Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

865.014/10–2049

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Moose)

secret

[Washington,] October 20, 1949.

Participants:	Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson
	British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
	Under Secretary, Mr. James E. Webb
	NEA—Assistant Secretary, Mr. George C. McGhee
	ANE—Mr. James S. Moose, Jr.

The Secretary opened the conversation by observing that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, appears to be disturbed over recent developments in the General Assembly regarding the disposition of Libya and Eritrea, and inquired of the British Ambassador what Mr. Bevin wants.¹ The British Ambassador briefly described the position with regard to Eritrea agreed upon by the United States and the UK prior to the opening of the General Assembly, adding that the British really were not prompted by a desire to increase the size of the Sudan in proposing to annex thereto the western province of Eritrea.

Recently it appeared Mr. Jessup had mentioned to Mr. McNeil in New York a plan to establish an autonomous Eritrea united with Ethiopia through the person of the Emperor. Mr. McNeil apparently did not consider this mention as being serious enough or important enough to report to London, and London’s first knowledge of Mr. Jessup’s suggested solution came with its introduction into the deliberations of the Committee. The scheme, said the Ambassador, is distasteful to the British Government, and Mr. Bevin personally was disturbed by what appeared to him to be unilateral action by the United States in an area of policy subject to an understanding with the UK. Mr. Bevin was, therefore, worried both by the substance of the suggestion and by the method in which it was made.

The Secretary of State remarked that the result of the suggestion was unfortunate but that it had been done and the problem was now what further steps should be taken. He inquired what the British Ambassador would suggest. The Ambassador stated that, failing to achieve the solution previously agreed upon, that is, cession of the western province of Eritrea to the Sudan and cession of the remainder to Ethiopia, Mr. Bevin would prefer postponement of the solution for one year. Meanwhile, a United Nations Commission which would give a predetermined answer would carry out an investigation and report back to the General Assembly. The predetermined answer would consist of the cession of the eastern part of Eritrea to Ethiopia.

The Secretary of State observed that many small nations are opposed to the outright cession of parts of Eritrea to Ethiopia or to the Sudan. The proposal of the Indian Delegate, Sir [B.] N. Rau, was an example of the impractical suggestions made by the smaller nations. He inquired whether or not the British Ambassador thought it would be useful for Mr. Jessup at this stage to propose a change in the resolution. The British Ambassador replied that an amendment to the resolution was what Mr. Bevin had in mind. Mr. Bevin had indicated that if an amendment along the lines just indicated were not feasible, then he would favor a similar procedure but with a commission not bound to give a predetermined answer, and a commission in which there would preferably be no Slav participation.

Mr. McGhee observed that the problem was in large measure tactical: that of assessing the willingness of the Sub-Committee to alter the resolution and a determination of the method through which such alteration should be achieved. He believed that Mr. Jessup and Mr. McNeil would be in the best position to decide this point. The British Ambassador asserted that the British authorities can scarcely accept the most recent suggestion of Mr. Jessup with regard to Eritrea. Especially objectionable is the provision for a United Nations Commission to operate in the territory while the British are still in administrative control.

Mr. McGhee replied that the U.S. Delegation would be glad to assist the British Government in any proper way to divest itself of the burden of administering Eritrea at the earliest practical moment.

The Secretary remarked that he considered it improper for the U.S. Delegation to suggest, without British consent, a plan for the disposition of Eritrea which would in large measure be carried out by the British Administration.

The Ambassador repeated the British objection to a United Nations Commission in Eritrea during the period of British administration.

The Under Secretary offered to call Mr. Jessup on the telephone and to discuss with him the possibility of exploring with Mr. McNeil plans for reaching a mutually acceptable result. The Secretary approved this suggestion and remarked that after conversation with Mr. Jessup, it might be possible to arrange a solution.

Reverting to Libya, the Secretary remarked that he considered Mr. Bevin to have jumped to an erroneous conclusion in blaming the United States for the objectionable features of the Sub-Committee’s resolution. The Ambassador stated that Mr. Bevin was not annoyed with the U.S. on this score. He added that there was a complete understanding between the U.S. and the UK on UK military requirements in Cyrenaica and the necessity for a treaty to safeguard them. The UK did not wish to assume responsibility for all Libya; neither did it wish to bar the Italians from some form of participation in Tripolitania. However, continued the Ambassador, the Sub-Committee had produced an unacceptable resolution. Mr. Bevin was worried over the establishment of a “single united Libya”. If Sayid Idris became the head of the united Libya, the UK might find itself taking responsibility for the entire area in order to accomplish its aims in Cyrenaica. Further, a united Libyan state might offer more difficulty to Italian cooperation with Tripolitanians. The Foreign Office had thought that the U.S. Delegation in New York had become so involved with tactical considerations that it had tended sometimes to lose sight of the joint US–UK aims. While Mr. Bevin offered no criticism of the US attitude or tactics in this connection, he desired an amendment to the resolution passed by the Sub-Committee.

