840.20/2–849
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)
| Participants: | Halvard M. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway |
| Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway | |
| Mr. Torp, Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party in Parliament | |
| Mr. Dag Bryn, Norwegian Defense Under Secretary | |
| Mr. Arne Gunneng, Norwegian Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Sivert Nielsen, Second Secretary, Norwegian Embassy | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director for European Affairs | |
| Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, Chief, WE | |
| Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE | |
| Mr. Walter S. Surrey, L/E |
The Foreign Minister reviewed some of the statements he had made yesterday to Mr. Hickerson. He then discussed briefly the Scandinavian Alliance Plan of which three drafts were made. The Swedes think recent events prove the Soviets do not have as strong objections to a Scandinavian Pact as to an Atlantic Pact. They would not put on paper any evidence of connection with the West for fear of Soviet reaction. The three countries are ready to give automatic commitments to each other (since in each the King in Council declares war) to use all means available to go to the assistance of any of the parties attacked on its home soil. Attacks on outlying areas like Spitzbergen, the Faroes and Greenland would not involve mutual defense. However, there is no restriction on making other arrangements to protect Such outlying territories. Hence, if such an outlying area were attacked, Sweden would not be obligated to defend it. Nor would it be obligated to assist in case Danish or Norwegian forces in Germany were attacked. Only an attack on the home soil, irrespective of its cause, would make defense obligatory. If any is attacked, help from outside of Scandinavia would at once be requested. The agreements do not provide for consultation except in case of a threat of aggression against Scandinavia or elsewhere affecting the security of the three countries. Probably any war on the continent would be deemed to affect the security of Scandinavia. Sweden would accept a clause under which any of the parties during the life of the treaty (e.g., 10 years) could give notice of intention to enter into defense talks with an outside power, but in that case the others could withdraw. The Swedes would not agree to a contractual tie of any kind with any regional [Page 70] group. The Norwegian position was that if the reality of the tie were there, that would suffice without any legal tie. Swedish military experts have no illusions that they can stay out if a war starts, but their politicians believe they could stay out a week or two which would be very valuable for mobilization.
I thanked the Foreign Minister for this which is the first definite information we have had on the subject. I emphasized that we expect adherence to the Atlantic Pact to be purely voluntary. We do not want to persuade any country which feels doubtful. The Scandinavian countries form an important part of the democratic world and have the same general political objectives as we do. However, from the viewpoint of United States security, the purely military aspect of adherence by one or more of them is not a major overriding consideration for us.
Mr. Lange said he told Secretary Marshall in Paris1 that the Scandinavian countries would be more of a burden than an asset and that Mr. Marshall disagreed, saying that Southwest Norway was a very vital area as a base to be denied to Russia and for control of the Baltic. The Swedes said, and would not want to be quoted, that if a Scandinavian pact were signed, the West would have to come to the defense of the Norwegian coast. The Norwegians replied that this would not be good enough unless the US agreed in advance to it.
I said that we had two thoughts underlying the proposed Pact: (1) An aggressor should not be left in doubt about what he would run into if he started something, and (2) we wanted European countries to have a sense of security which would be vital in regaining normal economic and political existence. We believed each country would have to decide for itself what is in its best interest. One of the factors which had to be weighed but on which views could only be speculative was the question of probable Soviet reaction. We think the Soviets will have a strong antagonism to any grouping—to a Scandinavian defense pact as well as a North Atlantic treaty. They would look on a Scandinavian pact as essentially hostile and would not believe it had no legal connection with the West.
Mr. Lange agreed that the decision was one for Norway to make alone using its best judgment. Also, he agreed on the basic priority of the Economic Recovery Program. He fears the Soviets might react to the Pact by moving its military bases nearer to the Norwegian bolder which would oblige Norway to mobilize and that would destroy its economic recovery. He feels that the maximum security can [Page 71] only be obtained if the Soviets know that an attack on Norway would involve the Western Powers, In his opinion the Soviets do not seek or deliberately plan a war now. They want to push their positions as far as possible without starting war. Last March Mr. Bevin favored the Scandinavian Union accompanied by a public unilateral US-British guarantee.2 At that time the Swedes feared this but are now inclined to it provided there is no mutual agreement. Norway feels it necessary to draw a line beyond which the Soviets cannot advance without getting into trouble with all the Western countries. The Swedes say they will not join the Atlantic Pact now or at any future date. Norway considers the Scandinavian countries more stable and reliable than, say France or Italy. The communists have been kept down, but a split in Scandinavian unity would strengthen the communists. I said I agreed that the effect on the internal political and economic situation in Norway was of very great importance and must be carefully considered. Furthermore, what people think the Soviets will do is an important political factor.
