757.6111/2–1049: Telegram
The Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Secretary of State
108. Norway’s expected reply latest Russian démarche1 together with previous exchange viewed here as important milestone Norway’s [Page 94] history. Further felt Norway’s reply may prove key to future Soviet attitude toward Denmark and lesser degree Sweden; may also imply threat to other nations considering invitation Atlantic Pact. Norway small but vital fulcrum in international balance. Government officials and public remain calm with no evidence fear though obviously determined move cautiously. While certain officials believe complications and some degree pressure, might be anticipated from USSR, nevertheless, believe Soviet proposal has loophole on hypothesis “If Norwegians doubt Soviet’s good neighborly intentions” logical answer would be “Norway has no ground for questioning Soviet intentions and therefore no need for nonaggression pact”. Chief Political Section Foreign Office stated to my counselor, no reply before return Lange and possibility accepting Soviet suggestions being seriously studied with opinion somewhat divided. Press opinion and to less determinable extent Norwegian people clearly favor Atlantic Pact and express opposition though more cautiously to Soviet pact.
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My observations and understanding Norwegian people lead me to believe majority resent and will reject Soviet proposal on theory disadvantages far outweigh advantages to Norway.
Possibility should not be overlooked Norway offered pact with little expectation by Russians of favorable reply main target being Sweden and Denmark, in light of present Scandinavian relations.
Embassy believes Soviet interference Norway constitutes intensification war of nerves possibly effort to find soft spot in West hitherto undiscovered in probe Greece, Iran, Berlin, elsewhere. I therefore cannot subscribe to Embassy Moscow (their Embassy’s telegram 304, February 72) belief Norway might well consider offer join both pacts same time. Potentially serious implications Russian notes with Norway’s pending reply coupled with usual reaction Norwegian people under duress impelled Embassy establish rigid hands-off policy in its broad contacts, thus avoiding possible suspicion of US pressure. I believe this policy contrasted with Soviet behavior will be rewarded.
Sent Department 108, repeated Moscow 2, pouched Stockholm, Copenhagen.