and at the same time say that they would like to have their views upon it. It would be necessary to be able to say that consideration could still be given to any views they might express.

Mr. Le Gallais said that his Government was in favour of the inclusion of Italy as a signatory power. He added that if anything happened all would be in the same boat and he thought it would be preferable if all were united from the beginning. In regard to the time table he agreed with the views expressed by Sir Oliver and hoped that a definite text of the Treaty could be set up today.

Baron Silvercruys pointed out that the question at issue at the moment was the form which Italian participation would take. What had to be decided was whether Italy should be invited to sign the Pact or whether arrangements should be made which would give her the opportunity of acceding later. It was, of course, possible to have the signature in two acts: first the signature of the original members, and then the signature of the others, say half an hour later. But the difference was merely technical and he did not think it worth consideration. Whether Italy signed the Pact or whether she acceded later, it was clear that she would enter the North Atlantic community. Her status through accession would be identical to that as a signatory. The moment Italy acceded she would be in exactly the same position as if she had signed as an original signatory with the other participants. If Italy was only asked to accede, he thought that the position of the Italian Government might thereby be made more difficult. The charge would be made that Italy had been put in an inferior position while assuming the same responsibilities as the other members of the North Atlantic community.

He had been impressed, Baron Silvercruys continued, by a recent remark of the Secretary of State in connection with one of the Articles of the Treaty. Mr. Acheson had said “If we mean it, why not say it. The Senators will ask us anyway and we will have to make clear what is in our minds”. He thought that the same wisdom might be a guide over this present subject. If it was decided to let Italy in, would it not be as well to make clear what that decision really amounted to? Why not let Italy join at this time as a partner because she was going to be a partner anyway! He thought that the signature of Italy would help to remove a lot of doubts which might be created by accession. The Belgian view therefore was that Italy should be told that she would be given the opportunity to sign as an original signatory with the other participants.

Mr. Bonnet said that he would try to dissipate some of the fears which had been expressed around the table. The first one concerned the possibility that Italy might raise embarrassing questions if she was admitted to the present discussions. From a practical point of view, however, there was little chance that the Italian representative could join the negotiations before the conclusion of the present stage by which time the text would have been agreed. Moreover, he had been informed that the Italian Government had made it clear that its representative would not raise the question of the Italian colonies or of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty or any other clauses of that kind if she was admitted to the discussions. He did not therefore think that this fear was justified.

As regards the proposals of the Permanent Commission concerning the time at which these other countries should be invited to join the Pact, he thought that there were some obscurities. Nevertheless, he thought that the proposals amounted to this. The seven representatives should agree upon the text as soon as possible and, after securing the agreement of their governments, should initial it. As the next step, the seven powers would undertake to sign the Treaty, it being understood that the five other countries would in the meantime have received the text as well as an invitation to accede the same day during the same ceremony. It could be argued that there was some obscurity arising from the fact that the Permanent Commission had used the word “accede”. He agreed that if the word “accede” was used in its full legal sense, that would mean that the Treaty would have to come into force before the five powers could accede. The representatives at the Permanent Commission had meant, in his judgment, that the five powers should be invited to sign. These would be signatures of accession. He was sure that the French Government intended that all members of the future Treaty should be put on the same footing. That was the origin of the proposal of the Permanent Commission. Thus Norway should be put on exactly the same footing as Italy. The French Government were concerned that the Treaty should cover the Southern flank of the North Atlantic community in the same way as the area in the North of Europe. That was the meaning of the Permanent Commission’s proposal as he saw it, and that was why it had been accepted by the other representatives in London.

Mr. Bonnet added that he had received instructions from his Government to support this proposal.

Mr. Acheson said he understood that the Permanent Commission had been most anxious that nothing should happen which might drag out the discussions. He did not think that there was any chance of that happening. He confirmed the views of the Italian Government reported by the French Ambassador that the Italians would not raise any difficult points if they were admitted to the discussions.

