501.BB/10–2149: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
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Delga 127. Jessup and Ross discussed with McNeil and Clutton last night all aspects current status Itcols, reviewing common US–UK interests in these territories and most practical means achieving common objectives in light of political realities in Assembly. Jessup emphasized the following points with which McNeil in light of discussion appeared to agree fully:
- 1.
- Under subcommittee draft on Libya there would be no difficulty in achievement UK objective treaty protecting special interests in Cyrenaica because form of Libyan unity would be either unified Libyan state under Senussi or very loose confederation.
- 2.
-
Regardless of US and UK pledges to Ethiopia solution along lines our original proposal, that is annexation eastern provinces to Ethiopia with western province going to Sudan, does not have slightest chance getting necessary majority in Assembly. There is, furthermore, serious risk that independence for Eritrea would get majority vote at least in subcommittee, thus tending to block off any other solution. Solution along lines latest US suggestions that is personal union of [Page 603] Eritrea with Ethiopia under Crown of Emperor with control over defense and foreign affairs vested in Emperor but with autonomy for Eritrea in local affairs, probably only solution short of postponement that could command necessary two-thirds vote and at same time be wholly acceptable to Ethiopians in discharge of our obligations to them.
Although Clutton argued strongly for postponement on grounds autonomy for Eritrea with personal union under Emperor is not “workable,” McNeil agreed that postponement would involve delay in British being able to withdraw from Eritrea of at least 18 months. Such delay, McNeil felt, would be intolerable to his government and he agreed, therefore, that solution along lines our personal union suggestions would be preferable to postponement on condition that procedure could be worked out whereby authority would be turned over to Ethiopia by UK as present administering authority in not more than six months. On this condition McNeil felt it might be possible for UKDel here not to oppose our compromise suggestions. He was not willing, however, to commit himself to positive support of our suggestions at this stage.
- 3.
- It was agreed that the possibility of two-thirds majority in Assembly for Italian trusteeship for Somaliland hung on thinnest of margins and that failure to get definitive solution of Eritrea in principle at least at this session might be factor causing loss of Somaliland proposal. In this event it was agreed there was serious risk defection enough LA votes to lose Libyan solution as well. Thus, there would be another failure on all fronts which would either leave British holding bag in all three territories indefinitely or force them to unilateral withdrawal as in case of Palestine which would be most damaging to British prestige.
- 4.
- We tentatively agreed on following tactics concerning Eritrea
in Subcommittee:
- (a)
- Vote on independence would probably have to come first because of pressures in Subcommittee in this direction.
- (b)
- We would next have vote on original US proposal for annexation eastern provinces to Ethiopia.
- (c)
- We would vote on compromise solution along lines latest US suggestion.
- (d)
- Finally, we would vote on postponement with commission of investigation.
As indicated, conversation was most friendly throughout. We feel we are on excellent working basis with UKDel here and hope Douglas may be able to persuade Bevin that this is the case.
Please relay Embassy London as USUN 50.