Mr. Lange agreed that the Soviet constituted a political menace more than a military one. He hoped Norway would not have to make its decision before February 20 as a very important Labor Party meeting would start on February 17 at which this question would be debated and very valuable groundwork would be done.
I said we were anxious to avoid using the question of military supplies as a pressure weapon Membership in the Pact will be one factor but not the only one in allotting military supplies. It does not follow that countries not in the Pact would be excluded. Obviously, common sense would require that available supplies be allotted to countries cooperating with us for mutual aid. (Mr. Lange commented that it is very important that we be clear on this point.) I said arms would go to places where it was considered most advantageous for our security and that of the world, and that we do not as yet have commitments for sending arms to any of the Pact countries. When Mr. Lange asked if Mr. Bryn could get an idea of availabilities in relation to Norwegian needs, I said a meeting with Mr. Gross is being arranged. I pointed out that the matter is not before the Congress as yet, programs are not yet made up, and we are not advanced far enough on this line to be definite. I repeated that we are not going to rush into this Pact, that there is no deadline, and no take-it-or-leave-it offer. Our object is to preserve peace but if this fails we do not want to have to wait before knowing what will be done about it.
Mr. Lange said the Danes ask what the Pact offers in the way of [Page 72] protection apart from its preventive effects. They say the Pact provides for consultation and other action according to constitutional processes and meanwhile Denmark will have been overrun. We then had a brief discussion of the meaning of constitutional powers in the US.
Mr. Lange said that if the US and Britain believed the Scandinavian Pact is the best solution for the three countries, their three drafts would be reduced to one in a couple of days. Norway must be sure of US and British approval of the Pact as being in the best interest of all the democratic nations.
Mr. Hickerson reverted to the question of the schedule and said we had never had a deadline although we had set up various tentative target dates. There would certainly be time for Norway to take part in the discussions after February 20 and in any case there is a provision to adhere after the Pact is signed.
I pointed out that the Soviets are quick to exploit any weakness and to use any initial success as a new point of departure from which to launch further actions based on the initial advantage as a starting point. They would not be slow to follow up any weakness displayed by Norway to pursue their advantage with further demands. It would be in Norway’s interest that any decision reached implies no restriction on Norway’s freedom of action.
Mr. Lange referred to Secretary Marshall’s statement to him in Paris that the period between signature and the arrival of arms—possibly a year—would be critical and might be a temptation to Russia. This was important to Norway because of its exposed position. He asked about security during the intermediate period. He thought the Soviet war of nerves might be stepped up and asked if there were any solution.
I commented that the Soviets feel that the tide has turned against them with the progress made in economic recovery and that they would be on the alert to exploit any point where a weakness is shown. Mr. Lange agreed that Norway would have to be firm and for this reason it had insisted on staff talks with the West as essential to its security. The effects of a Soviet war of nerves might become very real in Norway. The communists are now arranging meetings to defeat the Atlantic Pact and he cited the close connection between the Norwegian communists and the Soviets, giving as an example use in the Soviet note of the exact words spoken by a communist member of Parliament two days earlier. He thought there might be growing public opinion favoring that Norway sign both the Atlantic Pact and a nonaggression pact with Russia and asked what the American reaction would be. I commented this looked like a too obvious tactical move which would [Page 73] defeat itself and that Americans would probably consider it as a sign of Norwegian weakness and as a Soviet victory.
- See Secretary of State Marshall’s summary of his conversation with Lange on September 29, 1948, in telegram No. 5130 from Paris, September 30, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 256.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1948. vol. iii, pp. 46 ff.↩