The State Department, Mr. Acheson went on, had had indications from the Danish Ambassador that Denmark did not intend to ask to join the discussions in the next day or two. The Foreign Minister wished to come to the United States and discuss the subject. He wanted to go through the same procedure as that followed by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Mr. Acheson felt that the Norwegian Ambassador would not wish to make any difficulties over the Treaty. He thought therefore that, if the text could be completed early in the following week, the whole matter would become unimportant.

As regards the point that the Norwegians should not be treated differently from anyone else, that would also become an academic question if it was agreed that all countries should sign at the same time. He did not see what difference it would make whether all signed at once or some at different times from the others. If the text could be agreed soon, Mr. Acheson thought that it could be given to the other governments.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he was not sure whether the analysis given by the French Ambassador was shared by the British representative. He therefore would like to report to his Government on the discussions which had just taken place and find out whether they would agree to the general course proposed by the present meeting.

Mr. Acheson asked whether there was any significance in the proposal of the Permanent Commission that the draft should be initialled. Unless there was some special reason for it, it would be an added complication from the American point of view. The French Ambassador suggested that the proposal had been made in order to show that at the moment of initialling the text was final between the seven negotiating governments. It had not been suggested, for instance, that it should be initialled by the Norwegian representative.

Mr. Hickerson thought that the same purpose could be served by other means. There could be agreement around the table that the seven governments were generally agreed to the text and no changes proposed by other countries could be agreed to except by the unanimous consent of the seven governments who would have to be certain that the proposed changes were good and that their consideration would not delay final signature. He said that considerable public discussion would take place after publication of the text. From this discussion there might arise some suggestions which the seven governments might wish to consider and there might be disadvantages if the document had been completely finalised as a result of initialling.

Mr. Wrong said that it would be a complication from the Canadian point of view if the draft was initialled at this stage. He did not think that there need necessarily be much difference in the degree of authenticity to be attached to the text whether or not it was initialled.

Mr. Acheson said that he would much prefer to drop the idea of initialling which he would have great difficulty in explaining to the Senate.

Mr. Van Kleffens thought that his Government would agree to the trend of the conversation. On instructions he had received, he expressed the hope that it would be possible to come to a conclusion and to finish a text very quickly. There was some danger in delay. The working group could perhaps prepare a text for discussion. He had had information that the Norwegian Ambassador would join the discussions today. He wondered how that fitted into the agreement just reached.

Mr. Hickerson said that he thought it fitted in very well. The Norwegian Ambassador would be present when the text was discussed later during the meeting. He went on to say that it would be helpful if about twenty-four hours before publication the text could be communicated, as a matter of courtesy, to the governments of the other American Republics, signatories of the Rio Treaty. He hoped there would be no objection to that.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he thought it would be the wish of the British and Canadian Governments to be able to extend this same courtesy to the other Commonwealth Governments.

No objections were raised to these proposals.

Mr. Hickerson asked what the views of the representatives were on the question of the place of signature for the Treaty.

Sir Oliver Franks recalled that the Permanent Commission had suggested Bermuda.

Mr. Wrong said that the Canadian Government had no strong views on the subject but would also welcome Bermuda.

Mr. Le Gallais thought the Luxembourg Government would be agreeable to the signing to take place in Bermuda in view of the contents of the cable from the Permanent Commission.

Baron Silvercruys asked whether the place of signature would have any influence on the headquarters of the council or the defense committee.

Mr. Acheson said that he thought not, certainly not if it was Bermuda. He wondered whether it might not seem somewhat frivolous to go to Bermuda.

Mr. Van Kleffens concurred in this. If it was envisaged that the ceremony of signature would only be a very short one, he himself did not see why the signature could not take place in Washington.

Baron Silvercruys spoke in the same sense pointing out that Washington might be the most appropriate place in view of the very important part which the United States Government had played in the negotiation of the Treaty.

