Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.00/3–449

Memorandum by Ambassadors Caffery and Harriman to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Schuman)¹

top secret

[Paris, March 3, 1949.]

Memorandum

Although no commitment can at present be made it is not unlikely that a program of military assistance prepared by Western Union countries and presented to the U.S. Government would be acquiesced in by the latter if it conformed generally to the concept and principles which are set forth later in this informal memorandum. The subject matter of this memorandum is being presented to the other countries concerned and the French Government will be advised when this presentation is completed. The matter is, of course, of Top Secret character.

A Military Assistance Program in which the United States is a participant would be based on the principles of self-help and mutual aid and a common interest in defense against totalitarian aggression. Accordingly such a program should be considered as a measure in partial implementation of the general obligations of the North Atlantic Security Pact, particularly of the principles expressed in Article III of the Pact.

The general principles governing an extended Military Assistance Program for Western Europe should, in the present tentative thinking of the United States, include the following:

a) Military strength should be developed, without endangering the achievement of permanent economic recovery and continuing economic viability, on the basis of collective defense arrangements which include the United States, to the point eventually where free Europe can feel confident of an effective ability to resist aggression and will be making its proper contribution to the common effort.

b) It is accepted that a continuing sound economic structure is a necessary basis for military strength in free Europe. Economic recovery and the maintenance of viability must have a clear priority. Thus the United States anticipates that for a period of time it may furnish some substantial portion of the finished armament required.

c) Self-help and mutual aid are also fundamental to the concept of U.S. assistance. A request for military assistance by the European countries would be construed as an acceptance of the validity of these principles and the obligations they entail, including that of reciprocal assistance to the United States.

Acceptance by the Western Union countries and by the United States of these principles of common interest and mutual aid involves, insofar as the development of Western European military strength is concerned, the following:

a) European armed forces should be developed so that in case of aggression they can operate on a unified basis in accordance with a common strategic concept.

b) Over a long period, the arms and equipment requirements of the European Nations should be increasingly produced and financed by the European economies.

c) Any expanded military effort, including arms production, should be consistent with economic objectives and the maintenance of economic viability.

d) Arrangement concerning the transfer of military equipment and supplies for such production among the European participating countries should permit transfer, insofar as possible, without regard to foreign exchange problems and without disrupting the intra European payments scheme.

Essential to this concept of military assistance, including its mutual aid aspect, is a contribution by the European countries in the form of a steady, if moderate, expansion of their production of arms and equipment. This would be an evidence of mutual aid and self-help. In order not to jeopardize the objectives of the European Recovery Program or the target date by which recovery should be achieved, some additional burden on the European participants in the military assistance program might be involved and any net additional local currency costs must be met from non-inflationary sources. It is recognized that although sacrifices by the Western Union countries are necessary, some additional dollar costs may have to be met by the United States. The United States is contemplating the possibility of furnishing some funds to aid in covering additional dollar costs involved in projects for additional European production if assured that local currency costs will be met through processes of non-inflationary financing.

The United States Administration is prepared to consider, if it is requested to provide assistance and if mutual agreement is reached with the Western Union countries, presenting to the Congress a program of military assistance for the year ending June 30, 1950 based on the above principles. This program would include requests for authorizations and appropriations to permit a) the transfer of certain finished military arms and equipment from United States stocks or production to the Western Union countries and b) a sum of dollars to be available to cover necessary dollar costs of agreed specific proposals involving additional military programs, including production, in the Western Union countries.

The present U.S. timetable envisages presenting an overall military assistance program to our Bureau of the Budget about the middle of March and to the Congress by the end of the month.

For the Budget Bureau it would be hoped to have received from the Western Union countries a general acceptance of the principles upon which the program would be based and before presentation to Congress to have received a more specific request for military assistance. This more specific request should, in present thinking, include a statement of agreement on the objectives and principles as indicated above; a description of present plans for increasing military strength; a statement of the deficits in requirements for the year ending June 30, 1950, and a statement in general terms of additional armament productive capacity which might be employed without adverse effect on ERP if some assistance to cover dollar costs were forthcoming. It is assumed the specific request would be based essentially on the report approved by the Defense Ministers of the Western Union on January 14 and it should make clear that the plans involved leave minimum deficits in requirements for (a) forces in being for the twelve months ending June 30, 1950, and (b) forces which could be mobilized within 90 days after the declaration of an emergency. The request should specify that the requirements for category (a) are most urgently needed.

It seems most important that European leaders explain at least the general principles and broad outline of the Military Assistance Program to the Western Union public prior to or at the same time as the presentation for use before the Bureau of the Budget. This explanation should make it clear that the project has been developed by the European countries and is within the framework of the Atlantic Pact.

In the light of the above, a similar informal, tentative expression of the views of the French Government would be appreciated both as to the principles and procedures, as well as on the question of public presentation.

1. Copy dated March 3, 1949, left with Schuman by the Ambassadors on that date. A copy was enclosed in despatch No. 229, March 4, from Paris, not printed (840.00/3–449).