840.20/2–849
Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, February 8, 1949, 3 p. m.
Mr. Acheson said that he wished to report on his talks with Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg1 about the North Atlantic Pact and with the Norwegian representatives who had recently arrived in the United States.
Mr. Acheson had not yet spoken to any Senators other than the two just mentioned and it was clear to him that after further discussions with them he would have to talk privately with other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, in the near future, when things were a little more crystallized, to spend a good deal of time with the full Committee. Discussions with Congress had not gone as far as he had expected. It was most important from all points of view to proceed sufficiently slowly to make sure of carrying the Senate Committee along with the negotiations. He explained that he had not found objection or obstruction on the part of the Senators but a sense that they did not fully understand the discussions which had taken place between the seven governments over the past few months. It would be a greater disaster and would defeat the purpose of all seven governments if by trying to go too fast in the negotiations the result were to cause misunderstanding in the Senate which might result in limitations. Contrary therefore to his first impression that rapid progress could now be made in the negotiations, he thought that the various discussions would take some time. A further delay of this kind, however, would, he thought, be amply repaid later on by the smoothness of the debate in the Senate.
Referring to Article 5, he said that the Senators agreed that the wording should aim at implementing the Vandenberg Resolution and should make it perfectly clear that an attack in ana area or upon a country which involved the security of the United States would be met with force. What gave them pause at this moment was the detail of the draft text: What was armed attack? Who would determine what was done? It would take a little time to find the right form of words. An armed attack really did not require definition. If there was [Page 74] any doubt about whether there had been an armed attack, there would be no need to bring the armed might of all the nations into play. On the other hand, if an armed attack did take place, then the situation would be perfectly plain. This question was not really important enough to cause anybody any concern.
On the subject of who would determine what would be done under the Pact, Mr. Acheson said that discussions would have to take place in advance to work out in joint staff talks, etc., the action to be taken under any one of a number of circumstances. The Senators thought that the language used gave an impression of crescendo and haste which perhaps overstated the problem. It implied that the United States was rushing into some kind of automatic commitment. The Senators wanted the Pact to avoid overstatement or rhetoric. There would be preliminary talks, there would be plans, but the ultimate action would depend upon the decision of each member country and would have to be in accordance with its international legal and moral obligations. There was no difference of opinion on this subject, but it was a question of finding more neutral language than that contained in the present draft.
The Senators had also talked to him about the need to make it as clear as possible at every turn that the Pact was consonant with and concluded within the framework of the United Nations Charter. He did not think that that would cause any trouble.
On his talks with the Norwegians Mr. Acheson said that while the Norwegians felt strongly the advantages of participation in the North Atlantic Pact they were also very conscious of the seriousness of any step which might split Scandinavia. To divide the Scandinavian countries would furnish opportunities for propaganda to the Soviet Union which might be seized upon in Norway and Denmark and result in the weakening of the governments there. The Norwegians thought that a breach, once made, might widen and result in a tendency on the part of Sweden to drift in one direction while Norway and Denmark went in another. The Norwegians wanted to know if it was really the opinion of the Atlantic Powers that it was in Norway’s interests to have a division in Scandinavia take place, or whether the interests of the Atlantic powers might not be served by a Scandinavian defense arrangement which would either bring the Scandinavian countries into war if they were attacked, or, alternatively, serve to reassure the Atlantic powers that Scandinavia would remain neutral if they were allowed to do so. Such a Scandinavian defense arrangement would, so the Norwegians had indicated, apply only to metropolitan territories and would not preclude other treaties being made for reciprocal [Page 75] assistance covering the overseas territories of the Scandinavian countries.
Finally, the Norwegians had given the impression that they were frightened of being rushed. The subject would have to be carefully considered before decisions could be reached and they did not wish to be hurried into precipitate action.
Mr. Van Kleffens thought that the wish of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a little more time to study the provisional draft should be taken into account in setting up the time-table. On the other hand, any delay would provide the detractors of the Pact with further opportunity for their undermining activities.
The wording of the treaty should enlist the greatest possible support in all quarters. Substitute language might well be found for expressions which met with criticism. However, the Netherlands Government would not like to see the substance of the treaty materially weakened.