Mr. Wrong said that he had assumed, and so had his Foreign Minister, that there would be a really respectable launching ceremony which would involve the attendance of several Foreign Ministers. He did not think that it would be enough if the Ministers were merely to sign their names to a document and then leave. A Treaty making so striking a departure in foreign policy should be launched with rather more ceremony than that, for the purposes of publicity. He also thought that it would be possible to agree finally on the text only at the time of signature. Furthermore, the Canadian Government had made a proposal about the form of a joint declaration which might be made at the time of signature. The purpose of a Declaration of this kind was to explain more fully than could be done in the preamble or the text the reasons why the treaty was necessary at this particular time. The signature of Foreign Ministers to such a Declaration would, of course, give it greater authority. For all these reasons he hoped that, while it might well be short, the conference would be a formal diplomatic gathering. It would only be fair for the countries which had not participated in the negotiations to have the opportunity to state their views publicly at a conference. It did not matter whether signature took place in Bermuda or Washington.

Mr. Acheson said that if matters were to be raised at the last moment it would certainly be easier for him if the signature was in Washington, rather than a long way away from Capitol Hill.

Mr. Bonett said that the Foreign Ministers would in any case wash to visit Washington.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he thought Mr. Bevin would wish to come, wherever the Treaty was signed and would feel that the signature would mark a great event in the history of the North Atlantic area.

Mr. Acheson agreed and said that the more he thought about it, the more Washington seemed the best place. Perhaps President Truman, rather than himself, would sign the Treaty. This would help a great deal in the presentation of the Treaty to the Senate. If the President could address the conference it would bring the whole matter to public attention in the United States in a way that could not happen if the ceremony was in Bermuda.

Mr. Le Gallais expressed the view that should President Truman be willing to sign the Treaty himself, this would be a very convincing argument for the ceremony to be held at Washington. He expressed the hope that a double signature would be considered, as all would wish the Secretary of State to sign it.

At this point there was a short recess after which Mr. Morgenstierne, the Norwegian Ambassador, joined the meeting and Mr. Acheson welcomed him on behalf of the other representatives.

Mr. Morgenstierne thanked Mr. Acheson for his words of welcome. He said that he had been asked by his Government to convey its appreciation and thanks to him, Mr. Acheson, and to the countries represented at the table, for giving him this opportunity to take part in the deliberations. His first task would be to gather information about the present state of the negotiations and about the text itself. When the Norwegian Government had had an opportunity to study these matters, he hoped he would be able to make some contribution to the discussions.

Mr. Acheson explained the tentative time table for the negotiation and a discussion then took place on the draft Articles of the Treaty.

As regards Article 2, Mr. Van Kleffens said that his Government regretted that this Article did not go so far as the Canadian proposal. He would welcome a stronger Article.

Mr. Bonnet asked that there be some mention in the Article of intellectual or cultural cooperation. Economic collaboration was the only form of collaboration now mentioned in the Article.

Mr. Wrong said that he had secured the agreement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Article as it now stood, subject to the substitution in the fifth line of the words “these institutions” for the word “they”. He recognised that it would cause great difficulty to the United States Government if they had to try and secure the acceptance of an Article more in accordance with the original Canadian proposal, and did not wish to press for any further changes.

Mr. Le Gallais said he had no comments, as the Canadian Government was in agreement to Article 2 as it stood now.

On Article 3, Mr. Van Kleffens said that he wondered whether the word “endeavor”, which was rather weak, could not for the sake of a uniform terminology be replaced by the expression “will contribute”. This last expression was also used in the preceding Article. He thought that uniformity of terminology was necessary if wrong and undesirable interpretations were to be avoided.

Mr. Acheson said that he was a little worried by the expression “will contribute” which reminded him of some sort of new lend lease operation. He suggested that the subject should be referred to the Working Party.

The other representatives said that the present phrase was not altogether satisfactory and agreed that the wording should be considered again by the Working Party.

On the subject of Article 4, Mr. Morgenstierne asked whether consultation between members had to be limited to instances where one of the parties felt threatened. Could it not also take place in connection with political matters? He thought that under certain circumstances it might be useful to consult on other matters than those especially mentioned in Article 4.

Mr. Acheson referred to Article 8 and suggested that any matter could be brought up under the council which would be established under Article 8.

Mr. Morgenstierne said he wanted to be sure that Article 4 would not be interpreted as to exclude consultation on other matters than those specifically mentioned.