The Secretary observed that the resolution has already been approved by the Sub-Committee and that the offending words had been borrowed from a draft proposed by Iraq. One method of accomplishing Mr. Bevin’s aim would be to propose that the offending words be stricken out and that the resolution provide for the creation of “one or more independent states”. If this plan were adopted, there is considerable probability that it would be defeated and that the present provisions would be confirmed with a legislative record which would make them stronger than they now are. Perhaps a better plan would be to leave the wording as it now stands and to clear up in debate any necessary points, for example, to establish the right of the Libyan National Assembly under paragraph A–2 to form a federation if it so desires. In this matter, would it not be better to trust the judgment of Messrs. Jessup and McNeil, who are on the spot and who are in touch with the sentiment prevailing in the GA?

Mr. McGhee stated that it was his understanding that members of the British Delegation in New York believe that a federated state is possible without alteration or amendment to the present wording of the resolution.

The Ambassador quoted Mr. Bevin as desiring to have the unity of Libya decided by the people and not by the General Assembly. The Under Secretary remarked that Mr. Bevin’s wishes could be carried out through the procedure just outlined by the Secretary. The Secretary added that he was sure Mr. Jessup would be happy to let Mr. McNeil take the initiative either in amending the resolution to suit Mr. Bevin’s views or in the debate which would interpret the resolution through the legislative record.

The Ambassador said that he would report to London that no differences existed in US and UK policy aims and that such differences as exist are purely tactical. The answer to tactical problems is not to be found either in Washington or in London but must be worked out in New York. He will add that the Secretary will take into account the points raised by the British and that Mr. Jessup and Mr. McNeil will endeavor to evolve a solution.

The Secretary expressed his agreement and added that the Under Secretary would talk to Mr. Jessup on the telephone on the subject of Libya.

The Under Secretary asked the British Ambassador if he could have a written indication of the objections raised by Mr. Bevin, and the Ambassador supplied a written statement as requested.

Since the Ambassador desired to speak to the Secretary on another matter, the Under Secretary, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Moose went to the Under Secretary’s office where the Under Secretary placed a telephone call to Mr. Jessup in New York. They were joined shortly by the British Ambassador.

The Under Secretary suggested that it would be useful if the Ambassador would talk with Mr. Jessup, and the Ambassador agreed to do so.

Mr. McGhee reminded the Under Secretary that Mr. Bevin’s suggestion of postponement, with the appointment of a United Nations Commission to investigate between sessions of the GA, was, in fact, a reversion to the United States second position with regard to the area.

The Under Secretary remarked that he had talked with Mr. Jessup this morning and that Mr. Jessup had reported that he was working closely with Mr. McNeil. Mr. Jessup had stated that he thought the differences between the US and UK positions were less than Mr. Bevin thinks.

The Ambassador expressed the personal opinion that the burden in Eritrea, which is so galling to Mr. Bevin, is political rather than administrative and fiscal. Mr. Bevin has taken a dislike to the suggestion that the British, who are thoroughly experienced in the administration of dependent areas, should be subjected to the supervision or even observation of a United Nations Commission in Eritrea.

Mr. McGhee remarked that the resolution approved by the Sub-Committee provided a commission for Libya also.

The Ambassador distinguished between the commission in Libya, which would be a relatively short-time operation, with the commission for Eritrea, which would operate over a much longer period.

Mr. McGhee pointed out that if the General Assembly arrived at no solution of the disposition of the former Italian Colonies, the burden of administering those areas will remain largely upon the British for an indefinite period, perhaps a period longer than the life span of the proposed commission for Eritrea.

The Ambassador stated that Mr. Bevin objects to the commission for Eritrea, nevertheless, and he pointed out that members of the commission might well turn out to be unfriendly to the administering British authorities. He inquired whether or not the U.S. would like to take over the responsibility from the British of administering the area.

Mr. McGhee replied that the British were more experienced in such matters than Americans are and that they do a better job. The proof of this is in their administration of the United States when it was still a colonial area.

Mr. McGhee made the point that the British authorities had shown some disapproval of US consultation with Rome on the disposition of the former Italian Colonies without consulting the British. He pointed out that the exchange with the Italian Government did not involve substantive policy but referred to the relationship between Italy and certain Latin American states which the United States was inclined to consider in a special category. The Ambassador said that he understood.