The Norwegian problem was very complicated. The way in which this problem presented itself had materially changed since the exploratory talks began. In July of last year the Netherlands Government had been of the opinion that the territorial scope of the Treaty should not be too greatly extended. Later on, the point of view was generally accepted that in view of their coast lines and their proximity to the shores of Great Britain and the Netherlands, the participation of Norway and Denmark outweighed certain disadvantages inherent in their non-participation. Now it had been allowed to become publicly known that the Western countries wanted the participation of the Scandinavian countries, or at any rate Norway and Denmark, in the projected North Atlantic Pact. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, was putting some pressure on Norway to discourage it from joining that Pact. If Norway should ultimately not participate, the Soviet Government would be in the position to claim a major victory for its policy and would undoubtedly fully exploit that position.
He thought that not too much importance should be attached to the Norwegian preoccupation lest Scandinavia be disrupted by the North Atlantic Pact. The force which held the Scandinavian countries together was very strong and would not be materially weakened if one or two of these countries undertook some commitments which others deemed it inopportune to undertake. He was not prepared to give an offhand answer to the question whether from the point of view of Western security a Scandinavian defensive alliance, not linked with the North Atlantic Pact, which only in case of need would swing its point of gravity to the West, or participation of Norway and possibly Denmark in the Pact would be preferable. This was a problem he did [Page 76] not consider himself competent to deal with without expert advice of the military. As he understood it, Norway was concerned that its security would not be adequately safeguarded in the period between the proclamation of its willingness to participate and the conclusion of the Pact. Had the military given any advice on this point?
He further drew attention to the probability that an attack on Norway would involve Sweden. If Sweden did not participate in any security arrangement, prearranged planning which had proved so important in the years 1942 and 1943 would, for the whole of the Scandinavian area, be impossible.
He felt that these and other considerations should be weighed in the scales in order to deterimine what would be best for the West.
Mr. Bonnet began by emphasizing the importance of not losing too much time at this stage. There was no intention of reaching hasty conclusions, but he pointed out that there had already been protracted talks over many months. All this time there had been an attempt to keep secret the progress of the negotiations but some indiscretions had taken place on the most important points and too much delay would inevitably create the undesirable impression that serious difficulties had arisen. Mr. Bonnet nevertheless well understood Mr. Acheson’s need to have full discussions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
On the subject of Article 5, Mr. Bonnet said that the draft text as it stood at present had only been arrived at after much thought and negotiation. The text did not really go very far. Other treaties of this type had been made in the past and were much more binding. It would create a bad impression if the wording of the Atlantic Pact were much weaker than that of the Rio Treaty. He recognized the strong feeling in the United States against any wording which might imply an “automatic action”. But Article 5, from this standpoint, was extremely prudent and modest. It left certain freedom of judgment to each participant while also providing, in keeping with the views of all participants, that if one Party were attacked, it would be to the advantage of each to act. Mr. Bonnet did not think, however, that there need be any difficulty over one word or two, if such minor changes would help. If, however, there were to be important changes, he thought it would be useful to discuss them soon to learn how matters stood so that early consideration could be given in the various capitals.
On Norway, Mr. Bonnet said that he did not think it was surprising that the Norwegian Foreign Minister wanted the two alternatives for Scandinavia to be compared. In the previous discussions he, Mr. Bonnet, had expressed his preference for approaching the three Scandinavian [Page 77] countries together—not just Norway and Denmark—and discussing frankly with them the whole problem from the point of view of their own interest and that of the Atlantic powers. It was extremely interesting that in the opinion of Mr. Lange a mutual defense pact might be concluded among the three Scandinavian countries and which would not preclude them from making partial arrangements for overseas territories such as Greenland. There were, Mr. Bonnet thought, certain military aspects on which it was essential to consult governments. For the time being, the French Government was in favor of inviting Norway, Denmark, and Sweden into the Pact; even if Sweden and Denmark did not join, the French Government would still favor the participation of Norway.
Before concluding, Mr. Bonnet drew attention to one or two outstanding points for discussion, including the Preamble, Article 8, and Algeria. The French Government had strong views about Article 8 to which they had already drawn the attention of the U.S. Government.