Mr. Acheson suggested that other matters might be dealt with through the council.

Mr. Wrong said that he had always understood that the parties could consult under Article 8 on any matter which they felt had a bearing on the execution of the Treaty. He did not want to see the area of mandatory consultation expanded.

Mr. Van Kleffens wondered whether the Norwegian Ambassador should be informed that this Article, through the word “security”, covered also aggression by subversive action.

As regards Article 5, Mr. Morgenstierne said that his government hoped that this Article could be made as strong and comprehensive as possible so as to provide that military aid should be given to a country which was attacked with maximum speed and effectiveness.

Mr. Bonnet said with reference to Article 7 that he wished to make it quite clear that it was not the equivalent of an expulsion clause. He did not wish to insist upon having an expulsion clause but wished to emphasize that this Article could not be regarded as one.

On the subject of Article 8, Mr. Bonnet said that the Permanent Commission had proposed the insertion of the words “prepare plans”. The insertion of these words would make acceptance of the Treaty easier in the French Parliament. The French Government thought that they would add strength and substance to Article 8.

The other Brussels Treaty representatives said that they were prepared to support this proposal if it met with unanimous approval.

Mr. Wrong said that he was prepared to accept the Article as it stood.

Mr. Acheson said that the French proposal had been discussed again with the U.S. military authorities and the Secretary of Defense. He regretted to say that the US could not support the inclusion of these words. They thought it much better to leave the text permissive in the sense that the defense committee could recommend measures which might include the preparation of plans. But the US did not think that it should be bound by Treaty obligations to agree that this committee was the only place in which plans were prepared.

On the subject of the special Article defining Article 5, Mr. Van Kleffens referred to the preference of the Permanent Commission for the formula “armed forces”. He pointed out that this wording would include U.S. and U.K. forces in Greece. As he understood it, this was not what was meant and he had no authority to commit his Government to what would amount to a guarantee extended to Greece. He had that morning received instructions by telephone from his Government to accept the wording “occupation”.

Sir Oliver Franks pointed out that the phrase “occupation forces” might not be regarded as including U.S. and U.K. forces in Trieste.

It was agreed to refer that and certain other matters of definition to the Working Party.

Mr. Wrong suggested that the Working Party should consider the question of which islands should be covered by the Treaty.

Mr. Morgenstierne asked whether aircraft taking part in the Berlin airlift would be covered by the expression “occupation forces” and Mr. Acheson said that they probably would.

As regards Article 9, it was agreed to insert “the United States Government” in the blank space.

A discussion took place on Article 10 and Mr. Acheson referred to a suggestion that had been made by Senator George. It was agreed to refer this to the Working Party.

Mr. Wrong also proposed that the last Article should be broken up and made into several Articles, and that provision should be made for equally French and English texts of the Treaty.

Mr. Morgenstierne asked whether it would be reasonable to include Norway at this time among the countries mentioned in connection with ratification of the Pact.

Mr. Acheson said that he did not think so. The original text had said that the Treaty would come into effect when a majority of the signatories had ratified it. The change now made had been put in as a result of proposals by the Senate. If Norway was added to the list of states, it would mean that the Treaty could not come into effect unless Norway ratified it. That was not what was meant. They wanted Norway to ratify it but they also wanted the treaty to come into effect among the other countries even though, for some reason or another, Norway decided not to ratify it.

Mr. Morgenstierne said it seemed that it would be more natural to distinguish between countries which had taken part in the discussions and signed the Treaty on the one hand and, on the other hand, countries which acceded to the Treaty afterwards.

Mr. Acheson did not think that the Norwegian proposal would be acceptable.

Mr. Morgenstierne added that the Norwegian Government would consider it a great honour to be a charter member of the Treaty.

Mr. Van Kleffens said he thought that Norway would be a charter member.

Mr. Acheson said that there was no question about that.

Mr. Morgenstierne said that there would, however, be a certain distinction between the original and the later charter members.

Mr. Acheson explained that it would only be a distinction arising from the number of ratifications necessary before the Treaty came into effect.

1. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.