Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/2–749: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, February 7, 1949—4 p. m.

304. As seen from Moscow, Soviet representations¹ Oslo against Atlantic Pact adherence present problems not only Norwegians but US. If Kremlin achieves objective frightening Norwegian Government into refusal join, impression will be left and fully exploited Soviet propaganda Foreign Minister Lange forced to conclude after investigation Atlantic Pact actually hostile and potentially aggressive toward Soviet Union, as Moscow charges. Conclusion may also be drawn by third countries pact implementation insufficiently planned, regarded as ineffective protection.

While tough tone Soviet démarches carries implication bad consequences to Norway, we believe after careful consideration that Soviet bark this instance stronger than bite, Kremlin has high hopes present menacing tone will suffice for its purpose and that no disastrous consequences will follow Norwegian decision join Atlantic Pact.

We are convinced Kremlin does not want serious risks hostilities at present juncture and this limits its field possible retaliatory action to propaganda and hostile economic and political maneuvers. Example Iran, to which even tougher notes addressed,² instructive display Moscow ability quietly backdown when bluff called.

Consequently we think US Government need not hesitate continue seek Norway adherence pact and latter need not fear having courage its convictions. On surface, except for unilateral Soviet interpretation, there would be no conflict between Norway’s adherence Atlantic Pact and non-aggression treaty and we believe Norway well-advised offer do both at same time. While Moscow would reject offer, on basis its own interpretation, Norway’s position would be honest and clear, and wind would be taken out of Soviet propaganda sails. Soviet Government would then be in actual position turning down a “peace pact” of its own proposing (as its distorted propaganda re Stalin questions and answers is now attempting portray US as doing).³

As to (Swedish-inspired) suggestion Norway adherence would cause Soviet Union bear down on Finland, demand bases, we think this unlikely. This may have been real possibility if all three Scandinavian countries joined Atlantic Pact, but with Sweden out we doubt Kremlin would risk scaring Sweden (and Denmark) into following Norway’s example by confirming suspicions latest Soviet aggressiveness.

Sent Department 304, repeated Helsinki 7, Stockholm 13, Oslo 13, Copenhagen 6.

Kohler

1. Soviet statements of January 29 and February 5. See editorial note, p. 53, and enclosure to despatch No. 51, February 10, p. 91.
2. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in the Iranian section of volume vi.
3. Documentation on the exchange of questions and answers between Kingsbury Smith, the European Director of the International News Service, and Generalissimo Stalin is scheduled for publication in volume v.