The Under Secretary’s telephone call to Mr. Jessup was put through and the Under Secretary stated the British objections. He expressed the opinion that perhaps there had been some confusion of Libya with Eritrea in the discussions in New York. He added that the British and American positions were not far apart and that to reconcile them would require an amendment of the resolution regarding Libya, or the establishment of an appropriate legislative record. He added that the Secretary had suggested that Mr. Jessup and Mr. McNeil confer on the matter, and that they could cooperate in establishing the desired and desirable record in debate. Should it be decided that amendment is required, Mr. McNeil would take the initiative in the matter but would have U.S. support. He observed that perhaps the British Ambassador could authorize this procedure.

Turning to the British Ambassador a moment later, the Under Secretary remarked that Mr. McNeil’s instructions with regard to Eritrea deal principally with abstention. The British Ambassador remarked that London was talking mostly in terms of objectives and that his own wire dealt with amendment. However, Mr. Jessup and Mr. McNeil should consider how the desideratum could be obtained and should endeavor to get consideration of the matter back into the hands of the two delegations in New York and out of the Department and the Foreign Office.

The Ambassador, at the Under Secretary’s suggestion, took the ’phone and, talking to Mr. Jessup, said that he would reiterate to London the identity of US and UK aims and the desire of the United States to concert on measures to achieve them. While his messages from the Foreign Office spoke only of amendments to the resolution, he thought that Mr. McNeil had later instructions.

Referring to Eritrea, the Ambassador stated that Mr. Bevin is worried about the U.S. suggestion of a “federated scheme” for Eritrea and about British tutelage under the supervision of a UN Commission. This worry was caused by political considerations and by the belief that the arrangement is unworkable and will cause difficulty hereafter. The impression of the Foreign Office had been that Mr. Jessup’s suggestion was brought forward probably before the British Delegation had been consulted.

The Ambassador added, with reference to the administration of Eritrea as suggested by Mr. Jessup, that the British “cannot carry a baby with that number of nurses to help”.

After a considerable pause, the Ambassador remarked that he thought a misunderstanding had occurred and that London considered the Eritrean suggestion unworkable. Mr. Bevin would prefer to send a UN Commission to Eritrea to investigate and to wait a year before reaching a decision.

The Under Secretary returned to the telephone and informed Mr. Jessup that the Department desired him to work out the best possible solution with Mr. McNeil in New York. He remarked that when the U.S. puts forward proposals unacceptable to the British and expects the British Administration to carry them out, it inevitably makes a difficult situation. Mr. Jessup, the Under Secretary continued, could talk to Mr. McNeil and decide whether or not it could establish a legislative record with regard to Libya for future use. If Mr. Jessup and Mr. McNeil can agree on a plan of procedure with regard to amendment or legislative record, no further intervention from the Department would be needed. If they should not agree, however, Mr. Jessup might refer the matter back to the Department.

With regard to Eritrea, the Under Secretary stated that the Secretary is sympathetic with British aims. Should further amendment be attempted, the Secretary believed that Mr. McNeil should take the initiative and the U.S. Delegation should support him.

Leaving the telephone, the Under Secretary remarked that Mr. Jessup was worried over the turn taken by events in the Sub-Committee. Should the UK abstain from voting on the resolution with regard to Eritrea, it might result in no agreement on that area. Failure in Eritrea might result in successive failures in both Somaliland and Libya.

The Under Secretary inquired whether or not the Ambassador had any suggestions as to how to remedy this situation. The Ambassador replied that he had no suggestions now. The Under Secretary added that Mr. Jessup thinks postponement of consideration of any area is dangerous as it is likely to inspire proposals for postponement of consideration of other areas as well.

Summing up, the British Ambassador said that he would report to London that the Department is still in general agreement with the Foreign Office on the objectives to be striven for in New York, and that the US and UK Delegations there, would endeavor to work out an arrangement for accomplishing these objectives.

1. In the summary of the Secretary’s daily staff meeting for October 20, 1949, not printed, the following statements are recorded: “Mr. Webb reported that Dr. Jessup called on the Italian colonies problem. Dr. Jessup felt that the U.S. position had not been made clear to Mr. Bevin and that we needed a real advocate to push our position. He thought it might be desirable for the Secretary to send Mr. Bevin a message on this subject. Jessup said that Bevin was mixed up about the problem and that, contrary to Mr. Bevin’s views, the British and the U.S. Delegations in New York were quite familiar with one another’s views and actions on this matter. The Secretary said he was inclined to be sympathetic with Mr. Bevin’s point but that he would like to have the question looked into carefully”. It was then decided to discuss the matter with the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks. (Secretary’s Daily Meetings, Lot 58D609, October 1949)