Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/2–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] February 7, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Lange, Norwegian Foreign Minister
	Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway
	Mr. Torp, Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party in Parliament
	Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State
	Mr. Bohlen
	Mr. Hickerson

Mr. Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, accompanied by Ambassador Morgenstierne and Mr. Torp, Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party in Parliament, came in to see me by appointment made at the Foreign Minister’s request this afternoon.

I welcomed Mr. Lange and his party to Washington, expressed sympathy for Norway’s present situation and told him of the admiration which Norway’s quiet, courageous stand had evoked in the United States. I told him that we would be very glad to listen to what he had to say and to discuss with him any questions about the North Atlantic Pact which he might wish to raise. I stated that I hoped that he will be agreeable to regarding this first talk as an introductory one to be followed up with detailed talks with Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Hickerson after which the Foreign Minister and I could discuss this whole question again.

Mr. Lange indicated that this procedure was quite satisfactory to him. He referred to the Scandinavian talks which had broken down over divergence of views between Norway and Sweden. He said that Norway had insisted on approaching the problem of Scandinavian security as just a part of the common security problem of all the western democracies, and a problem to be solved on the basis of the fundamental solidarity of the western democratic world.

Sweden, on the other hand, insisted on limiting the discussions to the possibility of finding a solution on the basis of a Scandinavian pact, free from any alliances or entanglements outside of Scandinavia. He said that Norway was not willing to go along with Sweden and Denmark in presenting to the western democracies a joint Scandinavian security plan along the lines of what might be called Swedish neutrality. He said that it seemed clear to Norway that a neutral Scandinavian bloc would not be strong enough to afford its members any reasonable degree of security and that to achieve that end such a bloc would require help from the western democracies in peacetime and in war, the kind of help, he added, that he understood the Atlantic Pact intended to provide to its member states. In refusing to make such a joint approach, Mr. Lange said, he was anxious to avoid putting the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in the position that by refusing support to such a Scandinavian bloc they would be causing a split in Scandinavia. A negative answer by the western powers to a common Scandinavian request might, in the Norwegian view, give the outside world and especially Soviet Russia a false impression that a serious weakness of the general democratic front had occurred. Mr. Lange continued that the Norwegian Government had consequently made all necessary preparations to put before the Norwegian Cabinet and subsequently before the Norwegian Parliament the question as to whether or not Norway alone should indicate its willingness to accept an invitation to join the preparatory talks on the Atlantic Pact. Nonetheless, the Norwegian Government is acutely aware of the fact that the problem of finding a solution of Scandinavia’s security needs is a very difficult and delicate one. The Norwegian Government sees important advantages in a joint Scandinavian solution provided it could be arrived at with full understanding and support of the western governments, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and provided the Scandinavian bloc could obtain the necessary war materials for its armaments on lenient terms.

Mr. Lange said that Norway would regret very much to see a break in Scandinavian solidarity although he intimated that his country was prepared to take this step if necessary. He said that such a break would undoubtedly increase to some extent Communist influence in Norway although he did not think this would in itself be due so much to increase in the number of Communists as in causing disagreements among the non-Communist left over this issue.

The foregoing were the reasons, therefore, why the Norwegian Government had wished to raise the whole Scandinavian security problem with the United States and, at a later stage, with the United Kingdom Governments. He concluded by asserting that Norway has a strong desire to confer and consult on this situation as a whole on the basis of the fundamental solidarity of the western democracies with a view to finding a solution which would at one and the same time satisfy the common security needs of the democracies and meet the special conditions in Scandinavia.

I informed Mr. Lange that I understood the difficulties of this whole situation and that we would consider what he had said and what he would subsequently say to Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Hickerson with the greatest sympathy and care. I added that I would look forward to seeing him again later in the week.