Sir Oliver Franks said that what Mr. Acheson had expressed about the necessity of consulting Congress must be regarded as a question of fact which obviously entered into the general consideration of timing. There was, however, another side to the time question. Enough had been published to create a mood of expectancy and if, after the recent propaganda activities of the Russians, too long an interval were to elapse without any final result, that in itself would be taken as a sign that there was trouble and would constitute something of a gain for the East. Subject to the conditions which Mr. Acheson had explained, everyone was anxious to make progress with the Treaty for other and more general reasons.
In a sense, the substance of the Treaty was what mattered and the words were of secondary importance. But there was another angle to this. It was not just a matter, Sir Oliver thought, of what would in fact happen if one of the Parties to the treaty was attacked. There was also the question of the effect which the Articles of the Treaty would produce themselves. The European representatives in the talks were aware that what the United States and Canada were proposing to undertake was more a change in general foreign policy for them than similar action for the European governments. Greater care might therefore have to be taken in North America in accommodating what was done to what public opinion was prepared to take. But there was also the question of public opinion in the other countries participating in the talks, as well as the question of public opinion elsewhere, for instance, in Russia itself.
These discussions were not, Sir Oliver thought, a complement to, [Page 78] but at once the foundation and crown of what the United States had been able to do on the economic front in Western Europe. If this North Atlantic Pact came into being, there would be established a set of arrangements between the countries of North America and the West of Europe which might ensure peace for a lifetime. One of the conditions of this was that the words of the Pact, while sober in tone, should make it plain beyond misunderstanding what would happen in the event of trouble occurring.
As to the words “forthwith such military or other action” in Article 5, Sir Oliver said he could see that objection might conceivably be taken to them by some. He felt that there should be mention of military action. From the point of view of people on the other side of the Atlantic, it was precisely the sober mention of that kind of possibility which would contribute toward making political, moral, and economic recovery go all the way and make the European countries into complete partners, rather than partial dependents. It was therefore necessary to balance what opinion in North America might be prepared to accept with what those on the Eastern shores of the Atlantic would regard as necessary. Wording which erred on the side of understatement might make the Pact look weaker than it really was and thereby detract from its value in maintaining peace.
Referring to Scandinavia, Sir Oliver said that in the last ten years the Scandinavian countries had not been united in the policies they had pursued. It would not be a new thing for them to go different ways. The British Government attached very great importance to the participation of Norway and, if possible, Denmark in the North Atlantic Pact. It would be a new situation requiring careful study if it were really possible for there to be a Scandinavian mutual defense pact which did not preclude the conclusion of special agreements with the Atlantic powers for overseas dependent territories.
It was Sir Oliver’s impression that the united efforts of the Scandinavian countries would probably not alone suffice to build up a completely strong military defense unit. It would obviously be a matter of considerable importance whether other countries would be prepared to give a neutral Scandinavia the arms they required.
The British Government had never expected that Sweden would be willing to join the North Atlantic Pact. They had hoped that Norway would do so and considered it possible or even likely that Denmark would also join. They were anxious that Denmark should come in. The fact that the three countries were now worried about the situation had not altered the British view. The Swedes had indicated that if Norway were to join the Atlantic Pact, the Russians might take some step such as moving a division up toward Kirkenes, but [Page 79] Sir Oliver thought it difficult to believe that the Russians would go so far as to move a division into Norway. Moves which menace had to be distinguished from moves which matter and he did not think that Norwegian participation in the Pact would be the occasion for an explosion. Unless, therefore, other considerations were brought forward, he thought that the British view would remain as it had been and would not be altered in the light of the arrangements which had been discussed among the three Scandinavian countries.
Mr. Bohlen, in answer to questions by Mr. Hoyer-Millar on the subject of a possible Scandinavian defense pact, confirmed that according to Mr. Lange a country joining such a pact would not be prevented thereby from making separate arrangements for its overseas territories. Such separate arrangements could not, however, be made in respect to metropolitan territories. Likewise, if an attack took place on the overseas territories of a Scandinavian country, this would not bring the Scandinavian Pact into operation. Thus Norway would have to stay neutral unless directly attacked; this would prevent the members of the Atlantic Pact from making use of Norwegian shipping or facilities.
Mr. Hoyer-Millar also asked whether the Norwegian Foreign Minister had said anything about how the proposed Scandinavian alliance would defend itself. He doubted whether the Scandinavian countries could rearm their armies without outside assistance.
Mr. Hickerson replied that Mr. Lange had admitted that the Swedish arms would not be enough; equipment would also have to come from the West. Norway would be disinclined to join a neutral Scandinavian Pact unless there was some sort of blessing from the West and an assurance that arms would be forthcoming on fairly generous terms.
Mr. Bohlen recognized that the Scandinavian group would require assistance in arms if it were to be effective. He did not think that the Swedes really believed they would be able to stay out of a war. But a neutral pact would provide an element of delay. The Swedes had told the United States that, had Sweden been attacked on the same day as the attack upon Norway in 1940, the result would have been roughly similar, but if the attack had come ten days later, when the Swedes had had time to prepare defenses, they would have been able to put up considerable resistance. It was an important consideration in the Swedish mind to provide for some delay so as to improve their defensive position.
Mr. Hoyer-Millar pointed out that the Value to the Western countries of a Scandinavian pact would depend very largely on the extent to which it could defend itself in the event of an attack. This in turn [Page 80] would depend on the quantity of arms the Scandinavian countries could expect to get from elsewhere. He thought the Norwegians would want to know the answer to that before they could reach a decision.
Mr. Wrong said that he was in general agreement with what had already been said. On the timetable, while recognizing the importance of further discussions with the Senate, he referred to a certain impatience on the part of the Canadian Government at the delay in the negotiations. The negotiations had aroused considerable public interest and there was the danger that those opposed would gain adherents. Opposition was already beginning to increase to some degree in Canada.
The Canadian Government was in favor of the present wording of Article 5 and would be sorry to see any change which might give rise to the idea that it had been watered down. In particular, he considered it desirable to retain, if possible, a reference to military action. If the negotiations had been just starting, it might have been possible to avoid such a reference. But such a change of wording after so much had appeared in the press about the present wording would cause difficulties and might be of considerable advantage to Soviet propaganda.
The Canadian Government, Mr. Wrong explained, would be happy to see a Scandinavian defensive arrangement on the lines proposed by the Swedes, provided there could be some organic connection with the Parties to the Atlantic Pact without this involving any of the Scandinavian countries in full participation in the Pact. He understood, however, that this would not commend itself to the Swedes. While the Swedes said privately that they recognized that if a major war broke out on the continent of Europe their country would probably be involved in a matter of six weeks, they were not prepared to make any advance commitment of cooperation. The Swedes, so he understood, did not necessarily attach as much importance as did the Norwegians and Danes to outside arms; they considered that their own requirements would be modest. He thought that there would be reluctance to see scarce military equipment going to reinforce some sort of armed neutrality in Scandinavia, rather than going to those who are prepared to incur the responsibilities of full participation in the North Atlantic Pact. On these grounds he believed that the Canadian Government would welcome full Norwegian participation in the North Atlantic Pact, if they were prepared to join, and also Danish participation in good time.
Mr. Le Gallais expressed the view that Article 5 should be considered also in the light of what influence its wording might have on Soviet foreign policy. He said he was in favor of retaining the original text, particularly those five most important words “forthwith such [Page 81] military or other”, as this wording would have a definite meaning when under scrutiny by Soviet officials. He thought this argument might well impress Congress, as obviously no one wished the Soviet Union to try any experiments.
Baron Silvercruys drew attention to the many months which had elapsed since the start of the talks on the implementation of the Vandenberg Resolution. The subject had also been thoroughly discussed in detail in working groups and subcommittees. He did not therefore think it could be said that there had been precipitation or an absence of thoroughness in dealing with the problem. He realized, however, that, owing to the stringent secrecy which had surrounded the talks, there were many who still required to learn and study some of the details. It was reasonable that they should be given all the time required and should not have the impression of being rushed. But the points at issue were not great and the delay should not have to be too long.
At the outset of the negotiations misgivings had been expressed about the wisdom of extending the North Atlantic Pact to the Scandinavian countries. He had then asked whether it might not be better to limit the Pact to the Brussels Treaty signatories, the United States, Canada, and one or two other countries. But some of the representatives of the Brussels signatories and those of Canada and the United States had felt strongly that there were security gaps which would have to be filled if the Pact were to be fully effective. In these circumstances, the Belgian Government for its part had not felt justified in arguing its misgivings further.
While it was up to Norway and Denmark to make up their own minds, it would be wrong if the seven governments now in negotiations were to be deflected by the antics of the Kremlin. They must not deviate until they reached their goal, whether with or without Norway and Denmark. The seven countries represented at the talks had good will and strength in sufficient measure to make an efficient defense pact.
This brought him to Article 5. The North Atlantic Pact was definitely a defense pact. It should not only be interpreted in that sense but so worded that everybody could readily recognize it as a defense pact. Only in that way would people come to realize that it was not directed in a spirit of aggression against anyone. He believed that the Pact should involve an obligation on each member to come to the rescue of another and to take effective measures of assistance. The Pact should serve both as a deterrent against aggression and as a means of bringing about collective action to restore order should an attack occur.
Mr. Acheson explained that regulating progress depended more [Page 82] upon the Senators than upon himself. He acknowledged the importance; to which Mr. Van Kleffens had drawn attention, of bearing in mind the possible propaganda use which the Soviets might make of a decision now not to invite Norway into the Pact. As regards the pros and cons of the two alternatives, he pointed out that, if Norway and Denmark were included hi the Pact, this would enable facilities to be obtained in Greenland, On the other hand, it might be better for Norway and Denmark themselves to remain non-belligerent in the event of an attack upon some other country; this would not be possible if they were in the Pact. If the Scandinavians had a defense arrangement of their own, this would mean that if one of them was attacked the others would be involved in war. The Soviet Government, to do anything effective in a military way, would wish to obtain a passage across Sweden. It was conceivable that they might confine their military operations around the north of Sweden, but that was unlikely. If, therefore, the Russians wanted a passage across Sweden, then Sweden would be involved in war, which was further than she went during the last German war. The Scandinavian arrangement might have certain advantages over the alternative of having Norway and Denmark in the North Atlantic Pact.
There were many questions which would have to be answered, Mr. Acheson thought. Would military positions of any sort in Norway be required by the members of the Atlantic Pact? If there was a Scandinavian Pact, and Scandinavia was attacked, he supposed that they would be willing to receive all possible help. It might well be that the supply of arms could be the means to having staff discussions since it could be argued that there was no use supplying arms unless there was some information on the use to which they would be put. If, on the other hand, Scandinavia was not attacked, was it desirable to take up positions along the coast of Norway, which would almost certainly provoke an attack? If such an attack occurred, could these positions beheld?
Looking at it from all points of view, it might be that a certain kind of Scandinavian agreement involving arrangements between some Scandinavian countries and the Atlantic Pact countries, and staff conversations and the supply of arms, would add up to something more valuable than the alternative of having Norway alone in the North Atlantic Pact.
Mr. Van Kleffens, after referring to his previous remarks about prearranged military planning, expressed the opinion that it might perhaps be advantageous not a priori to exclude the possibility that Scandinavia would not be involved in a future conflict. He thought [Page 83] it advisable to have military opinion on this and other matters which, in part at least, lay outside the political sphere.
Mr. Bonnet drew attention to the fact that the Norwegian Government had recently given an assurance to the Russians that no foreign bases would be organized in peacetime on Norwegian territory. Another important consideration was that there was no doubt about the willingness of Norway to join the North Atlantic Pact. In consequence, he did not think that joint pressure should be put upon Norway to join if after considering the whole matter they decided in favor of staying out. If, in fact, Norway was reluctant to join, Mr. Bonnet continued, there might be advantage in seeing the conclusion of a Scandinavian Pact which would create a neutral area in which there would be no friction between East and West.
Baron Silvercruys expressed the view that the decision whether or not Norway and Denmark would join the Pact would ultimately be for the governments of those two countries to decide for themselves.
Mr. Acheson said that, from his talks with Mr. Lange, he had received the impression that neither he nor the Norwegian Government had yet made a decision.
Mr. Bohlen said that he thought it was clear from Mr. Lange’s attitude that Norway would not be disposed to join a neutral Scandinavian Pact unless this had the blessing of the North Atlantic Powers. Although, therefore, the decision would ultimately rest with the Norwegians, they would find it easier to reach conclusions after knowing the viewpoint of the Atlantic Powers.
Mr. Van Kleffens pointed out that the question whether to participate or not was, of course, for the Norwegians and Danes themselves to decide. He thought, however, that some more spadework should be done in order to determine more specifically the position on this problem of the countries represented in the talks and to work out in more detail the arguments which could help the Norwegians and the Danes to make up their minds.
Baron Silvercruys recalled that some countries acting within the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter had taken the initiative in an attempt to build up a defense organization to safeguard peace and repel attack. The work had been carried on in an inclusive, not an exclusive, spirit, and the Scandinavian countries would be welcomed into the organization either now or later. While the Scandinavian Governments were making up their minds what to do, it was necessary, however, for the North Atlantic Powers to keep moving forward toward their goal.
The Scandinavian countries could, if they chose, conclude a regional arrangement of their own under Article 52. But that was a quite [Page 84] different solution from joining the proposed North Atlantic Pact. He could not imagine anything more likely to bring the matter to a head and help the Scandinavians to reach a decision than to impress upon them the fact that the present negotiations were moving rapidly forward to a successful conclusion.
Mr. Wrong said that the informal approach which had been made to the Norwegian and Danish Governments should have left them in no doubt that they would be welcome if they wished to join the Pact. He thought a possible solution would be that Norway should join now, Denmark later on, and Sweden come in eventually, perhaps after a year or two. Alternatively, if all the Scandinavian countries stayed out, an attempt should be made to see that there was no language in the Scandinavian Treaty which prevented a later tie between the Scandinavian and the North Atlantic countries.
Mr. Hickerson said that what the Scandinavians had been considering was the possibility of a ten-year treaty providing that an attack on one would be an attack on all with the tacit understanding that during the period of the treaty none of the members would join the North Atlantic Pact. The Norwegians had been very insistent on obtaining an understanding that such a treaty would not preclude staff talks with the Western countries.
Mr. Acheson asked what would be the total effect, including that of propaganda, of having at one and the same time a North Atlantic Pact which would include Iceland, a Scandinavian defense arrangement, and a treaty between Denmark and the Atlantic group as regards overseas Danish territories.
Mr. Van Kleffens was afraid that such a solution would, rightly, or wrongly, be construed by Soviet propaganda as a great success for Soviet policy.
Mr. Bonnet wondered whether on these conditions the Danes would be prepared to make an agreement regarding Greenland as well as joining a Scandinavian pact.
Mr. Hickerson admitted that the State Department had no information about this.
Sir Oliver Franks asked what the chances would be of Iceland joining the Atlantic Pact if the Scandinavian countries were all outside it.
Mr. Hickerson said that the Foreign Minister of Iceland had told the United States Minister in Reykjavik that it might be difficult for Iceland to join in those circumstances. He added that the Communist Party was stronger in Iceland than in Scandinavia.
Mr. Acheson gave an account of some other points which had been made by the Senators. They had suggested that the second paragraph [Page 85] of Article 6 should be tacked on to the end of Article 5. This paragraph stated that action taken under the Treaty would be immediately reported to the Security Council. He did not think there should be any objection to this proposal of the Senators.
He said, with reference to a remark by Mr. Bonnet, that there was no intention to make the language of the Atlantic Pact weaker than that of the Rio Treaty. But it was a question of finding the right wording for Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact. The phrase “military or other action” was an unnecessary embellishment; the words merely meant “action”, i.e., of military, diplomatic, economic, and any other kind of action in concert with the other Parties as may be necessary to restore security. That was what would actually happen.
The question of who would decide what would be done was also a problem in the minds of the Senators. They were worried by the words in Article 5 “action, individually and in concert with the other Parties”. Some of them were probably afraid that it would be the “concert” which would decide what action was necessary. There would be a great deal of discussion about the wording of Article 5, both in the United States and in all the other participating countries. By the time the Treaty had been debated there ought to be no question in anyone’s mind as to what was intended.
Referring to Article 1, Mr. Acheson said that the Senators had proposed omitting the words “article 2 of”.
On Article 4, the Senators had asked about the purpose of the words “or security”. They considered that, if consultation was provided for in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the Parties, that practically covered the whole field.
The Senators also had taken the view on Article 10 that the Treaty should only come into effect after the seven powers now negotiating it had deposited their ratifications. Mr. Acheson considered this wise.
Mr. Wrong said that he had just received instructions from the Canadian Government urging the strengthening of Article 2. For political reasons, the Canadian Government was anxious to emphasize the fact that the Treaty was not merely a military alliance. Article 2 was the only non-military article in the Treaty and, as at present drafted, it was weak. The Canadian Government therefore suggested an additional sentence for insertion after the first sentence of the article on the following lines:
“The Parties agree to make every effort in common to eliminate conflict in their economic policies and develop to the full the possibilities of trade between them. The Parties also undertake to make every effort in common to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their people and greater economic and social justice, and to [Page 86] bring about a better understanding on the principles which form the basis of their common civilization.”
Mr. Acheson said that the Senators were worried about Article 2 as at present worded. It detracted from the main purpose of the Treaty and got involved in social and economic questions which might raise internal political problems. What, for instance, was the meaning in the Article of the words “the general welfare”? Did this refer to the whole world?
Mr. Wrong said that he did not want to go into details at this time, but wanted to point out that it would cause great political difficulty in Canada if there were no article in the Treaty of a non-military nature. There was need for something which reflected the ideological unity of the North Atlantic powers.
Mr. Acheson suggested that this might be done in the Preamble.
Mr. Wrong said that it had always been understood that there would be some wording in this sense in the Preamble, as well as in Article 2. The Canadians had originally suggested much stronger language for Article 2. They wanted now to find words which would be more explicit. The Government would be able to win more support for the Pact in Canada if it was not purely military in character. This point would carry considerable weight with several political groups. He hoped that the political necessities in Canada would be borne in mind in any further discussions between Mr. Acheson and the Senators.
Mr. Bonnet, referring to Article 4, said that he did not think the words “or security” were useless. A country’s security could be affected by ways other than a threat to its territorial integrity or political independence.
On Article 5, he said that any attempt to weaken the phrase “military or other action” would raise very strong objections. The present wording had only been agreed to after protracted discussions and every effort should be made to avoid having to change them.
He also referred to the outstanding question of area, particularly regarding Algeria.
Mr. Acheson said that he would much prefer to avoid a reference in the Treaty to Algeria. The United States Government did not see how there could be an attack on Algeria without there being also an attack on European France, unless it was a local scrimmage which would not be within the scope of the Treaty. The U.S. would much prefer merely referring to an attack “in Europe or North America” rather than having a definition of area in the Treaty.
Mr. Bonnet said that insertion of these words constituted a definition of area and that to use them alone would amount to leaving [Page 87] out a part of French national territory. If there was no mention of area in the Treaty then, of course, the question of Algeria would not have been raised, but unfortunately an area had to be defined. There was, he added, a political aspect to this from the French point of view, and the omission of Algeria would be as difficult to justify in France as the exclusion of some of the northern territories in Canada and the United States. Moreover, the French Government thought that the Pact, for strategic considerations, must not be exclusively oriented toward the north of Europe.
Mr. Wrong said that he appreciated the arguments on political grounds but the arguments on strategic grounds were not sound.
Baron Silvercruys said that political considerations had to be taken into account. They had been taken into account by other governments in respect of other questions in the Treaty.
Mr. Acheson said that the United States attitude was pretty strong and that the question would have to be postponed.
Mr. Bonnet reiterated that there could be no question of a Pact covering the whole Arctic area and not the French Department of Algeria. Referring to Article 8, he then said that the French Government wished to see the Article so worded as to provide that the Defense Committee would not only “recommend measures”, as stated in the present wording, but also “prepare plans” for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
He said he presumed that whatever decision was reached about Norway, it would have no bearing on the question of inviting Italy to join.
Sir Oliver Franks said he understood that Italy was an unresolved question.
Mr. Acheson agreed that no conclusions had been reached about Italy.
Mr. Van Kleffens said that he understood that Norway might be less inclined to join the Pact if Italy were in than if she were out.
Sir Oliver Franks confirmed that he had information in the same sense.
Mr. Bonnet raised a protest against such pretensions on the part of Norway.
Sir Oliver Franks suggested that the Military Committee of the Brussels Treaty might be asked to give their comments urgently on the military questions governing Norway and the North Atlantic Pact as they had been raised at the meeting.
There was general agreement with this suggestion.
Mr. Acheson recalled that the question of Norway’s attitude and the arguments discussed at the meeting were of the utmost secrecy. [Page 88] He understood that in the Washington talks on the Atlantic Pact strict security had been adhered to hitherto and he asked that these be continued.